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—
TO THE
REFORMATION

JOHN S. BANKS



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*THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE
FROM THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES
TO THE REFORMATION*

BY

JOHN S. BANKS

London:

CHARLES H. KELLY

2, CASTLE ST., CITY RD.; AND 26, PATERNOSTER ROW, E.C.

1901

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June 1901.

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PREFACE

THE present work is a continuation of the "Development of Doctrine in the Early Church," tracing the growth of doctrine through the Middle Ages and the Reformation. The works chiefly consulted are, as before, Seeberg's *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* (2 Band) and Loofs' *Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte*. The former work is especially valuable for its large collection of well-chosen and well-arranged quotations from the original writers in the periods described. The student will find fuller details in Neander's *Church History*, Harnack's *History of Dogma*, Fisher's *History of Christian Doctrine*, Milman's *History of Latin Christianity*, Maurice's *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*. Rev. H. B. Workman's *Church of the West in the Middle Ages* (2 vols.) and the present work may be regarded as in part mutually complementary, one tracing the general

history of thought, the other confining itself to the history of doctrine in the strict sense. The inclusion in the present work of the Middle Ages and the Reformation, while necessitating brevity, brings under one view both the resemblances and the contrasts of these two periods. Despite the break, the continuity is no less evident.

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PART I

THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES,

590-1073 A.D.

[If any portion of the Middle Ages deserves to be called "Dark" it is this period. Our knowledge of it is broken and meagre. There are no great men or great movements. There is little doctrinal activity in the Church. In Europe the old political order is passing away; a new Europe is in course of formation; the lines of division between nations are far from settled. The main work of the Church is in training and evangelising rude masses of people and sowing the seeds of order, civilisation, and religion. A vast amount of missionary work was done in Britain, France, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany. The names of Boniface, Columban, Paulinus, Aidan, Anskar represent lives and work which mean more than we

are able to realise.¹ However dry and uninteresting the details of doctrinal discussion, we see at least that the line of development runs on unbroken.]

¹ Ulphilas, Severinus, Patrick, Columba belong to earlier days. Maclear, *Christian Missions in the Middle Ages*; Workman, *Church of the West in Middle Ages*, i. 65.

CHAPTER I

GREGORY THE GREAT

THE representative name in theology is Pope Gregory the Great (590–604), memorable to us as having sent the monk Augustine to Britain. His many writings,¹ while showing no creative genius, evidence considerable nobility of tone and administrative skill. He takes his material from the great Augustine, whom he interprets to the Middle Ages. Indeed, the Middle Ages see Augustine through Gregory's eyes. While Augustine's characteristic doctrines are diluted or abandoned, his spirit rules those ages with ever-increasing power. It was no little honour to be accepted as an interpreter of so great a master, and this Gregory was. He caught something of the master's spirit, and transmitted it to after days. It has been said with some truth that "the following ages

¹ *Exposition of Job or Morals, Homilies on Ezekiel and the Gospels, Dialogues, Pastoral Rule, Letters.*

inherited Augustine's ecclesiastical dress, not his spirit." The difference between east and west is largely explained by the fact that the former had no Augustine. Gregory has been called the Last of the Fathers; he might also be called the First of the Mediæval divines, forming as he did a link between the two periods.

On the doctrine of the Trinity and Christ's person Gregory simply repeats the decisions of the early Councils,—in one case a Trinity of persons and one substance, in the other two natures and one person; the Spirit is of the same substance as Father and Son.

The authority of the Church begins to take its place beside that of Scripture. The first four General Councils are compared with the four Gospels. Still Scripture is made prominent as the "foundation of divine authority" and the basis of all preaching. The reading of Scripture is often earnestly urged. A strict doctrine of inspiration is held. The Holy Spirit is the "author." The sacred writers, "because filled with the Holy Spirit, are raised above themselves, as it were carried out of themselves." But the method of allegorical interpretation, inherited from the Fathers and continued

throughout the Middle Ages, is carried to excess.

The different aspects of Christ's work are strongly emphasised. He is the Redeemer and Mediator of fallen humanity. He gave himself to suffering and death in order to free us from them. Great stress is laid on Christ's intercession. He presents himself and his merit to the Father, thus appeasing the divine anger. The intercession of saints and martyrs, as well as of the Church in its sacrifices, is also dwelt on. "He who could have succoured us without dying chose to help men by dying, because he would have loved us less if he had not borne our wounds, and he would not have shown us the force of his love if he had not for a time borne that which he took away from us." "The incarnate Lord showed in himself everything which he taught us, in order that he might impress by example everything that he said in precept." Whether, as Dr. Seeberg remarks, the thought of Christ's teaching and example is put first or not, at least it is not forgotten.

Gregory gives great prominence to the perverse notion of the ransom-price in redemption being paid to the devil, who is represented as outmatched in cunning. The divinity veiled in

humanity was the bait by which he was caught. "He justly lost him whom he with a quasi-justice held captive."

The beginning of sin is traced to the weakness of man. The first sin was a free act. While all become sinners through Adam, all retain free will. "Because the human race was corrupted in our first parent as in the root, barrenness followed in the branches." "We are born with an inherited vice of *weakness*,"—a very different doctrine from Augustine's. The doctrine of grace is similarly modified, in a right direction. The grace that goes before (*præ-veniens*) imparts the will for good, the grace that follows (*subsequens*) gives the power. As there is no salvation without grace, man has no merit. "The good we do is both God's and ours, God's by prevenient grace, ours by free will that obeys." Free will indeed seems to be ascribed to grace. The first effect of grace in man is faith, of which the means is baptism. Faith is defined as assent to church teaching. Love again is the fruit of faith through the preaching of the Word; an inward as well as an outward teaching is recognised. Love is significantly described as a good will. "To hear the voice of the Spirit is by the force of inner compunction to rise to the love of the unseen Creator." Yet

again, man's co-operation procures merit. "That which is the gift of the omnipotent God becomes our merit." Man can do more than he is commanded to do.

Predestination is retained only in name. God elects to salvation in foresight of man's faith. Irresistible grace is taught in some places, the opposite in others. "He calls some elect, because he sees that they will persevere in faith and good works." There is a definite number of the elect, but it is unknown to us.

The essential elements of the Roman doctrine of penance are found in Gregory. In addition to inward compunction for and outward confession of sin (public for open sins), followed by priestly absolution, satisfaction to God is necessary. The satisfaction consists in abstinence from lawful things, and is fixed by the priest. "Three things are to be considered in every penitent: change of mind, confession with the mouth, punishment of the sin." It is obvious that the absolution is only provisional, because forgiveness depends on the rendering of the satisfaction.

The sacrifice of the Mass has superseded the Supper. The body of Christ is really present. A propitiatory sacrifice (*hostia placationis*) is offered; Christ's sacrifice is repeated. "As

often as we offer to God the sacrifice of the passion, so often we renew (*reparamus*) his passion for our absolution." In this way as by prayer and alms the Church influences God. In this way also souls are released from purgatory. Belief in purgatory, which overshadowed the whole of the Middle Ages, is prominent in Gregory.

Gregory identifies the present Church with the kingdom of heaven. The one holy, universal Church embraces angels and men, the latter from the days of Abel. It contains good and bad, as the ark contained clean and unclean. Salvation is to be found only within it. And in the Church the clergy are supreme, because they bind and loose, they give absolution and offer sacrifice.

CHAPTER II

ADOPTIANISM AND PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

A PECULIAR view respecting the person of Christ was advocated by two Spanish bishops—Elipandus of Toledo and Felix of Urgellæ. Desiring apparently to lay stress on or do justice to Christ's humanity, they distinguished between his eternal, divine Sonship and his human Sonship by adoption. He suffered only as the "adopted man." This was held to illustrate the similarity of Christ to believers. The difference is that we *become* God's adopted sons, Christ was such from the first. The unity of person was preserved by supposing that the human adopted Son was assumed by the divine Son from the moment of conception. If such a view was not actually Nestorian, it tended in that direction, and was promptly rejected on that account.

Alcuin in France was a chief opponent of the doctrine. He bluntly charged it with Nes-

torianism. "As the Nestorian impiety divides Christ into two persons on account of the two natures, so your untempered rashness divides him into two Sons, one proper, the other adopted." He quotes against it also the Fathers of the Church. "In the assumption of the flesh by God the person perishes, not the nature." It was condemned by Hadrian I. and Leo III., and by councils at Frankfort, 794, and at Aix, 799.

The twofold procession of the Spirit from the Father *and the Son* (*filioque*) is taught by Augustine, Leo I., and Gregory the Great. It found a place in creeds first in Spain under King Reccared, at synods in Toledo, 589, and other dates. Thence it came into France. The Nicene Creed was used there with this addition under Charles the Great. French theologians under his influence advocated the new formula. There was a strong prejudice against making any change in the Nicene Creed, which had to be overcome.¹

¹ See article "Creed," by Swainson, in *Dict. Christian Biog.*

CHAPTER III

PREDESTINATION AND THE LORD'S SUPPER

THERE was controversy in this period on Augustine's predestination-doctrine as during all the Middle Ages, with the singular feature that the leaders of the Church were anti-Augustinian, and those who held with Augustine were treated as heretics. The monk Gottschalk of Orbais (province of Rheims) asserted a twofold predestination of the elect and the reprobate. To him as to Augustine immutability stood at the head of the divine attributes. Election in foresight of man's faith would infringe that attribute. He limited the work of redemption to the elect. In this doctrine, as magnifying God's grace, he found comfort and strength. "As the immutable God predestinated before the world's creation by his free grace all the elect to eternal life, so the same immutable God predestinated the reprobate, who will be condemned at the day of judgment for their evil deserts, by

righteous judgment to eternal death." This, it was argued by Rabanus Maurus, made sin a necessity and made God its author, although Gottschalk affirmed the predestination of the reprobate to punishment, not to sin. The council of Mayence (848) condemned Gottschalk and handed him over to Hincmar of Rheims for punishment. At Chiersy (849) he was again condemned, brutally scourged and sentenced to imprisonment for life in a cloister.

The controversy became general. Some leading theologians (Prudentius of Troyes, Remigius of Lyons, Ratramnus of Corbie, Servatus Lupus of Ferrières) took Gottschalk's part; Hincmar and Rabanus along with others again opposed, dwelling especially on the immoral consequences of the doctrine. There was not much difference between his friends and his opponents. The former held a double, the latter a single, predestination, *i.e.* of the elect to life; both basing the rejection of the lost on the divine foreknowledge. They were all alike semi-Augustinian, while Gottschalk was Augustinian. All, too, held that the baptized and believers are predestinated, which Gottschalk again denied. Friends and foes also agreed that Gottschalk's strict doctrine robbed the sacraments of their effi-

cacy, reducing them to mere forms, and destroyed the motive to good living. Gregory's spirit of compromise was abroad, and it prevailed. With him Hincmar said, good is both ours and God's,—"God's by prevenient grace, ours by obedient freewill." At Chiersy (853) Hincmar's views found expression, at Valence (853) those of the Augustinian or semi-Augustinian party; but the difference was inconsiderable. The decision at Chiersy runs: "From the mass of perdition God, according to his foreknowledge, elected those whom he predestinated to life; the others, whom he left by righteous judgment in the mass of perdition, he foreknew would perish, but he did not predestinate them to perish." At Valence: "There is a predestination of the elect to life and of the wicked to death; in the former case God's mercy precedes merit, in the latter guilt precedes God's righteous judgment; in the case of the wicked he foreknew their wickedness, for it was from them, but he did not predestinate it, for it was not from him." The council condemns those who think that "any are predestinated to evil by divine power as if they could not be different." The work of Christ applies to all who believe in him. At Toucy in 860 the dispute was settled without any decision being come to.

As Gottschalk was disposed of, no decision was necessary.

THE LORD'S SUPPER. The first open advocate of transubstantiation was Paschasius Radbert, a monk of Corbie, in his book on *The Body and Blood of the Lord* (831), which was the first work on the subject. In the days of the Fathers there was a double line of teaching, realistic and figurative, although it is not always easy to say in the case of such metaphorical writers as many of the Fathers were, how far their language is to be taken literally. The figurative interpretation of the ordinance was prominent, especially in Augustine. The realistic interpretation was increasingly favoured by the materialist tendencies in religious life and still more by the growth of the sacrificial view. If the eucharist is a repetition of Christ's sacrifice, the body of Christ must be actually present. This prepares us for the considerable step forward taken by Radbert, who says that in the eucharist a miracle of creation takes place. "God by his invisible power, through the consecration of his sacrament, makes of the substance of bread and wine the flesh and blood of Christ." By this miracle the daily offering for the good of the world is made possible. Thus Christ's body is really present, and in substance the

body is the same in which Christ was born, suffered, rose again, and which he possesses now in heaven. How the body now locally present in heaven (as Augustine says) is present everywhere in the Supper, is not considered. He alludes to the Scripture accounts of the multiplying of bread, oil, meal. The bread and wine remaining is in deference to human sentiment, and that room may be left for faith. Partaking of the Supper cleanses from slight daily sin, strengthens faith, and effects corporeal union with Christ. And yet it is a sign of a transition stage that Radbert speaks of a spiritual receiving. Only those who have accepted Christ spiritually receive Christ's body and blood. Symbol and reality are both present. The outward visible forms are the one, the body of Christ present is the other. Only he receives the body who believes that it is offered in these forms. The invisible reality is present to faith. Here we still see the double line of teaching, with one side more accentuated than the other.

A chief opponent was Ratramnus, also a monk of Corbie, whose book on the subject was addressed to Charles the Bald. He insists that, while a great change takes place, the change is entirely spiritual. Outwardly the bread remains

what it was ; but inwardly, to faith, it is something higher and heavenly—seen, received, eaten only by the believing soul. “Under the veil of material bread and wine Christ’s spiritual body and blood exist.” “According to the visible appearance figures are present ; but according to the invisible substance (*i.e.* the power of the divine Word), Christ’s body and blood are truly present.” This figurative spiritual sense is plain, despite the use of language denoting change and conversion. Yet he speaks, like Radbert, of the sacrament being one thing outwardly to sense, another thing inwardly to faith. “The bread, which by the priest’s ministry is made Christ’s body, presents one thing outwardly to man’s senses and preaches another thing inwardly to the minds of believers. Outwardly indeed the form and colour and taste of bread, as before, are perceived ; but inwardly something far more precious is suggested.” “To deny that the body is present—not only to say but to think so—is wicked.”

Radbert’s doctrine was destined to prevail, but not yet. Rabanus Maurus speaks of the Lord’s body being daily consecrated and offered by the priest for the life of the world, but denies its identity with Christ’s historical body. Another writer, Haimo of Halberstadt († 853), says

definitely: "The substance of bread and wine is substantially converted into another substance, *i.e.* into flesh and blood." Private masses, *i.e.* masses without the presence of communicants, a natural consequence of the daily sacrifice which had gradually established itself since the fifth century, were now justified on principle (Loofs, p. 235).

CHAPTER IV

PENANCE

A GREAT change, amounting to a revolution, was going on during this period in regard to confession and absolution. In the early Church confession was made before the congregation, and referred only to gross sins entailing excommunication for a longer or shorter time; it bore only on the offence against the Church, and was in order to restoration to church fellowship. The absolution did not touch the sin against God, which God alone could pardon. The priest merely offered prayer for the offender. The difference from the later practice at every point is obvious.¹ The old forms of discipline gradually broke down. Augustine said: "Sins committed before all should be rebuked before all; those committed more secretly should be rebuked

¹ The change is well explained in an essay by Canon Meyrick on "The Confessional" in the volume *Church and Faith* (Blackwood).

more secretly.”¹ The old system never took firm root in Germany, and never took root at all in England. Then gradually private was substituted for public confession; and the form of absolution was changed into declaration, although more slowly; not merely gross sins but all sins, even of thought and desire, were to be confessed. This practice of private confession was at first merely recommended, and was first made obligatory at the Lateran Council of 1215, where transubstantiation also became dogma. It is thus a great mistake to suppose that the practice of auricular confession and absolution is primitive. It appears first as a form of monkish discipline in Ireland, and was brought thence by Columban to England and the Continent. The two systems of private and public confession for awhile continued side by side, as they do still in name. We need not call in question the good effects of the practice at first. The abuse should not blind us to the benefit, in rude times like the period under consideration, of the evil and even the penalties of sin being kept before the minds of men. The whole Christian life was made one long penance.

In all the teaching about the necessity of

¹ Augustine treats the priestly claim to forgive sin as presumption.

inner contrition we cordially agree. The evil begins in the human additions and distinctions, especially in the insistence on works of satisfaction which are imposed at the will of priestly confessors. Venial sins are removed by the use of the Lord's Prayer, mortal sins by "the fruit of penitence." Satisfaction consists in the bearing of punishment; and the punishment consists in sorrow for sin, confession to the priest, and the performance of works of penance. The penitent might be admitted to full communion before the penance was done, but it was always assumed as done. The priest inquires minutely respecting the sins committed, and fixes the penance. He also intercedes for the penitent: "Almighty God be thy helper and protector and give thee pardon (*indulgentiam*) for thy sins past, present, and future." "The absolution always bears this intercessory character; for God only can forgive sin, and only the actual penance cleanses from sin" (Seeberg, p. 30).¹

Very soon the idea of commutation was applied to the penances imposed. Light punishments were substituted for heavy at fixed prices.

¹ Gregory's list of the principal sins agrees in substance with Cassian's: vainglory, envy, wrath, sadness, avarice, gluttony, luxury. Dante's mount of purgatory is parcelled off in this order. *Development of Christian Doctrine*, p. 182.

A regular tariff came into force.¹ Taking part in the Crusades, or enabling others to do so, was added to prayers, alms, bodily austerity, fasting, pilgrimages as a form of penance. The entire system is a terrible externalising of the Scripture doctrine of penitence. Inward sorrow is still retained as a necessary condition; but the external acts must often supersede it. In the further development forgiveness was linked to inward penitence and confession, and the works of satisfaction were brought into connection with purgatory. A further step was the issue of indulgences; but this belongs to a later stage.²

¹ Seeberg, p. 31; Loofs, p. 240.

² See on the whole subject the exhaustive work of Lea, *Indulgences*, especially vol. iii.

PART II

LATER MIDDLE AGES

CHAPTER I

RISE OF SCHOLASTICISM, 1073-1200 A.D.

Section I. *General Characteristics*

THE theology of the Middle Ages is known as Scholasticism; the theologians are called Scholastics or Schoolmen.¹ The prime characteristic of scholasticism is the intellectual, philosophical treatment of doctrine. The blending of metaphysics and theology charged against the early Church was carried to an extreme in the Middle Ages. As the Scriptures and the Fathers supplied the material of theology, Aristotle ("the master of those who

¹ From the theological schools (*scholæ*) or seminaries connected with the monasteries and cathedrals, out of which last the universities grew. See Workman, ii. 254.

know") supplied the form, his logical and metaphysical treatises reigning supreme in their sphere. Aristotle's influence was still further increased from the middle of the twelfth century by the use of Arabic translations of his works and commentaries on them brought from Spain. Scholasticism reached its zenith in the next period, but its rise and early growth were in the present one. It is not for us here to give a complete account of the system, but only to note its relation to Church doctrine.

Scholasticism supplies another proof of the impossibility of keeping religion and philosophy apart. Its great appeal was to human reason; it aimed at proving everything, at convincing the intellect of the truth of accepted doctrine,—a right aim if kept within due limits. One limitation, explicit or latent, was always accepted,—the authority of Church teaching, and we may add, in a sense, the authority of Scripture. Every theologian professed that his aim was to prove the truth of Church doctrine. In no other age of the Church has reason been made so much of. Scholasticism claimed to be rational theology in the fullest sense. In philosophy theologians were classed as Realists and Nominalists according to the view they took of the nature of universals or general ideas. This was

the test question of philosophy, Realists affirming that general ideas have a real, objective existence, Nominalists that they are merely names invented by man to express subjective ideas.

The two greatest names of this period are those of Anselm († 1109)¹ and Abailard († 1142), who may be called the founders of scholasticism. Anselm was a realist. To him the universal or general idea was the only real; the particular object is merely an imperfect embodiment of the idea (a phenomenon, manifestation). His theological principle was that faith precedes knowledge ("I believe in order that I may know"), but should advance to knowledge. "A Christian should advance to knowledge through faith, not through knowledge to reach faith; nor ought he to renounce faith, if he cannot understand. When he is able to attain knowledge, he rejoices; but when he is unable, he reverences what he cannot grasp." Thus his idea of faith is intellectual; it is believing Church doctrine or the three creeds. He undertakes to prove the necessity of the incarnation, "not only to Jews but also to heathen by reason alone."

¹ Chief works: *Cur Deus Homo? Proslogium de Dei Existentia, Monologium de Divinitatis Essentia*. Workman, *Church of West*, i. 151. Townsend, *Great Schoolmen of Middle Ages*, p. 79, an instructive and brightly written work.

Abailard more truly represents the eager, curious spirit of the age. Like Anselm, he makes faith precede knowledge; not everything can be proved, something must first be assumed. But he gives much freer scope to reason. Having paid homage to Church and current doctrine, he gives the reins to speculation. Doubt, he says, leads to inquiry, and inquiry to truth. But what, we ask, if it does not? He was the rationalist of the age.¹ He accepts the ordinary definition of the Trinity and then proceeds to speak as if the affirmation of the three persons is the same as saying that the "divine essence itself is power, wisdom, grace."² One of his characteristic works is entitled *Yes and No*; in it he places side by side passages from Scripture and the Fathers on a hundred and fifty-eight theological points, which contradict each other, and then proposes methods of reconciliation. It is not surprising that he provoked great opposition. He was charged with deriding simple Christian faith, doing away with mystery, and vilifying the Fathers. St. Bernard especially combated his teaching point

¹ Harnack, vi. 39, differs from this, the ordinary, view. He admits, however, that his own view "seems paradoxical." See Workman, *ibid.* p. 217; Townsend, p. 99.

² Seeberg, p. 43.

by point. On the Nominalist controversy Abailard's position is ambiguous. General ideas, he says, are objective as produced by objects, subjective as existing only in the mind (subject).

Two eminent orthodox theologians of this period are Hugo of St. Victor († 1141) and Peter Lombard († 1164), the latter a scholar of Abailard. Hugo's great work on the Sacraments is a complete system of theology, with the sacraments as the central topic or connecting thread. Scripture is professedly taken as the sole authority, and salvation is its chief subject. In the first book Creation, the Fall, Original Sin, etc., are considered; Anselm's view of redemption is reproduced. Then the sacraments are put forward as the means of salvation, baptism and the eucharist chiefly. As the sacraments are sacraments of faith, faith is next considered, as well as natural law and written law. The second book treats of Christ's Person, the Church, Sacraments, and other topics, closing with anointing of the sick and eschatology.

Peter Lombard's *Four Books of Sentences*,¹ which was published, commented on, imitated times without number, became the text-book

¹ Hence Peter was called "Master of the Sentences." Townsend, p. 139.

of the Middle Ages.¹ It was the first work of its kind, and despite its dry formalism and close dependence on the Fathers, evidently met an urgent need. He appeals to reason as well as authority, thus showing the influence of his master Abailard, while arguing successfully against him. The influence of John of Damascus also is seen in the work. The first book treats of God, his existence, the Trinity and the divine attributes; the second, of creation, man, sin, freedom, grace; the third, of Christology, redemption, the cardinal virtues, the gifts of the Spirit, and the commandments; the fourth, of the seven sacraments and eschatology.

Yet Peter Lombard, like Abailard, encountered opposition from the traditionalists of his day. His new modes of statement excited suspicion. It was only from about the middle of the thirteenth century, when the Aristotelian philosophy gained greater hold, that suspicion vanished and Lombard's work became famous.

Section II. *The Power of the Church*

The foundation of Papal power was laid in the previous period. Pope Nicolas I. (858-867)

¹ Reminding us of Melancthon's *Commonplaces* in Protestantism.

advanced those claims to authority, not only over all bishops, but over the emperor and princes, which were the ground of the standing conflict between the Church and the State throughout these days. Sometimes one prevailed, sometimes the other; but the claims were never withdrawn. They were always ready to be asserted when opportunity offered.

These high claims found expression in the fictitious gift of Constantine (*c.* 754) and the Pseudo-Isidorian Decrees. In the latter, priestly pretensions are put at their highest. The priestly order is placed far above the laity; the bishops and their dependants constitute the Church. Only Christ can judge them. Christ is the Church's Head, but priests and bishops rule in his place. Independence of the secular power is claimed for them. They open and shut the kingdom of heaven. All this holds good pre-eminently of the Pope; for it is God's will that the Church shall be ruled in doctrine and life by the authority of the Roman Church. None but God and the Roman bishop can judge a bishop. The spiritual is to govern the secular order.

Hildebrand (Gregory VII., † 1085) succeeded in realising the Papal ideals. It was he who made clerical celibacy a law. According to him,

the Roman Church never has erred and never can err. The Pope is the Universal Bishop,¹ Lord of all bishops, who are merely his representatives. All serious questions of law in every church come before his tribunal. He alone decides in Councils. Princes kiss his feet. He can depose the emperor, and can be judged by no one. He is lord also of all earthly kingdoms. Princes are to him as the moon to the sun. He who binds and looses in heaven binds and looses also on earth. Gregory certainly allows the State a partial independence on condition of its subservience to the Church and the Pope. We do not of course doubt that in many respects Gregory was zealous for church reform, and a limited measure of truth underlies many of his ideas.

Hugo of St. Victor describes the Church as "the multitude of the faithful, the entire body of Christians." They are divided into rulers and subjects, *i.e.* the clergy and the laity. It may be said that the subjection is only in spiritual things. But on the other hand it must be remembered that the extreme Church ideal included the subjection of State to Church and the entire exemption of the clergy from State jurisdic-

¹ A title which Gregory the Great had disclaimed as blasphemous. See his letter in Goldast. ii. No. 4.

tion. According to Hugo, we know the nature of the Church by understanding "orders, sacraments, precepts." The gradation of orders is—priests, bishops, archbishops, patriarchs, Pope, who presides in place of Peter, the Prince of the Apostles, and who is subject to God only. The ecclesiastical is older and higher than the secular power, which it appoints and controls. John of Salisbury († 1180) says: "The prince receives the sword from the hand of the Church . . . Therefore is the prince the minister (servant) of the priesthood; he performs that part of the priestly functions which seems unworthy of the hands of the priesthood." Again: "The prince is the minister of the public welfare and servant of justice." The worst crime is the "tyranny, which is directed against the very body of justice." He infers that "it is not merely permitted but right and just to slay a tyrant." The State is a divine institution but subject to ecclesiastical control. Another writer, Robert Pulleyn¹ († c. 1150), in reference to Matt. 22²¹, says: "The priesthood is above the State in things pertaining to God; and the State is above the priesthood in things pertaining to the world," a far more reasonable view.

¹ Chancellor of Oxford University. Also Cardinal.

Section III. *The Person of Christ*

The early definitions were repeated and affirmed, but certain modifications of view appear. Both Abailard and the Lombard express the opinion that the incarnation makes no change in the divine life, the immutableness of God being emphasised. Abailard says that the incarnation means for God merely "a certain new effect of his unchanging will." "God *is* man," can only be taken improperly according to the rule which transfers predicates from the whole to parts or from parts to the whole. Christ is the "man assumed by the Word"; and this man perfectly observes the will of God who dwells in him. "That man never desired to do anything because he deemed it pleasing to himself, but because he thought it pleasing to God." This sounds very much like a merely ethical union of will, and so leans to Nestorianism.

The Lombard states similar views even more strongly. The Word assumed human nature like a garment in order that he might be seen of men. Thus the person of the Word remains one and the same without change. The Lombard also argues for the impersonality of Christ's human nature. The Son "assumed the flesh and soul but not the person of man," inasmuch as at

the time of assumption body and soul were not combined into one person. This impersonality may be accepted without the inference which the Lombard drew as to the nullity of the human nature. This inference (called Nihilianism) was disapproved by Pope Alexander III. The sharp separation of Godhead and manhood has the same Nestorian look that we see in Abailard. The suffering is absolutely limited to the human; and to the human only the lower worship (*dulia*), not the higher (*latria*), is due.

It was as a protest against Nestorianising views that another writer, Gerhoh of Reichersberg († 1169), renewed virtually the teaching and arguments of Cyril of Alexandria. He starts from the concrete God-man, in whom Godhead and manhood are united both in nature and person. Such union is possible, because the finite is capable of the infinite,¹ and it is necessary for the redemption of man. In Christ man is raised to the right hand of God, and a fire is kindled in human nature which destroys sin. The God-man is our way and example, our truth and life, the former as man, the latter as God. Christ the God-man "is to be adored with one adoration." He also deduces from his doctrine

¹ "One and the same Christ is Himself both a divine and human person."

the ubiquity of Christ in the Lord's Supper. "And whence this, unless the same spiritual body has transcended all narrowness of place and time? For not even in a bodily respect must Christ be thought to be confined in one place, however fair and desirable; he is everywhere, as he wills" (*prout vult, ubique est*), an anticipation of Lutheran teaching.

Section IV. *Doctrine of Atonement.*

Anselm and Abailard

Anselm's short treatise *Cur Deus Homo?* was the first reasoned attempt to discover a necessary ground for the incarnation, and he finds it in the work of redemption. First of all, he decisively sets aside the notion, found in some of the Fathers, of a ransom paid to Satan, of which very little is heard in subsequent days. Then sin is defined. To sin is to rob God of the honour due to him. Unless punishment or satisfaction follows, there is disorder in God's government, which is not to be thought of. Punishment would mean the destruction of the whole race of man, which again would be unworthy of the Creator. Thus, forgiveness by mercy alone is excluded. If we ask why forgiveness is necessary, Anselm replies that men are

to take the place left empty by the fallen angels, to which place God could not receive sinners.

Satisfaction then being necessary, what must be its nature? We learn this from the greatness of sin. The least sin is an offence for which the whole world would be no atonement. Besides, not only is the divine honour to be repaired, but the insult offered to God must be made good. The satisfaction necessary is one that must outweigh in value all that is not God. Who can render it? Only God. And yet man must render it, because the debt is his. Hence only one who is "God-man" can render it. All that man alone could do in the form of satisfaction he already owes to God. Even the God-man must render to God something that he does not owe as man to God. Perfect obedience is not enough, for he owes this as man. But the God-man, as without sin, is not subject to the penalty of death. In dying he goes beyond what he owes, and acquires merit before God. The surrender of his infinitely precious life outweighs the sin of the world.

The weakest point in Anselm's argument is the arbitrary way in which Christ's death is made to benefit man. The merit of Christ's death calls for reward, but as Christ himself needs nothing, he transfers the reward to his

people. It is strange that so acute a reasoner did not avail himself of the familiar thought of Christ's union with the race, which takes so conspicuous a place in the argument afterwards.

Some of these thoughts had long been current in the Church. What is new is their combination in a reasoned theory, and still more the importance attached to the idea of satisfaction by Christ's death. An objective atonement is made very prominent. The substance of the argument was widely adopted, and especially by the Reformers of the sixteenth century.¹

It is not a little remarkable that, in opposition to Anselm, a subjective view of the atonement, anticipating much modern teaching, was advocated by Abailard with almost equal acuteness and vigour. Agreeing with Anselm in the rejection of a ransom to Satan, Abailard agrees in little else. The arguments which he urges against Anselm's doctrine and in favour of a subjective doctrine are in substance just those which have been used ever since. Could God be pleased with the death of his Son? Could one sin be expiated by another, a less by a greater? Is it just to accept the innocent as a ransom for the guilty? According to Abailard, Christ came to

¹ Lidgett, *Spiritual Principle of the Atonement*, p. 132.

reveal God's love by assuming our nature and persevering as our teacher and example unto death. The sight of this love awakens love in us, and we are forgiven because of this response of love in us (Luke 7⁴⁷). "Righteousness" in Rom. 3²⁵ is interpreted as "love." Abailard again reaches the same end by another path. In becoming man Christ becomes subject to the law of love for one's neighbour. He obeys this law both by instructing and praying for us. As his prayers must be heard because of his righteousness, he supplies out of his merits what is lacking in ours. We are therefore redeemed by Christ "dying for us once, praying for us often, and instructing us continually." Dr. Seeberg sums up his teaching thus: "God sent his Son to sinful humanity to reveal his love and also as a teacher and example. Thus faith and love are implanted in sinners. This love is the ground of forgiveness. On the other hand, the effect of the love of Christ is that he continually instructs men and intercedes with God for them. Thus their imperfect merits are supplemented" (p. 55). This appeal to Christ's intercession is interesting.

Bernard of Clairvaux († 1153) criticised Abailard, adding to the aspect of truth which he emphasised the one he omitted. He holds fast to the teaching and example of Christ and to

the love shown in his death. We are to contemplate his love in order that love may be kindled in us. But still "the price of our redemption" is Christ's blood. To Abailard, he says, Christ is a mere teacher, Christ's blood and cross have no unique value. Bernard holds that Christ's example as little redeems us as Adam's example made us sinners. Christ's example of love is important; but it has no foundation to rest on, "if the foundation of redemption is lacking. Examples of humility and proofs of love are nothing without the sacrament of redemption." He also gives expression to the idea of deceiving "the tyrant," the devil, as well as of appeasing an offended God. Other writers of the day take up now one, now another of these thoughts. Hugo of St. Victor, like Bernard, reproduces Anselm's teaching. God is appeased by reparation for the injury and satisfaction for the dishonour. This is done by the God-man. Even if this method of redemption cannot be proved to be necessary, it is the most fitting, since the greatness of our sin and of future glory is thus brought home to the mind. Robert Pulleyn says that Christ set us free by offering a sacrifice to God, not to the devil. Although this was not the only possible way of redemption, it was the most fitting. It is the means best fitted to

show us the greatness of our sin and of God's love. The element of teaching and example is also recognised.

It is remarkable that Peter Lombard, the pattern of orthodoxy, should lean strongly to Abailard's subjective view.¹ He lays great stress on the "merit" of Christ. By his life Christ merited for himself both glorification and exemption from suffering. Therefore, his death took place, "not for himself, but for thee." By it he also merited for us entrance into Paradise, deliverance from sin, from punishment and the devil. "Christ as man," he said, "was a sufficient and perfect sacrifice." How did his death effect our redemption? By revealing to us God's love. "So great a pledge of love being given us, we are moved and stirred to love God; and by this we are justified, *i.e.* released from sin and made righteous. Therefore Christ's death justifies us, while through it love is kindled in our hearts." At the same time, while the Lombard is like Abailard mainly subjective, an objective element is not altogether wanting. Christ redeems us "by paying our debt." He also redeems us from the temporal punishment of sin, which is remitted in baptism and reduced

¹ We must remember that the Lombard had been Abailard's scholar.

by penance. "For the punishment, which the Church imposes on penitents, would not suffice, unless the punishment of Christ, who pays it for us, co-operated." He also retains the thought of deception practised on the devil. Evidently in his chief teaching on the subject he leans on Abailard.

Section V. *The Lord's Supper*

The controversy was revived by Berengarius of Tours († 1088), who accepted the figurative interpretation like Ratramnus (p. 15). The elements by consecration became Christ's body and blood sacramentally; they signify the body and blood, they are a likeness, sign, figure, pledge. The body and blood are for knowledge and faith, not for hand or mouth. He said that believers are to receive the whole Christ, whereas according to the new view Christ is divided into fragments. The doctrine also leads to two bodies (*duæ carnes*), earthly and heavenly. Berengarius was for a time protected by the Church authorities, even by Pope Gregory VII. He was an acute reasoner, but not a strong character. He was condemned in his absence at the synods of Rome and Vercelli in 1050. At Rome in 1059, and finally in 1079, he was compelled to

recant, and accept a confession which said that "after consecration the bread and wine are not only a sacrament but also the very body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, are handled sensibly not only in the sacrament but in the hands of the priests, and are broken and consumed by the teeth of the faithful."

It is evident from this result, as well as from the number and power of his adversaries, that Radbert's doctrine had practically become the belief of the Church. Lanfranc († 1089), Hugo, bishop of Langres, Guitmund, archbishop of Aversa (near Naples), were among those who wrote against Berengarius. According to them a change takes place in the elements; the words of institution have a substantive, not figurative, meaning. In every host the whole Christ is present. Believers as well as unbelievers receive him, the latter without saving effect. The elements retain the qualities of colour, taste, etc., that the feelings of the recipients may suffer no shock, and that believers may enjoy abundant rewards of faith. Anselm († 1109) said, "In receiving the blood and the body we receive the whole Christ, God and man." As a logical consequence, the practice of withholding the cup obtained early in the twelfth century. As to the relation of the eucharistic

to the historical body, Lanfranc said they were the same and yet not the same,—the same in essence, not the same in regard to the species of bread and wine. The phrase transubstantiation is found first in Hildebert, archbishop of Tours († 1134). The school of Abailard took the same side. Hugo writes: "By the words of consecration the true substance of the bread and wine is changed into the true body and blood of Christ, the species of bread and wine alone remaining, substance passing into substance." As Christ's body is not omnipresent, he is only present in the eucharist for the time, as long as he pleases, as once on earth. Peter Lombard says: "It is certain that the true body and blood of Christ are on the altar, nay the entire Christ is there under either species, and the substance of bread is changed into the body and the substance of wine into the blood." He declines to say anything about the mode of the change. The effect of the sacrament is the forgiveness of venial sins and the perfecting of virtue. He also regards the eucharist as a daily sacrifice. "He is daily offered in the sacrament, because in the sacrament there is remembrance made of that which was once done." "Christ was once offered and is daily offered, but in different senses." One writer

makes the sacrifice represent that of the cross like a picture. If Radbert had made the change in the eucharist an act of creation, Rupert of Deutz compared it to the incarnation. As the divinity, joined to the human, does not change or destroy the latter, so in the sacrament the elements remain the same in outward appearance. The doctrine was finally made dogma at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, under Innocent III. "The body and blood are contained in the sacrament of the altar under the species of bread and wine, the bread being transubstantiated into the body and the wine into the blood by divine power. And this sacrament no one can perform save a priest duly ordained." The materialising process goes on apace.

Section VI. *The Sacraments*

It was during this period that the nature of sacraments as the necessary means of salvation, and their number, were fixed. The term sacrament was at first used in a general sense. Bernard speaks of many sacraments, and names ten. Hugo even speaks of more than thirty. Then five are fixed upon, although variously stated. The five named in Robert Pulleyn and

others are baptism, confirmation, eucharist, confession, ordination. The five in Abailard's school were baptism, confirmation, eucharist, extreme unction, matrimony, to which the Lombard added penance and ordination. The definition of a sacrament was, in Augustine's words, a "sign of a sacred thing," or "a visible sign of invisible grace." But it was more than a sign; it was to sanctify as well as to signify. The Lombard says: "God ordained the remedies of the sacraments for the wounds of original and actual sin." Hugo of St. Victor, who played a chief part in developing the entire doctrine, says: "God the physician; man the patient; the priest the minister; grace the medicine; the sacrament the vessel." He defines a sacrament as "a corporeal or material element set forth sensibly to view, representing by resemblance, signifying by institution, and containing by consecration some invisible and spiritual grace." While we cannot say that the idea expressed in the much later phrase *ex opere operato* prevailed at this time, the tendency was in the direction of a magical rather than a moral effect of the sacraments. Some writers, like the Lombard and Bonaventura, refer to faith and penitence as conditions. Thomas Aquinas speaks of the sacraments as "instrumental causes" of the

“principal cause,” God, who confers grace through them. But the tendency is to ignore moral conditions. Indeed, Thomas uses the term *ex opere operato*:¹ “The sacraments of the new law confer grace *ex opere operato*” (Loofs, p. 275). Yet he also says, “He who has no faith is esteemed false (*fictus*), and does not receive the benefit (*rem*) of the sacrament.” On the part of the minister, the only condition required was the intention to do what Christ and the Church do. Thomas claimed divine institution for all the seven sacraments. Three of the sacraments—baptism, confirmation, and ordination—impart an indelible character and cannot be repeated. The Lombard and Thomas modify Hugo’s definition in making only some kind of “sign” necessary, and referring the effect more directly to God, the principal cause.

Baptism is said to take away original sin and the guilt of concupiscence; it imparts the initial grace of justification or regeneration. Concupiscence remains as a possible source of sin.

Confirmation brings the gift of the Spirit and maturity in grace. There is an interesting controversy as to whether baptism or confirmation takes the higher rank. Some say the latter, as

¹ On this important phrase, see remarks in Fisher, *Christian Doctrine*, p. 256; Harnack, vi. 210.

the sign of maturity, on which account it is reserved to the bishop. Others say the former, as the effect is greater, any greater dignity in confirmation being due only to the office of bishop. One writer says: "Baptism is more useful, confirmation more honourable and precious, as water is more useful than wine, but wine more honourable and excellent."

Extreme Unction, based on James 5¹⁵, is placed among the sacraments. Its object is both alleviation of bodily suffering and remission of sins, chiefly the latter. The remission is of venial, and also, if necessary, mortal sins.

The principle of ordination, taught by Augustine, was carried still farther. The priest receives the two keys of discrimination (*discretio*) and authority, expressed otherwise as the power of binding and loosing. He also receives fuller grace—spiritual authority and a spiritual character. It is not easy to distinguish between the form and the matter of this sacrament and some of the others.

Matrimony, as having the least spiritual character, was the last to be admitted to sacramental rank. It was said to be necessary with a view to the growth of the Church.

Penance was greatly developed and finally established as a sacrament during this period.

On this subject theology merely followed and justified Church practice.¹ Abailard and his school laid stress on contrition of heart, which ensures forgiveness. Confession would naturally follow, but it was not a condition of forgiveness. Still forgiveness only took away the eternal or spiritual penalties of sin. The temporal penalties for the scandal to the Church and religion remained, and had to be atoned for by works of satisfaction in this life or in purgatory. These temporal penalties and satisfactions were in the power of the priest or the Church; the spiritual penalties and forgiveness belonged to God. This distinction between what belonged to God and to the priest was a relic of earlier days, but it was soon given up.

Hugo put the stress on confession to the priest and the consequent absolution by him, contrition and readiness to render satisfaction being assumed. Confession and satisfaction are conditions of forgiveness. "He confesses his sin to the priest, who imposes on him just satisfaction, for he ought to make satisfaction, not according to his own will but according to the priest's will, and then the priest absolves him from subjection to future damnation." Hugo opposes the idea that priestly absolution has

¹ Seeberg, p. 65. Penance overshadowed the Lord's Supper.

merely declaratory force. It delivers from eternal damnation in virtue of "divinely conferred authority," as Lazarus, when raised to life by Christ, was set free by the apostles. Roland, a writer of Abailard's school, says: "We offend God by evil thoughts, we scandalise the Church by inconsistent acts; and as we offend both, we should render satisfaction to both, to God by contrition of heart, to the Church by confession of mouth and works of satisfaction, if the nature of the time demands it."

Robert Pulleyn sees in absolution and confession the nature of a sacrament. "The absolution pronounced by the priest after confession on the penitent is a sacrament, since it is a sign of a sacred thing." But the priestly absolution is only the declaration of a forgiveness which God bestows on the sinner on the ground of his penitence. After absolution works of penance are to be done. Otherwise they are replaced by the pains of purgatory.

The Lombard does not seem to advance beyond Abailard. "God alone remits and retains sin; and yet he has conferred on the Church power to bind and loose; but he looses in one sense, the Church in another." The priest decides whether the sinner is absolved in sight of the Church. He also binds and looses by im-

posing and lessening satisfaction, and by admitting to church-communion. "It is to be noted, that those whom the priests bind by satisfaction, they declare *ipso facto* to be absolved from sin, because satisfaction is not imposed on any one unless the priest thinks him to be truly penitent. On another they do not impose satisfaction, and *ipso facto* judge sin to be retained by God." Where penance is insufficient, it is supplemented by the fire of purgatory. The sacramental system is not yet fully developed.

Section VII. *St. Bernard*

Bernard of Clairvaux († 1153)¹ represents another view of religious thought, which we would fain believe often ran alongside the dialectic, namely, the experimental and mystic. Monk as he was, he was also a man of affairs, the preacher of the crusades, the counsellor of princes and popes. His Sermons on the Canticles use a kind of phraseology that offends modern taste. But even here the meaning is right, and his other sermons and treatises (on "Considera-

¹ Called *Augustinus redivivus*. Augustine moulded Bernard as he moulded Luther and many others. His treatise *De Diligendo Deo* recalls Augustine's *Confessions*. Workman, *ibid.* i. 285.

tion" and "Loving God") are free from this fault of taste. To him fellowship, union with God, is the goal of Christian life, a fellowship which reaches its highest point in ecstasy of soul. Another striking feature is his devotion to the Saviour's human life and passion. Christianity resolves itself in his eyes into the imitation of Christ.¹ "What is there so efficacious in curing a wounded conscience and purging the mental vision as diligent meditation on the wounds of Christ?" Christ's humanity is the way to his Deity. The ecstasy of divine union is described as a "going forth of the pure mind to God, or a gracious coming down of God into the soul; with inward affection and the deepest inwardness of feeling it receives God descending from heaven." These moments are rare experiences. "There is a place where God is seen truly to rest and repose; a place not of the judge or master, but of the bridegroom, and which to me (of others I know not) is a rest-chamber, if perchance I may attain it. But alas! rare is the hour and short the interval.

¹ Much of Bernard's line of thought and expression reappears in modern Moravianism. Remember his hymn, "Jesus, the very thought of thee," *Jesu, dulcis memoria*. The name of Jesus is "honey in the mouth, music in the ear, rapture in the heart."

There the mercy of the Lord from eternity to eternity to them that fear him, is clearly seen. O alone truly blessed man, to whom the Lord reckons not sin! Suffice it to me for all righteousness to have him alone propitious against whom alone I sinned." "God the Father is by no means clearly known unless he is perfectly loved." He reproves Abailard's daring speculations as profane intrusions into divine mysteries. Bernard does not forget the Deity in the humanity. "With the name Jesus I set before me the man, gentle and lovely in heart, gracious, grave, pure, merciful, and in short eminent in all righteousness and holiness, and the same man God almighty who will heal me by his example and strengthen me with his help." He gives the active Christian life a place beside the contemplative.

Hugo of St. Victor, a friend of Bernard, called in his own day "the second Augustine," had a similar strain of mystic doctrine alongside his dogmatic teaching. His two chief theological works are, one on the Sacraments, and a compendium of theology.

CHAPTER II

REIGN OF SCHOLASTICISM, THIRTEENTH CENTURY

DURING this period the Papal power and the Scholastic theology reached their zenith. The spirit of the age is embodied in three persons—Pope Innocent III., Francis of Assisi, and Thomas Aquinas. Francis is the redeeming feature of the period, but his work does not belong to our subject. He was a great popular evangelist and religious reformer; and if he had not been captured by the church authorities and made head of a new order, he might have anticipated or rendered unnecessary the Reformation of two centuries later. As it was, the influence he exerted for good was great and lasting. His ideal for himself and all Christians was the poverty of Christ. He himself fulfilled his ideal, and led others to do so. He made much also of Christ's human life, and was indirectly the occasion of Bonaventura and Ludolf of Saxony writing their famous *Lives of Christ*.

Great changes took place in regard to the sacrament of penance. The stress was laid on confession to the priest, instead of on inward contrition. Private confession took the place of public for all sins. The indicative form of absolution ("I absolve thee") took the place of the old precatory form. Papal indulgences took the place of satisfaction by works. Belief in indulgences was made a test of orthodoxy. The Constance Council directed that heretics should be asked whether they believed that the Pope could grant indulgences for reasonable causes. At the Fourth Lateran Council, 1215, Innocent III. decreed the following: "Let every believer of either sex, who has reached years of discretion, alone faithfully confess *all* his sins at least once a year to his own priest, and carefully perform to his utmost the penance enjoined him, reverently receiving the sacrament of the eucharist at Easter at least." This law was often repeated at synods in this century.

The chief heretics of the Middle Ages, the Cathari ("Puritans") and Waldenses, did not reject Church doctrine, but Church order and institutions, which they held to have become corrupt. They claimed to be the true Church, with true bishops and valid sacraments. The former sect was of eastern origin, and seems to

have revived Manichæan dualism. To it the Roman Church was the harlot of Babylon, its bishops pharisees, its sacraments worthless.

PAPAL CLAIMS.—These claims were put in the most extreme form, and were applied in practice. According to Innocent III., the Pope is “the vicar of Christ, placed midway between God and man, below God but above man, less than God but greater than man, judging all men and judged by none.” “James, the Lord’s brother, left to Peter not only the whole Church, but the whole world to be governed.” The bull “*Unam Sanctam*” of Boniface VIII. in 1302 formulates these claims bluntly: “We are compelled to believe in one holy catholic Church, out of which is no salvation or remission of sins. . . . In this Church and its power are two swords, the spiritual and the temporal. . . . Therefore each is in the Church’s power, the spiritual and the material (sword). The latter is to be used for the Church, the former by the Church. The former is in the priest’s hand, the latter in the hand of kings and warriors, but at the priest’s beck and call. . . . The spiritual power pre-cedes the earthly both in dignity and nobility. . . . For, the truth being witness, the spiritual power has to set up the earthly and judge it, if it is not good. . . . Whoever then resists this

power ordained of God resists God's ordinance, unless, like Manichæus, you imagine two principles. . . . Moreover, we declare, affirm, define, pronounce to the whole human creation that subjection to the Roman pontiff is necessary to salvation " (Seeberg, p. 72).

The charge brought against the theology of the early ages, that it mixed philosophy and religion, applies in full force to the theology of the Middle Ages. Aristotle's influence, great enough during the early Middle Ages (p. 22), now became greater than ever. Formerly only his logical treatises were known. Now his metaphysics, physics, psychology, and ethics are brought into use. He was called the "fore-runner of Christ in natural things." Not only was the formalism in the mode of treatment carried to the greatest extreme, but the substance of many of the doctrinal definitions was drawn more from philosophy than from Scripture. With all our desire to honour the earnestness of mediæval theologians in vindicating Christianity in the eyes of reason, we cannot but feel that the matter is carried too far. Philosophy throws religion into the shade.

The following are the leading theologians of this period. Alexander of Hales¹ († 1245, the

¹ Hales in Gloucestershire, or perhaps Hales Owen in Shrop-

“irrefragable” doctor) wrote a compend of universal theology. Albert the Great († 1280, “universal”), teacher of Thomas Aquinas, was the first to use Aristotle on a large scale in theology. His theories of metaphysics and human knowledge were followed by Thomas. Beside paraphrases on Aristotle, he wrote a commentary on the Lombard and a compend of theology which was left unfinished. Thomas Aquinas († 1274, “angelical”) represents the best side of the period.¹ “In him orthodoxy and real religious feeling, as well as great dialectic talent, are united with thorough knowledge of Aristotle and the Church writers (Dionysius, the Areopagite, coming into view). While we can scarcely call him a genius, he was as great a dialectician as Albert the Great was a collector.” It would be wrong to identify his teaching at every point with Church teaching. He was only one, though the greatest, of many writers, and had rivals and opponents, Duns Scotus especially. The Thomists and Scotists formed rival camps. As Thomas belonged to the Dominicans and Scotus to the Franciscans, the Franciscans were mostly Scotists and the Dominicans Thomists.

shire. Alexander taught with distinction at Paris, where Bonaventura studied under him. Townsend, p. 177.

¹ Harnack, vi. 155 ; Townsend, p. 199.

Among his works are a commentary on the Lombard, a compend of theology, an apologetic work against the heathen. His *Summa*, which was left unfinished, is still a text-book in the Roman Church,—a proof of its greatness and its general orthodoxy. The following indicates Thomas's mode of discussion. A question is proposed, which is then divided into a series of articles. Every article is put in the form of a question. Then a number of opposing reasons (*videtur quod non*) are adduced from Scripture, the Fathers, Aristotle. This is followed by affirmative reasons (*sed contra est*). There follows the decision (*respondeo dicendum*), generally in affirmative form. The opposing reasons are refuted in order (*ad primum, ad secundum dicendum*). *E.g.* in the First Part of the Compend the fourth article of the eighth question runs: Does it belong to God to be everywhere? 1. It seems that it does not belong to God to be everywhere; four philosophical reasons for this are given, partly from Aristotle, then two from Augustine. 2. But the contrary is the fact, for Ambrose says. 3. Then follows the answer: I answer, it must be said that to be everywhere primarily and *per se* belongs to God. Then there is the proof of this position and the disproof of the six opposing reasons. The Franciscan Bona-

ventura († 1274, “seraphic”) was Thomas’s contemporary and friend. He unites a large element of mysticism with his dogmatic teaching. He wrote a commentary on the Lombard, several compends, and a mystical *Journey of the Mind to God*, which is in great repute. Duns Scotus († 1308, “subtle”) was Thomas’s great rival. Other writers deserving mention are Raymund Lully († 1315) and Robert Grosseteste († 1253).

Before entering on the consideration of particular doctrines, Dr. Seeberg gives an account of Thomas’s general point of view, which yields points of interest. The contents of faith and so of theology are given in supernatural revelation, which is necessary because of the weakness of man’s intellect. Revelation also contains things which reason might possibly discover for itself, but only slowly. This revelation is contained in Scripture, of which God is the real author. By inspiration God communicated definite knowledge to the prophets by immediate impression on their minds. This is proved as well by the history and extension of the faith as by signs and wonders. And so Scripture acquires authority. “Our faith rests on revelation made to apostles and prophets, but not on revelation, if there is any, made to other teachers.”¹ But the truth given in

¹ A foreshadowing of the formal principle of the Reformation.

Scripture in loose, unconnected form needs to be put into succinct, systematic expression, and this is done in the Apostolic Creed. The rise of error led to the formation of the Nicene and Constantinopolitan Creeds. Further, an authoritative interpreter of Scripture and Creed is necessary, and this is the Pope. Thus the unity of the Church is secured. Creeds, Councils, Papal definitions must no doubt agree with Scripture; but in reality the living interpreter is placed alongside or above Scripture.

Thomas Aquinas was the first to investigate the nature of the faith which receives revealed truth. He begins with Augustine's principle, "to believe is to think with assent." A judgment is arrived at in either or both of two ways, perceiving a thing to be truth, or moved by the will to assent. The intellect yielding to the impulse of the will is due to the "habit (*habitus* = quality, power, faculty) of faith divinely inspired." "Faith is thus an initial knowledge of divine things above reason, dependent on practical motives." The weakness of human reason is to blame for the fact that only faith is possible; but the goal is the perfect knowledge of God, such as eternal life includes. Thus faith is perfected in knowledge, and is meritorious in so far as it proceeds from will.

There is a difference between explicit and implicit faith. The former is faith with intelligence, such as befits teachers and pastors; the latter belongs to ordinary Christians, consisting of simple assent to Church teaching.

The knowledge which faith brings is not against reason but above it. Theology has not to prove revelation by human reason, as it has to do with things above reason. It can only explain and illustrate in part. Its reasons are not demonstrative, but merely arguments showing that what is advanced is not impossible. But because theology draws its principles from revelation, its knowledge is more certain and important than that of all other sciences.

In regard to the nature of universals or general ideas, Thomas was an Aristotelian, like Albert, his master. According to Aristotelian Realism, the ideas exist in objects (*universalia in re*); they do not exist apart, but they do exist there; thence the mind collects and unifies them. According to Platonist teaching, they exist before and apart from things, like ideas in the mind of the artist (*universalia ante rem*), forming a world by themselves, the intelligible or intellectual world. To that world alone belongs reality. Sensible objects or phenomena are copies of the ideas, resembling them in part. Thus the Platonist

held two worlds, the world of ideas and the world of phenomena. According to Nominalism, general ideas are mere abstractions (names), formed by the human mind for purposes of convenience and utility (*universalia post rem*). According to the first theory, there was also a measure of truth in the two other views, inasmuch as phenomena are the occasion of the rise of general ideas, while the latter have their archetypes in divine ideas. The divine ideas are revealed in the order of the world.

Section I. *God and the Person of Christ*

Thomas's division of theology in his great work is simplicity itself: (1) God; (2) Man, or the rational creature seeking God; (3) Christ, or the way in which man finds God. But the exposition of his subject cannot be called simple. Especially is this true of his teaching about God. Here he draws largely from Greek philosophy. We need not object to the distinction of essence and attributes. But when he goes on to speak, with Aristotle, of God as the greatest being, the first mover, the first cause, pure energy, *i.e.* actuality without mixture of potentiality, when he identifies thought and being, and again, with Plato, describes God as most perfect being, we

are getting into the deeps. "To be (being) is itself the most perfect of all things, for it is compared with all things as actuality; for nothing has actuality except so far as it is, whence being itself is the actuality of all things, and even of their ideas; whence it is not compared with other things as receiving to received, but rather as received to receiving."¹ In other words, existence is necessary to all things, nothing else is necessary to it. Still more dangerous is the laying such emphasis on God's causality in second causes as to reduce providence to a sort of fate,—a view borrowed from Arabian interpreters of Aristotle like Avicenna. Verbally indeed he asserts human freedom, but only verbally; no real harmony is proved. There are, however, many fruitful thoughts. Since God is absolute activity of thought and will, he must act for an end, and since he is goodness, that end can only be good, *i.e.* love. Everything in the world must serve this end. "When anyone loves another, he wills

¹ We add the original as a specimen of scholastic statement: "*Ipsium esse est perfectissimum omnium, comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus; nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi in quantum est, unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum et etiam ipsarum formarum; unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis sicut receptum ad recipiens*" (Loofs, p. 262).

his good and acts towards him as towards himself, seeking his good as he seeks his own." Thus, God created and preserves and does good to the world from love. In mercy also he heals its wretchedness. Yet, as God alone can be his own adequate end, in the last resort he loves himself as end and the world as means. Here we have more of the personal God, and less of the abstract. Even redemption is viewed as the best means for reaching the supreme divine end.

In regard to the TRINITY there is nothing new of importance. The Lombard asks whether the Father generated the divine essence or the latter generated the Son or itself, and replies in the negative, because, as the essence is common to the three persons, and is entire in each one, the affirmative would make the Father generate himself, besides reducing the essence to a mere relation. He decides that the divine essence, identical in the three persons, neither generates nor is generated; the inner Trinitarian life is a relation between the persons. Others thought this would lead to Sabellianism or Arianism, and so emphasised the distinction of persons.¹ The Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 said: "We

¹ The terminology of the three Cappadocians passed through John of Damascus to the Lombard, and so into Church theology (*Development of Doctrine in Early Church*, p. 95).

believe and confess with Peter Lombard that there is one incomprehensible and ineffable supreme object (*summa res*), which is truly Father and Son and Spirit, at the same time three persons, and each one of the same severally. And so in God is a Trinity only, not a quaternity,¹ because either of the three persons is that object (or substance), the divine essence or nature, which is the sole principle of all things, beside which no other can be found. And that object neither generates nor is generated, nor proceeds, but is the Father who generates, the Son who is generated, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds, so that the distinctions are in the persons and the unity in the nature." All this is in the line of Augustine. Another questionable position was that the divine attributes are not distinguished from each other and from the divine essence in themselves, but only by our reason, and that in the same way the relations of the persons in the Godhead to the divine essence are of the same subjective kind. Here again Augustine speaks.

In Christology again no advance is made. The old phrases are reproduced, and the human nature in Christ receives scant justice. The Logos or the divine nature, it was said, assumes

¹ As though the essence were a fourth element.

an impersonal human nature into unity with itself. The result is not one nature, but the union takes place in the person. The whole human nature is meant. Yet the only union is a common relation of the two natures to the Logos. The union is real only in the human, not in the divine. God becoming man merely means that "the human nature begins to exist in the person of the divine nature that existed from eternity" (Aquinas). The *communicatio idiomatum* also is taught. Luther charged the scholastics with building "a wall between God's Son and the Son of Mary."

Section II. *The Work of Christ*

Anselm's teaching is adopted in substance both by Bonaventura and Thomas Aquinas, but they unite with it the true element in Abailard and supply other defects. Bonaventura argues for the necessity of the incarnation in order to satisfaction on similar grounds to Anselm (p. 33). This satisfaction consists in the merit of Christ acquired both by doing and suffering;¹ and as the two natures co-operate in both, the merit is that of the God-man, perfect and complete. The satisfaction by suffering was the most suitable

¹ A presentiment of the active and passive righteousness.

means of appeasing God; it was also the most suitable means for winning man to love God,—which was Abailard's point of view (p. 36). Bonaventura provided better than Anselm for transferring Christ's merit to man by dwelling on the relation of head and members.¹

Thomas enumerates all the points of view without attempting to harmonise them. He says: "In so far as Christ is man, it belongs to him to unite men with God by giving precepts and gifts to men and by making satisfaction and interceding for men with God." (*a*) The teaching and example of Christ are dwelt on. His suffering especially proves the greatness of God's love to us, awakening love in return. We are thus drawn to imitate Christ's example of obedience, humility, constancy, righteousness, and other virtues. Our love avails for forgiveness, according to Luke 7⁴⁷. This is the way of salvation under one aspect. (*b*) Thomas holds a relative necessity of satisfaction to God for sin, not an absolute one as Anselm held. As God is the "supreme and common good of the whole universe," he could have forgiven sin without requiring satisfaction; but this was the most

¹ Bernard had said: "Therefore the head made satisfaction for the members." Thomas says: "Head and members are, as it were, one mystical person, and so satisfaction."

fitting way, as best expressing both righteousness and mercy. Because of the greatness of Christ's love and the value of his life "his passion was not only a sufficient but a *superabounding* satisfaction." The satisfaction consists in Christ's suffering. He bore all suffering "as to kind" and the "greatest sorrow." Still the value of his suffering lies not in its physical but its moral character. It was an act of obedience and love, "God inspiring him with willingness to suffer for us by filling him with love." His death was a sacrifice only in so far as it was a voluntary act. (c) "By his passion he *merited* salvation, not only for himself, but also for all his members." His appearance in heaven is an intercession for us. (d) The relation of Head and members is the means by which the benefit of his suffering is communicated to us. The results of his work are—forgiveness of sin through love produced in us and through redemption, as the Church "is reckoned as one person with its Head"; deliverance from the devil and the penalties of sin; God is appeased; the kingdom of heaven is opened. Dr. Seeberg thus summarises Thomas's teaching: "Christ, the Head of the Church, is Redeemer in virtue of that character, (a) because he reveals God to us, overpowers us by love and incites us to good-

ness, so enabling us to acquire forgiveness of sins ; (b) because by his suffering he reconciles God and renders him satisfaction, so procuring salvation and immunity from punishment for us ; (c) because in both ways he rescues us from the power of the devil and opens to us the gate of heaven." We see here how the thoughts of Anselm and Abailard are blended.

Section III. *Sin and the Fall*

Alexander of Hales, Bonaventura, Albert, and Thomas present a doctrine of man's original state. They distinguish in him an innate ethical character, which they call original righteousness, from the "superadded gift" of grace. The former denotes the harmonious working of his faculties¹ and the absence of concupiscence. The second part means either graces which are a free gift, such as knowledge of God and man and physical immortality, or grace that renders man acceptable to God. This final grace consists essentially in an indwelling of God or the

¹ Chief of these is *synderesis* or *synteresis* = conscience. According to Alexander it denotes the habitual inclination to good, which is innate in human nature both in reason and the will. Thomas makes the will exclusively its seat, and describes it as inclining to good, restraining from evil, and judging of what has been done.

infusion of love. It is described as a "universal habit (quality) informing both the subject and all his powers and works, by which God dwells in all saints and inspires the power to merit eternal life" (Albert). According to Thomas this grace was bestowed along with original righteousness; according to Scotus it had to be acquired by man by the use of his natural powers,—one of many Pelagian traits in Scotus. Another sign of Pelagianism was the entire doctrine of merit, the germs of which came down from early days. Now was developed the distinction between a lower and a higher kind of merit, merit of congruity and merit of condignity (*de congruo* and *de condigno*). According to the former all right use even of natural gifts is duly rewarded; according to the second real Christian virtue deserves reward, even eternal life, in the strictest sense. At the same time the power to acquire such real merit is the gift of God's grace in Christ. Thomas says in substance that the distance between God and man is so great, that there can be no question of merit in man before God save by divine appointment, so that man obtains by his own effort from God, as a sort of reward, what God has given him the power to obtain. Accordingly as we consider man's free will or divine grace as the source, one or the other kind

of merit is possible. "It seems congruous that God should recompense according to the excellence of his power the man who strives according to his own power. But if we speak of meritorious work according to what proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit, the meriting of eternal life is one of condignity."¹ The possibility of merit in man was a general commonplace of the age. The Lombard says: "Where there is necessity there is no liberty; and where there is no liberty there is no will and so no merit." Bernard, Anselm, and Thomas speak in the same way.

Anselm, following Augustine, made sin the absence of good. Original sin he defined as "the absence of righteousness caused by Adam's disobedience, by which all are children of wrath." The Lombard described original sin as the fuel of sin and weakness of nature, and made its nature to consist in concupiscence. According to Alexander of Hales original sin is both fault and punishment; in the former respect it is lack of righteousness, in the latter concupiscence. The lack of righteousness includes loss both of grace and of natural original righteousness. The possibility of the Fall lay in man's weakness; the cause was pride. Thomas defines original

¹ Loofs, p. 267; Seeberg, p. 105.

sin thus: "Materially indeed it is concupiscence, but formally it is lack of original righteousness." It is thus both negative and positive. The powers of the soul are thrown into disorder, because ignorance, malice, weakness, concupiscence rule in it. Still all the good in human nature is not lost; otherwise it would be incapable even of sin. Natural capacities remain, but they are no longer directed to good. The mode of transmission from Adam to the race, and from parents to children, is explained by the idea of Adam's headship and by lust. The first reference is inconsistent in the scholastics, because they were all creationists, rejecting traducianism altogether. Thomas compares the relation of men to Adam to that of the limbs to the body, a strong form of Augustine's realistic theory. He says the bodily nature is impure, and the soul is defiled by contact with it,¹ a touch of Manichæism. Lombard takes the same view. The consequence of sin is disorder, suffering, eternal death. The punishment of children dying unbaptized is mild. They are free from all outward and inward suffering, but are bereft of the vision of God and physical light.

¹ Seeberg, p. 100. For the doctrine of Duns Scotus, see Fisher, p. 241.

Section IV. *Grace and its Fruits*

We have to note the change in the meaning of grace which under the influence of Augustine was completed in this period.¹ In the New Testament the word stands for God's free, unmerited favour; but soon it came to be used for the effect of that favour in man. We see a similar change of meaning in the case of words like creation and regeneration, etc., which denote either divine acts or the products of those acts. We can therefore scarcely wonder at the change in the case of so characteristic a word as grace; the mistake is that the original meaning was lost. Thomas first defines it as "God's free action" (*gratuita Dei motio*), and then the effect of this act (*gratia increata et creata*). "The action of God moving (*ipsa Dei moventis motio*)² is itself the infusion of grace." Thus it describes a permanent change in human nature, or the imparting of something substantial. "A supernatural something (*quiddam supernaturale*) in man proceeding from God," an infused habit (*habitus*) or quality. "Some habitual gift is poured into the soul by God." This new moral nature is the seed-plot of all virtues, such as faith and love.

¹ A full discussion of the subject in Harnack, vi. 281.

² The word "movement" should be noted.

Thus the idea of grace is transformed. The change was to a certain extent inevitable, and it is the key to much mediæval theology.

As to the relation between free will and grace Thomas Aquinas speaks ambiguously. He certainly emphasises freedom in man. But when he traces man's free action to grace, he looks another way. Conversion takes place through free will; "but free will cannot turn to God unless God himself turn it." The will is moved by God, God himself creates in us the disposition to receive grace.¹ From God's side we speak of grace working (*operans*), from man's side of grace co-operating. On the other hand, the idea of merit, which is so conspicuous in these days, strongly implies freedom in man. Here we see how Augustine's teaching is controverted. Really Thomas tries to hold both determinism and freedom.

As is the cause, so is the effect. The effect of grace is justification. The view taken of the first determines the view taken of the second. Grace was viewed primarily as a

¹ "When the will is moved it is moved by itself, *i.e.* by an intrinsic cause, but then an intrinsic cause may be moved by another extrinsic cause—God, and so to be moved of one's self is not inconsistent with being moved by another" (Fisher, *Christian Doctrine*, p. 238).

divine influence or infusion in man. Justification therefore becomes a change wrought in man's nature, "by which man is fitted for eternal life." The will is at the same time moved to accept the gift. Thomas enumerates the elements of justification thus: "infusion of grace, movement of the free will to God by faith, movement of free will from sin, and remission of guilt." "God so pours the gift of justifying grace into man that he also with this moves the free will to accept the gift of grace." "Justification is a certain act (movement) by which man's mind is moved by God from a state of sin to a state of grace." Faith comes into action, but saving faith is faith animated with love (*fides caritate formata*), not mere faith (*fides informis*),¹ so that in reality love justifies. Forgiveness depends on the grace infused. This act takes place in a moment: "The justification of the wicked is done by God in a moment" (*in instanti*). This order of the saving acts is logical, not temporal. No assurance of salvation is possible, as the grace of God lies outside the field of human knowledge; we can only draw inferences from effects in ourselves.

We have already spoken (p. 68) of merit and the distinction of lower and higher merit

¹ The thinking with assent (p. 58).

(*de congruo* and *de condigno*). It is not easy to reconcile the different statements on the subject. Grace is spoken of as the ground of meritorious works, and we are told that man cannot merit prevenient grace (*prima gratia*).¹ Again, it is said that before justification or grace infused, or apart from grace, merit is impossible. But this must refer to the higher merit, for, as we have seen (p. 68), merit in the lower sense is possible to the natural man. Nor is there any doubt that the higher merit is held to deserve eternal life. "All man's works springing from grace are meritorious before God. By them man merits eternal life and the increase of grace."² No doubt the insistence on grace as giving the power to earn merit greatly qualifies the doctrine in theory. How much it does so in practice is doubtful. "By their fruits ye shall know them"; and we see the fruits. The next step was to say that man can acquire more merit than he needs for himself; he can keep not only the precepts but the counsels of the gospel (Matt. 19²¹). The three monastic vows secure the perfect Christian life. We

¹ So says Thomas Aquinas (Seeberg, p. 105). Yet Bonaventura says: "A sinner by works good in kind, done outside love, merits prevenient (primary) grace *de congruo*" (Loofs, p. 272).

² Thomas Aquinas in Seeberg, p. 105.

are told also of a perfection of supererogation, superabounding righteousness, out of which grows a treasure of merit which the Church has at its disposal. In all this we note the growth of teaching that only came to maturity in the Trent Council.

Section V. *The Sacraments and the Church*

The great doctrinal contribution of this period was the elaboration of the doctrine of the sacraments. The doctrine assumed in detail the form which was formally adopted at Florence in 1439 under Pope Eugenius IV., and at Trent in the following century. Hugo of St. Victor, Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas are among the chief agents in the process. The sacraments become the sole channels of salvation, and the key of the sacraments is in the hands of the Church, *i.e.* the priest.

The number seven is assumed as self-evident. All are affirmed to be of divine institution. According to some they were indirectly instituted by Christ (Alexander, Bonaventura), according to others directly (Albert, Thomas, Duns, Biel). Yet baptism and the Supper are spoken of as the "most excellent" sacraments (*potissima sacramenta*). Thomas's definition is a "sign of a sacred

thing, inasmuch as it sanctifies men"; Bonaventura's, "Sensible signs divinely instituted like medicines, in which under the veil of sensible things divine power works more secretly." The essential conditions are visible things as the *matter*, words as the *form*, and the *intention* of the priest "to do what the Church or Christ has instituted." The bull of Eugenius says: "If any one of these is wanting, no sacrament is performed,"¹ a far-reaching statement.

What is the relation between the sign and the grace? To this different answers are given. Hugo said the sign contains the grace. Thomas Aquinas is inclined to agree, but says at last that it is the instrumental in distinction from the principal cause, *i.e.* God. "And thus spiritual power is in the sacraments, inasmuch as they are ordained by God for a spiritual effect." The words of institution confer "spiritual power" on the outward sign. This becomes more and more the prevailing belief, until at last we find the *opus operatum* doctrine long before the Council of Trent adopted the phrase. Indeed this is stated to be the distinction between the old and the new law. Bonaventura: "The sacraments of the new law justify and confer grace *ex opere operato*." Thomas Aquinas: "The

¹ Seeberg, p. 109.

sacraments of the law of nature had no efficacy *ex opere operato*, but only from faith . . . but it is not so with the sacraments of the new law,¹ which confer grace *ex opere operato*." Certainly faith was necessary in the receiver, but very meagre faith was sufficient. Finally, it was enough if the receiver did not interpose the obstacle of mortal sin.

At the same time a more worthy view was expressed by Bonaventura, who probably spoke for many others. Grace, he said, was in the soul, not in the sacrament. The latter was only a sign, like a seal on a letter. But God had promised that grace should accompany the worthy receiving of the sacrament. The bestowal of grace on the soul is the work of a direct creative act of God. Duns Scotus held the same view. Thomas Aquinas opposed this teaching. "According to it the sacraments of the new law are no more than signs of grace, whereas it should be held on the authority of many saints, that they not only signify but impart grace." Pope Eugenius agrees with him: "Those sacraments (the Jewish) did not impart grace . . . but these of ours both contain grace and confer it on worthy recipients."

We find mention also of a certain indelible

¹ Observe this name for Christianity.

“spiritual character”¹ which is the result of the sacraments of baptism, confirmation, and orders, although its nature is not made at all clear. It is described as a quality or disposition of the soul, qualifying it for God’s service. These sacraments therefore cannot be repeated. The following details throw light on an important part of the Church life of those days.

BAPTISM.—The matter of the sacrament is the water, or the ablution with it; the form the words, “I baptize thee,” etc. Baptism imparts grace that renders the subject acceptable to God, conferring forgiveness and capacity for good. “He that is baptized is freed from the guilt of all the punishment due to his sins”; “by baptism man obtains grace and virtues” (Thomas). “Baptism absolves from all eternal punishment by abolishing all guilt; grace has the double effect of effacing sin and enabling to good” (Bona-ventura). It imparts a spiritual “character,” which is regarded as an “infused habit (quality).” It not only does away the sins of the past, but weakens sinful impulse (concupiscence). But as the latter continues active, penal consequences of

¹ The “indelible character” is stamped on the powers of the soul, not on the essence, and qualify the man for receiving and dispensing those things which belong to divine worship (Harnack, vi. 211).

the present life remain as a means of trial and discipline. In infant baptism not particular virtues are inspired, but a habit (quality) of virtue. The baptism of children of non-Christian parents without the parents' consent is disapproved by Thomas Aquinas, but approved by Duns Scotus. Pope Eugenius IV. describes the effect of baptism thus: "The remission of all guilt, original and actual, also of all punishment due for the guilt itself."

CONFIRMATION.—Its institution by Christ was affirmed and its reservation to the bishop justified by ingenious reasons. The matter is the chrism; the form the words, "I sign thee with the sign of the cross," etc. The effect is the gift of the Holy Spirit and power.

THE EUCHARIST, as the chief sacrament, receives ample illustration. The elements are the matter, the words of institution the form. The teaching of Alexander of Hales exerted great influence here. Transubstantiation is everywhere assumed. The words of institution effect the change. "A consecrating power lies not only in the words themselves but also in the authority committed to the priest in his consecration and ordination;" "in the formal words of this sacrament there is a certain created power for effecting the change in the sacrament" (Thomas). "When the utter-

ance of the words ends, the sacrament begins" (Duns). It is a special feature of this sacrament that it exists not only in the partaking, but also "in the consecration of the matter" (Thomas). The result is the presence of the true body and blood of Christ; the soul of Christ and his Godhead are present not "by sacramental influence," but "in real concomitance"¹ (*ibid.*). The withdrawal of the cup from the laity, which was practised more and more, was justified on this ground. The accidents of the bread and wine remain—an additional miracle. So long as the species of bread and wine are preserved, the sacrament continues. The body which Christ gave to his disciples was the glorified body, of which he himself also partook.

Much unedifying controversy arose on the question how the body of Christ, which is in heaven, can also be in many other places. Of course no real answer can be given. Alexander of Hales said: "Christ is circumscriptively or locally contained in heaven; he is not circumscriptively or locally contained under the sacrament." Thomas, similarly: "The body of Christ is in this sacrament after the manner of substance, not after the manner of quantity." Duns rejects this answer as contradicting the nature of matter,

¹ Because the two natures in Christ are inseparable.

because substance cannot exist without properties. But he asks, Cannot God alter or add to the properties of matter? Can he not add the power to be in many places at once? Realists and Nominalists discussed the question from their different standpoints.¹ The difficulty was the greater to the former, because they held the independent existence of space. Note the distinction mentioned above "manner of substance," which is to be invisible; and if the substance is reduced to a mathematical point, as it may be, the difficulty is also reduced. To the Nominalists space did not exist independently, but only things conceived in space. Again the reduction to a point is resorted to. "The body of Christ is present in the eucharist with the property of quantity, but without existing as a quantum." "But these arid speculations altogether fail to prove the impossible. The body of Christ is in heaven locally, and it is all present in its substance in every eucharist. Dogma stands against dogma, and no logic bridges the chasm" (Seeberg). There is the substance of flesh and blood without the accidents, the accidents of bread and wine without the substance. The idea of concomitance was much insisted on.

¹ See Litton, *Introduction to Dogmatic Theology*, Part II. p. 284.

As to the effect, Thomas says: "The effect which Christ's passion wrought in the world this sacrament works in man." "The eucharist was instituted for a sacrifice and for a sacrament or food" (Biel). The latter points to increase of spiritual life, the imparting of grace, and the forgiveness of venial sins. The eucharist is also a "memorial of the divine passion." It is also a *sacrifice*. Christ's body is really offered, "there is not merely a representative but a real immolation." It avails not only for the partakers, but for others, "so far as it is offered for their salvation." It avails also for souls in purgatory. "That sacrifice has similar effects to the sacrifice on the cross" (Biel). Pope Eugenius says: "The priest, speaking in Christ's name, performs this sacrament, for by virtue of the words themselves the substance of the bread and the substance of the wine are converted into the body and blood of Christ, so however that the whole Christ is contained under the species of bread and wine; and under any part of the consecrated host and consecrated wine, in case of separation, is the whole Christ." Biel emphasises the spiritual effects,—life, sustenance, patience, fellowship, healing, strength.

While the decisions of the Church, as given above, were accepted, free discussion was not

altogether wanting. We find Duns Scotus, who taught the Church doctrine, asking whether without any change in the elements the divine power could not cause Christ's body to be present and impart grace to the soul. Alexander of Hales arguing against the suggestion, says that such a view would lead to worship of the bread.

PENANCE.—The matter here consists of acts of penance; the form of the words "I absolve thee," etc. As the perfection of everything lies in the form, the priestly absolution acquires high importance. The purpose of the sacrament is to remove mortal sin¹ committed after baptism.

The earliest view was that the first element is contrition; but if contrition is present, forgiveness is certain, and there is no need of confession and absolution. Contrition must be the fruit, not the condition, of grace. Besides, how can any one in mortal sin be the subject of contrition? This led to the adoption of another line of thought. Attrition, a purely human feeling of compunction for sin, arising from fear, was made the beginning of penance, taking the place of

¹Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between mortal and venial thus: "In mortal sin there are two things—aversion from the unchangeable good and conversion to the changeable;" in venial sins only the second is present (Thomas on Penance, see Harnack, vi. 245).

the old contrition. Attrition merits *de congruo* divine help and prepares for confession and absolution. The confession is to the priest because he alone can consecrate the eucharist and dispense grace. But God cannot remit man's sin without some change of man's will; hence remission of sins is accompanied by the infusion of grace (Thomas). If the penitent presents no obstacle, in absolution he receives grace, which does away spiritual guilt and "some of the temporal." The last qualification is necessary to leave a ground for acts of penance.¹ In this order contrition comes last as a consequence of the grace of absolution.

After absolution only the temporal penalties of sin remain, and these must be erased by works of satisfaction, consisting in sacrifices of soul, body, or worldly means, by prayer, fasting, and alms. Neglect of these exposes to the pains of purgatory. The satisfactions of penance, while not equivalent, are sufficient.

Indulgences—the final outcome of the doctrine of penance—became more prominent and were defended on principle. The Church is one as the body is one. The merits of Christ and the

¹ This is the pith of Thomas Aquinas' teaching. Dr. Seeberg gives also that of Duns Scotus and Biel (p. 120); but there is no material difference.

saints are more than are necessary.¹ These superfluous merits of the Head and members are distributed at the will of the Pope among the more needy,—a strange application of the solidarity of the race. The souls in purgatory, whose probation is incomplete, can share in the treasure. The distribution is effected in the case of the living by a judicial decision of the Pope; in the case of the dead by intercession. The Pope is the supreme judge; he may delegate his power in this matter to bishops.²

EXTREME UNCTION.—The matter is the oil blessed by the bishop; the form is the prayer offered. According to Thomas Aquinas and Scotus the sacrament was instituted by Christ himself; this was now asserted for the first time. Some limited the effect to the removal of venial sins (Bonaventura, Scotus), others extended it to all remaining sin (Albert, Thomas). Bodily healing is included, as far as is expedient. The anointing takes place on the eyes, nostrils, ears, mouth, hands, feet, loins.

ORDINATION.—The matter consists of the vessels or symbols used; the form of the accompanying words. It confers authority to administer all

¹ Alexander of Hales and Albert the Great advanced the doctrine, Thomas Aquinas adopted it (Fisher, *Christian Doctrine*, p. 259).

² Harnack, vi. 259; on Purgatory, p. 262.

the sacraments. A question arose whether the episcopate is a separate order or combines with the presbyterate. Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventura argue that as the eucharist is the chief sacrament and it is administered by priests as well as bishops, the episcopate is not a separate order. Only if "order" be used in the improper sense of dignity or rank, can it be called higher. Duns Scotus argues that, granting the priesthood to be the supreme office, the power to confer this office implies a higher character. Later writers incline to agree with Scotus. This sacrament is reserved to the bishop.

MATRIMONY.—The object is the bringing up of children and the prevention of sin. Marriage may be nullified by a solemn vow of continence made previously, or by entrance into a religious order before consummation. The form and matter are variously stated. Some say that the form is, not the priestly benediction, but the mutual consent of the parties. A divine energy is present in the consent, hallowing the marriage. The question of the matter is left undecided. It looks as if the development in this case had stopped midway. Marriage is indissoluble and monogamic. It is forbidden to the priesthood.¹ It images the union of Christ with the Church.

¹ Because priests have to handle sacred vessels and sacraments.

Thomas Aquinas calls the Church the "congregation of the faithful," also "the communion of the faithful." In it the "communion of the sacraments"¹ is found. The sacraments lead to the ministers who administer them and distinctions of higher and lower. The Church assumes the form of an earthly commonwealth. All priests celebrate the eucharist; but some sacraments, as we have seen, are reserved to the bishop. There are two keys, one of the priesthood and one of jurisdiction; one belonging to the priest, the other to the bishop. As the Church is a unity, it needs a Head. "The supreme pontiff is Head of the whole Church" (Thomas). He has "plenary authority over ecclesiastical affairs." He rules like a king in his kingdom; the bishops are his counsellors. The bishops by divine right have plenary authority in their dioceses; but they have it along with the Pope and in subjection to him. Accordingly the Pope has an "immediate jurisdiction" over all souls, and can claim episcopal rights in every diocese. He has to decide on

¹ So he understood the phrase *communio sanctorum*. Others understood it of "saints" or "angels" or "the church triumphant," or communion with the saints and the blessings inherited from them, or the communion of the good of all times and places.

matters of faith and creed, and to summon General Councils. He issues indulgences. As Christ's representative, he is above all princes. If they fall away from him, he can depose them and release their subjects from allegiance. The Church culminates in the Pope.¹

Such were the palmy days of mediæval theology. The scholastic system was a strange mosaic of philosophy and Christianity. Philosophy not merely controlled its form, but also exercised great influence on its contents. The faith of the scholastics in logic and their passion for system amounted to fanaticism. If we are struck by the distance between them and Scripture, we must remember that the Fathers came between. The scholastics adopted most of the accretions of the Fathers, added others of their own, and then pushed the whole to their logical conclusion. They are the children of the patristic age. Still philosophy and human tradition did not entirely displace Scripture. *E.g.* human merit and divine grace seem to be opposites; yet scholasticism subtly linked them together (p. 68). Possibly the popular faith was to a greater or less extent more simple and Scriptural. Many of our terms and definitions are borrowed from these days.

¹ Seeberg, p. 128.

CHAPTER III

DECLINE OF SCHOLASTICISM, THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH CENTURIES

Section I. *Duns Scotus*

IN date Duns Scotus ("subtle" doctor) belongs to the close of the former period (1274–1308).¹ But, as his teaching governed the theology of the next two centuries, he really belongs to the later time. He became the great rival of Thomas Aquinas, as Abailard had been of Anselm. The Thomists and Scotists formed two rival camps, which were in great part coextensive with the two orders of Dominicans and Franciscans.² Dr. Loofs well remarks that

¹ Born, according to one account, in the year when Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventura died. Probably a native of Dunse, in Berwickshire. He taught at Oxford, and afterwards with immense applause at Paris. His chief work is a great Commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences (Townsend, p. 245; Workman, ii. 272).

² Thomas was a Dominican, Duns a Franciscan.

the opposition was one of school and school, not of orthodoxy and heresy. The controversy touched many important points, such as the Immaculate Conception, which Dominicans opposed and Franciscans defended, and covered the whole field of church life. The extent and duration of such controversies explain the ambiguity and compromises on many subjects of the definitions of the Trent Council. The root of the differences is found ultimately in the teaching and temperament of the two leaders.

In philosophy Thomas and Duns stood on the same ground. The latter was no Nominalist, but a moderate Realist, like Thomas (p. 95). The radical difference lay elsewhere. Duns maintained the supremacy of the will over intellect in human nature, a far-reaching principle. With Thomas intellect was supreme; his whole effort went to prove the truth of doctrine to the reason; what the reason approved the will obediently carried into effect. On the contrary, Duns made the intellect serve the will. The will is under no necessity to carry out the clearest intellectual convictions and intuitions. Here is the seat of freedom. Thought acts from necessity; will is quite unfettered. On such principles the centre of gravity is shifted from knowledge to practice. Thus, Duns introduced

a new point of view, which affects every part of religion,—a point of view very familiar to us in modern days. It meant a revolution, and it effected one. The old teaching may have exaggerated the place of knowledge in religion ; but Duns and his followers go to as great an extreme in the opposite direction.

Duns was at once orthodox and rationalist. He accepted every doctrine taught by the Church on the authority of the Church and Scripture. He believed on the ground of authority, not of reason and proof. At the same time he criticised with unlimited freedom any and every doctrine he believed. In this respect he was even a greater rationalist than Abailard. Not without truth was he called the “subtle” doctor. There is no end to his arguments for and against every position, the result often being left uncertain. In this respect he gave full rein to the intellect. It is easy to see which of the two forces—orthodoxy or rationalism—would tell most on others. His exaltation of church authority as the ground of faith is quite in keeping with his principle of the supremacy of will ; in truth its logical outcome is despotism in Church and State. As in man will is supreme, so in God. The sufficient reason for everything is God’s will. Arguing against Anselm’s doctrine of satisfaction

for sin, he denies the necessity for it in any respect; it is right and true, because God so chose. God does not will anything because it is right; it is right because he wills it. Thus, the despotism of a single power or faculty is asserted in the interest of freedom. Intelligence and reason are reduced to servitude in order that will may sit on the throne. Freedom is confounded with arbitrariness. Such teaching is a sure sign and cause of decay; it degenerates more and more in the hands of subsequent teachers. We note some further characteristic details.

His view of the nature of will leads him to lay great stress on the individual, the personal, the concrete, rather than with Thomas Aquinas on the universal. The individual is the end of nature and the highest form of existence. Hence the importance of experience for knowledge. He also makes the intellect more active. Instead of waiting passively for the impression of the object, it seizes the object, impresses a form or species of its own upon it, and so coins the general concept.

The revelation of Scripture is the basis of religious knowledge and faith. Scripture is true, and contains all necessary truth. Then the authority of the three creeds, the "authentic Fathers," and the Roman Church is placed

alongside Scripture, for the Roman Church decides what is Scripture, what it means, what is orthodox or heretical. Thus the Church is the final authority. "Nothing is to be held as essential to faith but what can be expressly proved from Scripture, or is expressly declared by the Church, or evidently follows from something plainly contained in Scripture or plainly determined by the Church." Even if a doctrine is destitute of all other authority or rational proof, it must be received simply on the authority of the Church, which is the modern Romanist position exactly. Yet Duns Scotus claims and practises unlimited liberty to criticise all doctrines. It is such teaching as this that has brought on scholastics the reproach of holding a double form of truth or contradictory propositions, one thing being true in religion, the opposite in history or science. Simply on the ground of the authority of Scripture and the saints, he held the possibility of faith infused into the intellect as love is infused into the will. The faith that rests on rational proof is acquired faith, and therefore less certain than faith that is God's direct gift to the individual. We cannot imagine teaching more likely than this to foster and justify scepticism. Men are not likely in religion to believe on mere authority what

cannot be proved as other things are proved. First to discredit doctrines, and then to say that they must be believed because the Church says so, is a direct encouragement to scepticism.

To him God, as the "first efficient cause," is intelligent will. He proves it thus. There is contingent causality in the world. Since every second cause works "in so far as it is moved by the first cause," the first cause must work contingently, *i.e.* it is free will. "Either nothing takes place contingently, or the first cause acts so immediately that it might also not act." Contingency cannot with Aristotle be limited to second causes; for if the universal working of the first cause were necessary, this would make the effects of second causes necessary. Accordingly God is free will. No reason can be assigned for his willing or not willing, for all action of will is without reason; "and so there is no reason why will willed this, but that will is will." The reasoning is too simple. God wills this or that, because he wills it, and so makes it good. The argument on divine love is more reasonable. God wills or loves himself. Since all being is traced back to God, it is subject to God as the final end, and consequently has its share in God's love to himself. Thus love embraces all creation.

This champion of freedom holds Augustine's doctrine of predestination, like many others, maintaining God's freedom even in the act of predestinating. Discussing the question whether one predestinated could be condemned, he answers affirmatively in the sense that God could predestinate or not. He replies to the objection that the doctrine leads to immorality, by saying that God's will cannot be frustrated by anything outward. Predestination does not depend on foreknowledge, because God foresees all contingent action in its dependence on his will, and therefore the good actions of man appear as determined by that will. Predestination has no ground on man's side, for the divine will that a man shall be saved exists prior to faith and good works. Dr. Seeberg points out the encouragement to scepticism in such reasoning. "If the illogical is often true, may not the logical also be false?"

We see the influence of the same views in a striking way in Duns' doctrine of sin. As righteousness and sin both depend on acts of will, original righteousness in Adam cannot have been his work, but must have been the effect of a "superadded gift" of grace. Nor can there be original *sin*; for how can evil will be transmitted by generation? Yet he allows original

guilt, on the ground that Adam forfeited the original righteousness given him for himself and his posterity. The only sense in which original sin is true is in the lack of original righteousness, the loss of which was an act of will. This throws some light on Duns' doctrine of the sinless conception of the Virgin, which can only mean the absence in her of original guilt. His two arguments for it are that it was eminently fitting, and that it was possible to God. But original sin, in his sense of sin, is denied of all. Actual sin in individuals also is a defect in will. Instead of loving the supreme good or God, the will rests in a lower good.

It is a merit in Duns that in his doctrine of Christ's person he does more justice to the human life than most of the scholastics. He held a real communication of grace to the soul of Jesus, and a real growth in knowledge. Knowledge of universals Christ had through union with the Word; but knowledge of the individual and concrete he acquired as others did (Luke 2⁴⁰). He acquired merit by fasting, watching, prayer, resistance to temptation, as others did. In other respects Duns follows the traditional doctrine closely.

It is in relation to the work of redemption that Duns' peculiar theory is applied most

rigorously. The merit of Christ is only finite in itself, because only his finite human nature could acquire merit. But God had from eternity foreordained his suffering as the means of redemption, and therefore willed to accept it as efficacious. By another act of will he limited its efficacy to the elect. Duns also traverses all Anselm's arguments (p. 33) for the necessity of satisfaction. It was only necessary because God so willed. Nor, again, can it be proved that it must be made by the God-man. It might have been made by an angel, or a sinless or even sinful man, if God had so willed. Still God must have had reason for acting as he did. What was the reason? We may conjecture that the particular method was chosen because it was the best adapted to call forth man's gratitude and love in response. Here we see the subjective views of Abailard repeated. There is also in Duns another line of thought, which Dr. Seeberg states thus: "God will not forgive the sinner his sin, unless something is offered up to him which pleases him more than the sin of mankind displeased him. This could only be the obedience of a person more loved by God than mankind who had sinned would have been loved by God if they had not sinned. This was the person of Christ who in his obedience offered

up the highest love in suffering death for righteousness' sake. For the sake of Christ's obedience and love God bestows grace on men. Thus in the work of Christ as in God's act of redemption, the co-operation of justice and mercy is secured" (p. 141). Anselm might have written in this scholastic strain.

While Duns retains the usual idea of grace as an infused quality of love, he gives man's will a chief place beside it as a co-operating cause of merit. Will may suffice without grace, but not grace without will. The function of grace seems to be to prompt and enable the will to act. Grace is a certain supernatural influence, inclining the will to act, and causing it to act "gladly, promptly, and effectively." It merely perfects action. Again, the acceptance of an action as meritorious is purely a matter of the divine will.

There are some interesting points in the exposition of justification. Attrition, according to the received view (p. 83), is the starting-point. It merits justification *de congruo*. Duns distinguishes in justification between infusion of grace and forgiveness of sin. The former is a real change (*mutatio realis*); for, before grace is infused, it does not exist. Forgiveness is only an "ideal change," making no change in human

nature; and the guilt of man is no real object, but only the ideal relation of exposure to penalty. It seems as if here Duns were approaching Protestant ideas. Infusion of grace, however, is to him the chief factor in justification. The ultimate cause of justification is really not human merit as such, but God's will which established this order of salvation.¹

We cannot but be struck with the original, independent course taken by Duns, as well as with the strenuous effort to do justice to the ethical side of Christianity. The supreme importance ascribed to will is quite an anticipation of the modern spirit. His great influence on later thought is due to these excellences as well as to his defects. Not the least defect was the unchastened boldness of speculation and criticism which drew all subjects in heaven and earth into its range. Unlike Thomas Aquinas, Duns did not know where criticism should stop. He dogmatised where silence would have been the truest wisdom.

Duns' central thought of the supremacy of will powerfully influenced the view taken both of God and man in later theology. "Not the

¹ On the Semi-Pelagianism of Duns Scotus, as well as of Alexander of Hales and Bonaventura, see Fisher, *Christian Doctrine*, p. 249.

world surrounding man, nor the thoughts he gains from it, explain man's action and effort, but his own will. The will is the deepest thing in man, the absolutely individual. In acts of will man enjoys the highest satisfaction. From the standpoint of will, determined by nothing external, man is understood; on it his worth depends. Man is to be judged by his own disposition and act, responsibility and determination—these are the ideas, at least implicitly, contained in the psychology of Duns, however incomplete in detail.” “When God is conceived as absolutely free will, many of the traditional logical theories are dissolved, and the ground is cut away from all speculations about what God must do and what must happen. If absolutely free, nay arbitrary, will is the ground of all things, then the truth must be gathered by careful observation of things and events. This explains in Scotus the study of the concrete and empirical and the appeal to experience, and also the freedom of thought in presence of tradition. There is also explained a certain scepticism, and the satisfaction of the thinker with a ‘probable’ or ‘more probable’” (Seeberg). This is a very favourable estimate of the influence of Duns Scotus. It is no less certain that his influence was largely, if not mainly, disintegrating. He gave the signal

for the break-up of the scholastic system, an event of mingled good and evil.

Section II. *Influence of Nominalism*

William Ockham († c. 1350), the "invincible" doctor, the founder of the Nominalist philosophy, was a disciple of Duns Scotus, and carried his master's teaching to its logical conclusion. Although Duns Scotus held the Realist position, his entire course of thought tended in the opposite direction. His insistence on individual experience required for its justification the theory of knowledge advocated by Ockham.¹ He denied the objective existence of universals or general ideas; they are merely human conceptions, having nothing corresponding to them in objective existence.² In order to knowledge only the mind and the thing known are necessary; any mediation of ideas ("intelligible species") is needless.³ "The intellect, seeing

¹ Ockham was an Englishman. It will be remembered that Robert Pulleyn, Alexander of Hales, Duns Scotus, Bradwardine were of English race (Townsend, p. 269).

² Nominalism reversed the meanings of objective and subjective. There is, of course, an image in the mind of which the name is the sign; so that the subjective image has so far objective existence (Seeberg, p. 176 note).

³ A favourite maxim of Ockham was: "What can be done by

something outside the mind, forms a similar thing in the mind." This image corresponds exactly to the object pictured. From these terms, growing directly out of the individual objects, are formed by thought itself the more general terms called universals.¹ These universals express what is common to a class. If we ask why or how they arise, the answer is that the mind cannot think of the individual without thinking of a class to which it belongs. A white thing suggests abstract whiteness, a related thing, relation, etc. Science or philosophy has only to do with conceptions, not things. Ockham thus greatly emphasises the part which the mind itself plays in human knowledge, quite anticipating the tendency of modern philosophy. Kant and Ockham would have been kindred spirits.

The effect of this teaching, followed up and applied with relentless logic, was immediate and great. Even in the theology of the early Church general terms and concepts had been prominent enough; the Nicene and Athanasian creeds bristle with them. But in scholastic theology they were used on the largest scale.

fewer means need not be done by more" (*quia frustra fit per plura, quod potest fieri per pauciora*).

¹ Terms of the "first" and the "second intention."

When they were taken away, the system fell to pieces, a new basis and form of statement had to be found. As matter of fact, the new basis was not found till the Reformation; in the interval the old system maintained a precarious existence.

The inference which Ockham expressly draws is that faith in the doctrines of Christianity or the Church cannot rest on proof. No scientific proof of dogma is possible. He proceeds to state a number of absurd, almost blasphemous, propositions, which might be put on the same level with the Church doctrines of the Trinity, Incarnation, Transubstantiation, Merit, Penance.¹ The only conclusion left is that faith must rest on the authority of the Church or Scripture. Ockham says: "This is my faith, because it is the Catholic faith; for whatever the Roman Church believes, that only and nothing else I believe, either explicitly or implicitly." There is one point in which Ockham is better than Thomas Aquinas or Duns,—he refers to Scripture behind the Church. No Christian, he says, is bound under necessity of salvation to believe what is not contained in Scripture, or cannot be plainly inferred therefrom. Pope and Church cannot change anything taught there. Truths of faith

¹ Seeberg, p. 176.

are only binding as they are Scriptural. "An assertion of canonical Scripture is of greater authority than an assertion of the Christian Church" (Pierre D'Ailli, † 1420).¹ "Scripture is believed to have been written at the dictation or inspiration of the Holy Spirit" (Biel, † 1495). Paul was the "celestial secretary" (D'Ailli). Durandus († 1334) says: "We assent wholly or chiefly to the articles of faith on the authority of Scripture, which we believe to have been inspired by God." "All canonical Scriptures were revealed by the same infallible author—God" (D'Ailli). Here we seem to have Reformation doctrine, as well as a high doctrine of inspiration. But, on the other side, all Church doctrine was identified offhand with Scripture doctrine; the identity was always assumed. Ockham speaks of transubstantiation as "divinely revealed to the holy Fathers." Yet, on grounds of reason, he criticises the doctrine freely. He says he would not believe in original sin "but for the authority of the saints." We cannot help calling attention again to the sceptical tendency of this teaching. The whole case of Christian or religious faith is given up on

¹ Yet D'Ailli says elsewhere: "We receive the canonical or divine Scriptures on account of the authority of the Catholic Church, which so receives and approves them."

grounds of reason, and placed solely on the ground of blind submission to authority—"I believe as the Church believes." The result of such teaching will often be not faith but unbelief, as was actually the case. The real causes of the widespread unbelief of Europe just before the Reformation are to be found largely in the unsatisfactory teaching of the scholastics.

The faith by which Christian doctrine is received is "infused faith" (*fides infusa*), without which no act of faith would be possible. The principle of such faith is implanted in baptism.¹ Of course instruction is necessary in order to actual faith. Faith is defined in strongly intellectual terms. "Believing is an intellectual act, but proceeding from the command (*imperio*) of the assenting will" (Biel). Only a small portion of religious truth consists of necessary truth, or truth evident to the reason; the larger part is contingent truth, without rational proof or against reason. This must be received by a faculty or quality (*habitus*) which is supernaturally inspired. "God of his grace infuses a faculty or power, by means of which we are able to assent to any article of faith."² Faith on another's authority in things we do not understand, or of which we

¹ Ockham and Biel (Seeberg, p. 180).

² Ockham (*ibid.* p. 179).

do not know the reasons, is called "implicit faith." Of course there is a certain measure of truth in this position. Much of the faith of all Christians is implicit in this sense.

It is the scholasticism of these later days that has brought on the entire school, and indeed on the entire mediæval period, the reproach of unlimited hair-splitting. The charge is true of this closing period, but not of the earlier days. Ockham, whom Dr. Seeberg calls "a fanatic of logic," led the way. Among the leading Nominalists were Durandus de St. Porciano, † 1334 (a Dominican and an exception to the Thomist strain of his order), Pierre D'Ailli, Nicholas de Clemanges, Gerson († 1429), Gabriel Biel († 1495). It would be easy to give a long list of able writers taking opposite sides or advocating eclectic doctrines, but they would be mostly unknown names to us. Gerson, Chancellor of Paris University (fifteenth century), is one of the best known. Thomas Bradwardine, archbishop of Canterbury († 1349), is a considerable name. The best defence to be made for Ockham and his school is their practical aim. Their appeal to sense and experience was a recoil from the passion for abstractions that had long prevailed in philosophy. They preferred an actual to an ideal world, and protested against the discussion of questions on which

certainty was impossible. Gerson advocated a reform of this kind in theology: "In the faculty of theology reformation seems to be necessary. First, let us not discuss useless doctrines without fruit and substance, because through them doctrines useful and necessary to salvation are neglected. Through them students are misled into thinking those to be great who give themselves to such studies and despise Scripture and teachers. Through them theologians are laughed at by other faculties, for they are called dreamers, and are said to know nothing of solid truth and morals and Scripture. By them neither church nor faith is edified within or without."

Dr. Seeberg gives interesting particulars of the teaching of these days on particular doctrines.

On the doctrines of God, of sin and freedom, Duns was mainly followed. This opposition of the flesh to the spirit—concupiscence—is natural. The "superadded gift" of grace overcame it in Adam. Original sin is the "privation of the original righteousness that ought to exist" (Biel). Natural freedom of will is not touched by the Fall. "Rectitude of natural will (*i.e.* liberty) is not corrupted by sin, for really the will itself is not separable from liberty" (*ibid.*). "By man's sin nothing is corrupted or destroyed in the soul" (Ockham).

In Redemption Thomas and Duns mainly control the course of thought. The subjective view prevails, while the objective is not wanting. "The suffering of Christ was a sufficient and superabundant satisfaction for the sin of the whole human race. Christ by his love and obedience in suffering presented to God something more acceptable than recompense for the offence of the whole human race required" (Durandus). Anselm's idea of the necessity of satisfaction is often questioned. Yet it is regarded as the most appropriate, because exhibiting God's love in the strongest light. Redemption is realised only in those "who are united to him as members to a head," or "by real imitation, when we suffer like Christ" (*ibid.*). On the other hand, Gabriel Biel (†1495) strictly follows Duns in ascribing the infinite merit of Christ's suffering to the divine will. Biel, like Duns, is a strong predestinarian. Christ's suffering is merely the means by which God's purpose to save the elect is carried out. "No one obtains salvation finally, unless he was predestinated eternally." Of course he holds the usual doctrine of merit. "Although Christ's passion is the principal merit for which grace is conferred, the opening of the kingdom and glory, yet it is never the only and entire merit-

orious cause. It is plain that with Christ's merit there always co-operates some work, as merit *de congruo* or *de condigno*, on the part of him that receives grace or glory" (Biel). Thus our merit is the complement of Christ's merit. Dr. Seeberg thinks it is not right to say that in this period "the main thoughts of Anselm's theory of atonement had become common property." Rather Abailard's lead was followed. If so, the general acceptance of Anselm's teaching was postponed till the Reformation. Even where salvation is ascribed most fully, as it often is, to Christ's sacrificial death, the sacraments are regarded as the channels by which the benefits of that death are conveyed to us. A statement of the views of Durandus and Biel on Penance, Justification, and Merit would only be a repetition of the teaching of Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and others already given.

In regard to transubstantiation, a peculiar theory was broached by some writers, to the effect that the substance of the bread and wine remained along with Christ's body — a view resembling the Lutheran doctrine of consubstantiation,¹ although the word was not used. Ockham, Durandus, Biel, John of Wesel, Wessel,

¹ We shall see afterwards that Luther had studied the scholastics.

and others admit its possibility, and more or less favour it. D'Ailli defends it: "It is quite possible that the substance of bread coexists with the substance of body," and speaks of the theory as not opposed to reason or Scripture. As long as Christ's body was held to be present, speculation was free. Ockham held transubstantiation simply on Church authority. Next, speculation was busy respecting the mode. The Nominalist doctrine was used as a help. Quantity does not exist as a separate thing; there are merely quantitative objects. This object or thing might be reduced to anything short of the vanishing-point, and yet the substance remain. So it may be with Christ's body in the eucharist. Angels and the human soul are quoted as examples of different modes of presence, the difference between material and spiritual things being ignored. The whole Christ is in every part of the host, and in the whole as the soul is in the body. He is therefore present in the eucharist in a different way from what he is in heaven. A writer called Faber Stapulensis († 1536) held a doctrine still more like Luther's;¹ but this was in Luther's days. Christ's presence in every eucharist is twofold, as in the first eucharist—present to

¹ Seeberg, p. 190 note.

sense and hidden under the signs. He is united with the recipients. "He is everywhere, divinely and also corporeally, wherever he wills."

Transubstantiation was the doctrine against which Wyclif († 1384) waged uncompromising war. He opposes it as a new doctrine, and worse than heathenism. He distinguishes sharply between sign or sacrament and the body. The words of institution are figurative. Wyclif strongly held Augustine's doctrine of predestination, making it the ground of salvation. God is the sole cause of the difference between the predestinated and those only "fore-known or ordained to endless punishment." Yet he tries to save freedom in words: "God cannot will me to merit or the opposite, unless I also will." Grace means both the divine will to do the creature good and the "infused" power by which the creature becomes in form acceptable to God. The latter grace enables to meritorious action. He only admits a merit *de congruo*.

Bradwardine was a still more zealous champion of predestination and foe of Pelagianism. God is the cause of all acts and events. Every event rests on an unchangeable "antecedent necessity." There can be no better prayer than "Thy will

be done." He opposes grace to merit. Predestination is the "foreordaining of the divine will respecting the rational creature," and it is "two-fold." Its effects are "the present conferring of grace, justification from sin, good merits, final perseverance." Grace is a "habit (quality) of the soul freely infused by God." Yet Bradwardine in words denies determinism and asserts free will, as Augustine would have done.

Section III. *Signs of Change*

1. ATTEMPTS AT REFORM.—There was no lack of good men who lamented the weight of evils under which the Christian world groaned—Papal extortion and tyranny, a corrupt clergy, abounding superstition, materialised worship. An extensive literature remains as evidence of this. Councils were called to effect reform from within at Pisa, 1409; Constance, 1414–17; Basel, 1431–47. But nothing came of them. No one had courage enough to strike at the root of the evils confessed. Nothing is more remarkable than the teaching on church polity, in the early part of the fourteenth century, of Marsiglio of Padua and William Ockham,—an Italian and an Englishman.

The two agree in asserting independent rights

for the State as against the Church. In worldly things the Pope is subject to the Emperor. The supreme power in the State belongs to the nation, which elects its sovereign. No Papal confirmation or institution is necessary. The same line of argument is applied to the Church. The Papacy is one possible form of government, but not the only one. Peter was not made monarch of the Church. He received nothing which the other apostles did not receive. Paul was not subject to Peter, nor did Peter preside at or control the apostolic council. Only in a secondary sense is Peter the foundation of the Church. The functions of Pope and clergy are spiritual. The chief functions are those of the sacrament of penance. But since forgiveness and the giving of grace are God's work, priestly absolution is only in a declaratory sense. Excommunication is too great a power to be left to the clergy, and should belong to a council. An unjust excommunication does not harm the person concerned spiritually. The right of the Pope is to issue precepts and inhibitions for the common good; he has also a right to receive support. The celebration of the eucharist belongs to the clergy. These are most revolutionary doctrines. Though they were never applied in practice, their expression indicates the drift of thought. Ockham

teaches that the Pope can make no new article of faith, his judgment makes no doctrine heretical, all depends on what the teaching of Scripture is. "Sacred Scripture cannot err; the Pope may err."

God indeed has promised to lead the Church into all the truth. But this promise is by no means limited to Pope, Cardinals, Councils, or Clergy. The people also are part of the Church. "Laymen and women are church members (*personæ ecclesiasticæ*) as the clergy are, for they are of the church as the clergy are" (Ockham). "Pope and cardinals are not the rule of our faith." These were startling ideas in those days. The teaching of Wiclif was scarcely more outspoken. To him the Church was the "congregation of all the predestinated," whether belonging to past, present, or future, whether triumphant in heaven, sleeping in purgatory, or militant on earth, whether men or angels, Jews or Gentiles.¹ The "foreknown" merely are not "of the Church," although "in the Church." Whether any one belongs to the Church, *i.e.* is predestinated, can only be inferred from his course of life. The Pope errs when he departs from Scripture. So little is he in this case Head of the Church that it is doubtful whether he is even a member of it. Similar

¹ This is one side of Augustine's doctrine.

teaching is found in John of Wesel († 1481) and John Wessel († 1489), nearer the Reformation time. They base church government on a compact which is annulled by the unfaithfulness of either party. The people must judge both of doctrine and conduct. Excommunication is valid only when in harmony with facts. We see how far and deep the criticism had gone.

2. FORERUNNERS.—It has been the custom to speak of certain men as “Reformers before the Reformation.”¹ The phrase is correct only in a limited sense, and probably was never meant in any other. These writers never left the Church or abandoned its teaching. There were two remarkable series of German Mystics, one in the fourteenth and one in the fifteenth century: Eckhart († 1327), Tauler († 1361), Suso († 1361), Ruysbroek († 1381); also, John of Goch († c. 1475), John of Wesel, Wessel. Reformers in a fuller sense were Wyclif († 1384), Hus († 1415), Savonarola († 1498).

It is not a little remarkable that contemporaneously with the theological critics already mentioned (Ockham and others) there should appear another series of teachers who unconsciously were critics of the existing system in the sphere of practical religion. They virtually

¹ See Ullmann's two excellent volumes under this title.

left dogma and ritual on one side and showed that blessedness was to be reached by other means altogether—by inward purifying, enlightenment, and union with God, by dying to self and the world and losing self in righteousness and God. This was the keynote of the Mystics just mentioned. Their works form an extensive and interesting literature, as they are also a most striking phenomenon in church history ; no other similar series is known. Modern writers have drawn largely from them. Their influence on Luther as well as on others was great. But they stood quite within the church system. They did not even criticise doctrine and discipline, although they might condemn the abuse of indulgences and the like. Thomas à Kempis is scarcely a mystic in any sense. He represents the experimental side of religion ; but his *Imitation* in its complete form shows how fully he accepted church teaching as to sacraments and everything else. “A humble man must be detached from the creature, conformed to Christ and transformed into God” (Suso). He is first a servant, then a friend, then a son of God (Ruysbroek).¹ (a) The first step is detachment from the creature, from sense and self, which is effected by confession and sacrament, penance, mortification,

¹ Seeberg, p. 162.

prayer, and meditation on God's love. The spiritual end of outward exercises is here kept in view. (b) Conformity to Christ is to be brought about by consciously following in his steps. The conformity is to be far more inward than outward, as the *Imitation* and Tauler's *Following of Christ*¹ show. "Thou must pass through my suffering humanity if thou wouldst arrive at my simple divinity" (Suso, Tauler, etc.). Great stress is laid on self-renunciation and suffering. "The quickest beast to carry thee to perfection is suffering" (Eckhart). The office of suffering in Thomas à Kempis is well known. Christ's suffering is our "perfect righteousness" (Suso). "All my comfort and my confidence lie wholly in thy suffering, thy satisfaction, and thy merit." "And yet every man partakes in the satisfaction only in so far as by sympathy he becomes like me." The unevangelical element in this is easily seen. At the same time there is a certain anticipation of Reformation truth. Regeneration or sanctification may be said to be the central thought of mysticism, not justification. (c) The goal is union with God. There is much that is unintelligible in what is said on this subject, drawn from Neo-Platonist sources. "The nature of the soul is united with the nothing and the powers of the

¹ "Done into English by J. R. Morell" (Burns and Oates).

soul with the works of the nothing" (Suso). "Whoever has inwardness in outwardness his inwardness will be more inward than his whose inwardness is in inwardness," which, being interpreted, seems to mean, He who lives an inward life in the world is more truly spiritual than one who lives an inward life in seclusion—an excellent sentiment from a mystic. "The created will so flows into the divine will and blends therewith and becomes nothing, that the eternal will itself alone wills, does and leaves undone there."¹ Vision and ecstasy are much spoken of. Yet Eckhart says that a good man will be ready to give up the highest ecstasy to cook a meal for a needy man. The chief virtue is complete abnegation of will and self in all things. A common phrase is that Christ is born in the believing soul. The incarnation at Bethlehem only reaches its end in this spiritual birth in man. Still all the writers of this class remained within the lines of the Church.

The divergence of Wyclif, Hus, and Savonarola was greater. How the Church dealt with the two latter we know; it would have dealt with Wyclif in the same way, if circumstances had

¹ *German Theology*, an anonymous work of those days of great reputation, which was greatly prized by Luther, published in translation by Macmillan.

permitted. All three sought to reform, not subvert the Church.¹ There is no doubt that on the question of transubstantiation Wyclif would have been condemned as heretical. Hus, his disciple, held fast to the doctrine, while advocating communion in both kinds. Wyclif said that Christ's body is in the bread, not in substance and dimension, but virtually, spiritually, sacramentally. With respect to the sufficiency of Scripture, it is not so clear that his position and that of others contradicted explicit church teaching. No doubt theologians had long practically assumed the authority of tradition or the Church alongside Scripture; but this was not actually made binding till the Trent Council in the sixteenth century. Goch, speaking for others as well as himself, said: "Canonical Scripture alone has unquestioned confidence (*fidem indubiam*) and irrefragable authority. The writings of ancient Fathers have authority so far as they are in harmony with canonical truth." But even Thomas Aquinas had said: "Sacred doctrine uses the authority of canonical Scripture in giving proof strictly and of necessity, but the authority of other doctors of the Church in giving proof as it were strictly, but probably."²

¹ *Reformamini in novitate sensus vestri* (Rom. 12², Vulgate).

² Loofs, p. 295 f.

At least verbally Scripture was acknowledged in the Middle Ages to be the supreme authority on doctrine; in reality the principle was greatly qualified or neutralised.

Wyclif's chief opposition was to the hierarchical government of the Church. His ideal for the Christian and the Church was Christ's poverty and humility. Christ, he said, requires nothing from man but love and its exercise. His views on these questions are drawn out at length in his work on Civil Government (*de civili dominio*), a treatise which is often charged with teaching communism. The subject does not concern us here. His words must not be taken piecemeal, but as parts of an elaborate theory of what ought to be rather than of what is possible. When he says that the earth belongs to the predestinated, the righteous, that rich sinners are robbers, that in Christianity the only law is that of Christ, that civil government is a necessary evil in consequence of sin; all this must be judged as theory. Others than Wyclif have dealt in utopias. His purpose may be seen from his division of government into divine, angelic, and human, and of the latter into coercive and evangelical—one for the civil sphere, the other for the religious. The former was "instituted on occasion of sin," the latter "by God alone and

explained by Christ in word and deed." We thus get civil and canon law (*jus civile* and *jus canonicum*). For the government of the Church, "the spiritual house, having the faith of Christ for its foundation, the hope of life for its walls, love for its roof," the evangelical law was enough. No civil government would be necessary, if all men were "in grace," *i.e.* were predestinated or saints. His ideal for a Christian man's life was that of Francis of Assisi. A Christian man should renounce the world altogether and become a poor monk. Wyclif argues thus: "Every man ought to be in grace; and if he is in grace, he is lord of the world with its contents; therefore every man ought to be lord of all things (*universitatis*), which cannot be when there is a multitude of men unless they all have all things in common; therefore all things ought to be common,"—purely theoretical argument. His teaching on the last subject had great influence in Bohemia, and contributed to the Hussite war.

Wyclif says, Christ is the only Head of the Church. "The Pope, if he is predestinated and exercises pastoral duty, is head of so much of the militant Church as he rules." Indulgences, canonisation, saint-worship are condemned, as springing from lust of gain and power, and contradicting Christ's law and the

divine rule. The Papacy is an idea foreign to Scripture. "The Pope with his whole sect (*tota secta*), endowed with temporal power, is a hardened heretic; the Pope is not the vicar of Christ, but the vicar of antichrist." Despite his rejection of these things and much more Wiclif remained on the ground of Church doctrine as a whole.¹

If we included all preparatory movements, we should have to consider the Revival of Learning in representative men like Colet († 1519), More († 1535), Reuchlin († 1522), Erasmus († 1536). Many of the humanists were rather literary men and scholars than Christians. Some of them, it was said, lived like heathen and died Christians. Erasmus would have been content with reformation in morals. His edition of the Greek New Testament (1516) had great influence, and also his editions of the Fathers (Jerome, Cyprian, Hilary, Irenæus, Ambrose, Augustine, Chrysostom, Origen). "Let this be thy rule, to set Christ before thee as the one aim of thy whole life; to him direct all thy studies, all thy efforts, all thy rest and toil. But imagine not Christ to be an idle voice, but nothing else than love, simplicity, patience, purity, in short everything he taught. . . . Whoever seeks virtue alone aims at Christ"

¹ See Lechler's admirable *John Wiclif and his English Precursors*.

(*Erasmi Enchiridion*). This interesting topic lies outside our field.

Few who have read the foregoing exposition will doubt that in mediæval theology logic and metaphysics were greatly overdone. Men acted as if by reason and study they could find out God, could find out the Almighty unto perfection (Job 11⁷). They undertook to lay bare the depths of the Godhead. In that case revelation would have been unnecessary. At the same time we need not agree with the harsh judgment once passed on scholasticism as "revealed metaphysics." Excessive as was the attention paid to form, the substance of divine truth was not wholly forgotten. Incarnation and redemption may have been overlaid with theory and definition, but they were believed in as saving truth. Nor can we fail to recognise and honour the lofty motives which animated the greatest teachers in the long series—their passion for truth, their vast erudition, their strenuous faith and industry and invincible patience. They succeeded as completely as men could with their light and on their methods. It was well, perhaps, that the attempt to construct a metaphysical theology should be made. It will never be attempted again. It need not be. The scholastic writers have done all that is possible in that way. A

story runs that when Aquinas was writing his great theological treatise the Lord said to him in vision or dream, "Thomas, thou hast written well about me. What shall I give thee?" The saint replied, "Thyself, Lord."¹

¹ On Scholasticism in general, see Townsend, pp. 313, 357; Workman, *Church of the West*, i. 203, ii. 251.

PART III

THE REFORMATION

WITH the Reformation a new era opens in Christian history. The interpretation of Scripture, the views taken of Christian life and doctrine, underwent a transformation. We feel at once that we breathe different air and see everything in a different light. The Reformation did not take its rise in any doctrinal or ecclesiastical controversy. It arose out of the attempt of Luther to find an answer to the question, How can man be just before God? This with him was a personal question. He strenuously sought peace with God for himself. Light came, he said, when he saw that the righteousness of Romans 1¹⁷ meant not the righteousness by which God is just and punishes sinners, but that by which a merciful God justifies us through faith. Thus the ground of the Reformation was entirely practical and "religious." But this may be easily misunderstood. Luther

never renounced or discountenanced theology. He disclaimed the character of a theologian for himself and denounced the methods of scholastic theology in which he had been brought up. But he never disparaged theology; indeed in praising Melancthon he praised it. The change which he initiated was an immense one, but it was a change in direction and aim merely. In a right sense he was a revolutionist (Acts 17⁶). The revolutionists in the wrong sense were the scholastics and Fathers who had diverted the course of Christian thought into wrong paths. Luther led the Church back to primitive ways. The opposition which some modern teachers try to establish between "religious" and theological or theoretical is a false one.¹

Luther's originality is nowhere more strikingly seen than in his decisive breaking away from scholasticism. He had been a careful student of Peter Lombard, Ockham, D'Ailli, Biel, and others, and avowed himself an "Ockhamist" in philosophy. He continued to use very often the old terms, even when giving them a new sense. On the doctrine of the sacraments he retained, as we think, too much of mediæval belief. But, after every deduction, the change

¹ See Harnack, vii. 171 ff., for a graphic general description of Luther's work.

he introduced was very great, especially in giving emphasis to the practical doctrines of redemption. The doctrine of atonement and its related truths formed the staple of Reformation preaching and theology. The ground, conditions, and effects of a sinner's justification were the themes of sermons and theological treatises. These subjects, that had been comparatively neglected in early times,¹ were now put in the foreground. The theology of early days began with God and descended to man; the Reformation took the opposite course. It is characteristic that the first edition of Melancthon's "Commonplaces," which expounded the leading thoughts of the Roman epistle, omitted reference to the Trinity and Christology. Luther insisted that we must approach the divine side of the Lord's life through his humanity and redeeming work. The ideas which formed the substance of the mediæval system—grace, penitence, faith, justification, merit—were completely transformed in his hands.

We cannot wonder that Luther's discovery of truth was gradual. The year 1517, when he published his ninety-five Theses, marked a turning-point in his course. Before that time he had reached Scriptural clearness on many

¹ See *Development of Doctrine in Early Church*, p. 204.

vital questions ; but on others he remained in the old position, such as the worship of saints and the Virgin, the number of the sacraments, transubstantiation and the Mass, the infallibility of the Church. There is no need for us to linger on the earlier stage.

CHAPTER I

LUTHER'S TEACHING ¹

PENANCE AND PENITENCE.—The Reformation began in the dispute about Indulgences. The subject is very prominent in the ninety-five Theses. There Luther says that he does not attack Indulgences, but their abuses. On this subject as on others he advanced by stages. The pith of the question is that Luther went back to contrition, to a change of mind in relation to sin, as the true penitence. Such contrition springs, not from fear of punishment, as attrition was said to do, but from a consideration of the divine benefits, which again is a fruit of grace. Here he seems to hold to the idea of infused grace as the source of all good in man. "Contrition arises under the impulse and command of love." It is Pelagian to say that "penitence begins before love of

¹ *Babylonian Captivity, Liberty of a Christian Man, Address to German Nobles* (1520), *Commentary on Galatians*, etc.

righteousness, which latter is by God's grace, not by nature." "I allow that the law, remembrance of sins, a sight of punishment, may terrify the sinner, but they never make a penitent." Another point insisted on is that penitence is a lifelong act. "Our Lord and Master Jesus Christ, when he said, Repent, meant the whole life of believers to be penitence." Penitence is thus referred to the whole nature and life of man, instead of being a matter of piecemeal barter and exchange. Here were the beginnings of a doctrine of repentance which was bound to result and did result in overthrowing the entire mediæval system of religious practice. When we remember that the sacrament of penance was the means by which all sin after baptism was dealt with, we see the extent of the change. Confession to a priest, while not forbidden, was optional; confession to God was enough. Faith brings assurance of forgiveness. "All depends not on the priest, not on thy doing, but entirely on thy faith; believe, and thou hast." The efficacy of indulgences depends on contrition. Gradually Luther comes to see that his new position sweeps away the idea of satisfaction, the necessity of confession, purgatory, which are not to be found in Scripture. No *sacrament* of penance is left.

Although Luther for a time seemed to preserve the whole theory, it was only in appearance. The details were transformed, and the system was broken up. "Luther began with criticising the sacrament of penance, and replaced it by evangelical repentance" (Seeberg).

SCRIPTURE.—The sole authority of Scripture in matters of faith was a cardinal principle with Luther. This was the ground he took at the Diet of Worms, 1521. But he reached this point at the Leipzig Disputation, 1519, and never wavered afterwards. The Pope, Councils, Fathers were nothing to him as authorities. "No faithful Christian can be compelled beyond Holy Scripture, which is really the divine law, unless a new, attested revelation were given; we are forbidden indeed to believe what is not proved by divine Scripture or manifest revelation." God's Word is to govern God's people, not human doctrine,—Christ, not philosophy. Christ's servants are only to teach his Word. This became one of the fundamental principles of the Reformation. Verbally the same rule was laid down by mediæval writers. But in practice Church tradition was placed beside Scripture.

On the other hand, Luther himself introduced a limitation to his principle. He tested the canonicity of Scripture books by the degree in

which they treated of Christ, a merely subjective condition. "This is the true touchstone to try all books, to see whether they treat of Christ or not." "If I know what I believe, I know what is in Scripture, because Scripture has nothing in it but Christ and Christian faith." "What does not teach Christ is not apostolic, were even St. Peter or Paul the teacher. Again, what preaches Christ would be apostolic, even though Judas, Annas, Pilate, and Herod were the teachers." Hence his disparagement of St. James's epistle and of the book of Revelation. The gospel of John and Paul's epistles, especially Romans and 1 Peter, are "the true kernel and marrow of all books. For in these thou findest not many works and miracles of Christ described; but thou findest a masterly account of how faith in Christ overcomes sin, death and hell, and gives life, righteousness and bliss, which is the true nature of the gospel."¹ On questions of authorship, date, compilation, he speaks with great freedom.

Another weighty distinction which Luther drew was that between law and gospel,—a Pauline contrast. The first is a preparation for the second. It convinces of sin, works penitence, and shows the need of grace. Sometimes he identifies the law with the Old

¹ "Luther's whole theology is Christology" (Harnack).

Testament and the gospel with the New; at others he finds the law in a stricter form in the New Testament also. In any case its office is to prepare for Christ. The gospel saves and comforts those whom the law has humbled and filled with despair. The Baptist comes before Christ. The work of the law and the gospel is a frequent theme in Luther's writings. "The law discovers the sickness, the gospel gives the medicine." The office of the law is "to terrify the impenitent with God's wrath and displeasure." Whoever is under the law is without grace and the Holy Spirit. If he is not to sink into despair, the gospel must come quickly to his help. With the gospel comes the Spirit; then Moses must give way and the law loses its power. Law and gospel are God's Word, but in different senses. Not to have known this distinction is the worst fault of Roman theology. "This distinction between the two is the supreme art in Christianity, which each and all bearing the Christian name may and ought to know." What the law says to the heart, conscience confirms. The inner law of conscience finds expression in the moral teaching of the law of Moses. The sense of obligation it inspires, along with the sense of condemnation and weakness and fear, drives man to

Christ and the gospel. In some passages Luther says that the renewed man does not need the law. He carries it within himself. We do not say that three and seven ought to be ten, they are ten, and no law or rule is needed to make them ten; so we do not say that the righteous man ought to live well, he lives well and needs no law to teach him. The Christian has nothing to do with the law. "Therefore the chief art and wisdom of Christians is to know no law." In other passages, again, he speaks of Christians as still needing the law because they are still flesh. The contradiction is more verbal than real. When he seems to disparage the law, it is when the law is substituted for the gospel as a means of life.

CHRIST'S PERSON.—In nothing is Luther's practical, religious spirit more evident than in his teaching about Christ. Not merely is everything concrete, historical, but everything is viewed in its bearing on human salvation. Luther insists very emphatically that it is in Christ that God is to be found. He is the "true epistle," "the golden book," in which God's gracious will is revealed. Only in the man Jesus is God to be sought and found.¹

¹ On John 17³ he writes: "See how Christ in this saying interblends and unites knowledge of himself and knowledge of

In the Crucified we see God's loving will. From the loving heart of Jesus we rise to the heart of God. This is the right way to find God, not by speculating first on his majesty and government. In Christ we have goodness "concentrated" as in a single word. "All ascent to the knowledge of God is dangerous except that which is through Christ's humility, because this is Jacob's ladder. . . . In other works, God is known in the greatness of his power, wisdom, and justice, and there his works appear most terrible; but here is seen his gracious mercy and love, so that men are able to bear his works of power and wisdom." The divine nature is described as "gracious, loving will"; "the divine nature is nothing else than pure beneficence,"—a great contrast to the

the Father, so that it is only through and in Christ that we know the Father. For I have often said that, and will still go on saying it, so that even when I am dead people may think over it and guard against all teachers whom the devil rides and guides, who begin at the highest point to teach and preach about God, taking no notice whatever of Christ, just as up to this time there has been in the great schools a speculating and playing with his works above in heaven, with the view of knowing what he is and thinks and does by himself." "Begin by applying thy skill and study to Christ, there also let them continue fixed, and if thine own thoughts or reason or someone else guide and direct thee otherwise, only shut thine eyes and say: I must and will know of no other God save in my Lord Christ."

abstract definitions of scholastic days (p. 60). God's anger against sin and sinners indeed is strongly affirmed. But what God is essentially, apart from man's sin, is seen in his relation to believers, which is constantly described as "pure love." Whoever considers Christ's death learns "how immeasurably great and terrible is God's wrath against sin, and again how unspeakable, nay unfathomable, is God's mercy and grace towards us condemned men."

Christ's humanity and divinity are never considered in the abstract, but always in connection with redemption. Christ is not to be preached as "a history and chronicle," but we should be told "why Christ came, how we can use and enjoy him, what he has brought and given to me." "To confess Christ as God is to render and refer to him all the blessings received from him, to expect all blessings from him and put no trust in the creature." His Deity is "a gracious willingness to pity and save." "To have compassion (*misereri*) proves him God and distinguishes him from those who cannot have compassion, because they are wretched (*miseri*). Therefore he who pities and is good is God." His Godhead was hidden in his humanity out of regard for our weakness.

We can understand Luther's impatience with

the excessively abstract definitions of earlier days. Against the view that "the Word of God is light, which shone naturally and always gave light in the reason of men, even of the heathen," Luther says, "These are all Platonic and philosophical thoughts leading us from Christ to ourselves; but the evangelist would lead us from ourselves to Christ, for he would not handle the divine, almighty, eternal Word of God, nor speak of him, save as in the flesh and blood that walked on earth" (in Seeberg, p. 237). "Thus have the sophists painted him, as he is man and God, count his bones and limbs, mingle together his two natures in strange fashion, which is nothing but a sophistic knowledge of the Lord Christ. For Christ is not called Christ because he has two natures. What does this concern me? But he bears this glorious and comforting name from the office and work which he took on himself; this gives him the name. That he is man and God by nature, he has by himself; but that he has so used his office and poured out his love and become my Saviour and Redeemer, this takes place for my comfort and benefit; it applies to me, because he saves his people from their sins" (in Loofs, p. 331). "But if my soul hates the word *homousion*, and refuses to use it, I shall not be a heretic;

for who will compel me, provided I keep the thing that was defined in Councils by means of the Scriptures?"

But whatever fault Luther found with the terms of the old creeds there can be no doubt that he held their substance. The Deity of Christ is assumed everywhere.¹ While Luther criticised the old terms, the Trinity was to him "the first high, incomprehensible, chief article," which is to be believed "without question." "Hence the Wittenbergers not only did not put aside the three œcumenical symbols accepted in the Middle Ages, but strongly emphasised them against the anti-trinitarians. The Apostolic Creed was always specially valued by Luther. The Augsburg Confession accepted the Nicene Creed. Melancthon's *Loci* of 1535 accepted the Trinity. In 1538 Luther published with explanations the three symbols or confessions of the faith of Christ, *i.e.* the Apostolic, the Athanasian, and the *Te Deum* (along with the Nicene)."²

¹ "It is seen in Christ's works, his mediatorship, the infinity of the atonement, the overcoming of God's wrath, his lordship in the world, his work in saving men, his being the object of faith" (Seeberg, p. 251, references being given).

² Loofs, p. 346. Melancthon is more severe even than Luther on the mixing of religion and philosophy. "Whoever seeks the form of Christianity elsewhere than in canonical Scripture

ATONEMENT.—The satisfaction made in Christ's death for man's sin is very prominent in Luther. Man by his sin is exposed to God's anger, enslaved to the devil, bound to the law, subject to the penalty of eternal death. Christ took our place and bore these consequences of sin for us. He is the "sacrifice and payment for the world's sin." "In his tender, innocent heart he must feel God's wrath and judgment against sin, taste eternal death and damnation for us, and, in short, suffer all that a condemned sinner deserved to suffer eternally." All this he bore "that God's anger might be appeased," so that we may find grace and forgiveness. In the same way he spontaneously kept the law, which applies only to sinners, in our stead and for our sakes, and bore the penalties of its transgression. By this means he satisfied the law, *i.e.* the law, being satisfied, has no longer any right or claim on men. Again, he deprives the devil of his right and power over men, because he slew Christ without ground of guilt. What Christ did is as if we ourselves had done it. It would be easy to multiply teaching to the same effect. Anselm's necessity of satisfaction is reproduced, but with this difference. In Anselm the law is conceived as deceived. If you take away from Origen the forest of philosophical propositions, how little is left."

as private, in Luther as public. In one God is conceived as a private person, in the other as a sovereign or judge. Nor is the necessity conceived as absolute. God willed that forgiveness should come to man in this way; no reason is shown why it must be so.¹

Christ's work as intercessor is the continuation of his work of atonement. As sin still cleaves to the Christian, he ever needs the atonement as the ground of forgiveness. Christ has done what we were bound to do but could not; and what he has done becomes ours by faith. "We are most sure that Christ is well-pleasing to God. Therefore as far as Christ pleases him and we cleave to Christ, we also are well-pleasing to God; and although sin cleaves to our flesh, grace is more abundant and powerful than sin. Wherefore sin is unable to terrify or make us doubtful of God's grace in us. For Christ—a most potent giant—abrogated the law, condemned sin, abolished death and every evil. As long as he is at God's right hand, interceding for us, we cannot doubt of God's grace towards us."

Moreover, Christ not only represents us before God but represents God to us. Besides procuring and imparting forgiveness of sin, "he also gives the Holy Spirit, that we may follow him and

¹ The influence of Duns Scotus is seen here and elsewhere.

begin here to subdue and mortify sin." "God has *first* given us a man to make satisfaction for us all to the divine justice. *In the second place* by the same man he has poured out grace and riches," which takes place in regeneration. From Christ as the second Adam and the head of the new humanity flows new life and righteousness into us, for he dwells and rules in us. This is enough to show that to Luther justification, as he defined it, was not the whole of salvation.

SIN.—Recoiling from the Pelagian tendency which prevailed throughout the Middle Ages, Luther went back to the stern doctrine of Augustine, laying special stress on original sin. Before the Fall man, individually and collectively, was all good; since then he is all evil, a lump of corruption (*massa perditionis*). Human works, however fair outwardly, are mortal sins; every sin is mortal. Human nature is corrupt by birth, poisoned by the flesh, governed by evil lust. Yet Luther emphasises the moral side of sin. It consists in blindness, contempt of God, innate impurity, disobedience to God, and above all in unbelief, which is the root-sin. The will is the slave of sin. His treatise on the "Bound Will" was directed against the "Free Will" of Erasmus. Free will is a mere name as regards non-Christians; they are free only to evil. Yet

Luther rejects the notion of constraint either to good or evil. The twofold predestination is also held, with the difference that Luther does not, like Calvin, make it the keystone of his teaching. God's omnipresent activity, alike in good and bad men, is often so strongly asserted as to seem to make God the cause of all that is done. But Luther does not intend this. He is ever asserting man's responsibility for sin. Christ has borne the sins of all men; and if all believed, all would be saved. The inconsistencies are precisely the same as in Augustine's teaching. It is evident that Pelagianism and all notion of human merit are precluded. The glory of salvation belongs to God only.

GRACE.—Luther here went back to the Scriptural idea of grace as God's favour, rejecting the prevailing notion of grace as an infused quality (*gratia infusa* or *creata*). "I take grace properly as *God's favour*, not a quality of the mind, as our moderns (*recentiores*) have taught."¹ Its effect is forgiveness. Grace also renews and changes man. It is this latter effect which Luther speaks of as a "gift." By means of this view of grace the Reformers strenuously combated the idea of human merit and satisfaction in every form. The old view of grace, as an irresistible

¹ See *ante*, p. 71.

divine power and also as a quality in man, is cut off altogether. "This grace of God is an active power, no passive quality in the soul" (Seeberg). On this subject Luther never falls into fatalism. He always makes the relation between God and man a personal and ethical one. The power of love, as he conceives it, is ultimately the spiritual force of Christ's person.

FAITH.—A similar transformation takes place in the idea of faith. It is no longer a habit or quality of the soul (*fides acquisita*), an opinion, intellectual assent merely, but a receiving of God's Word or of Christ offered in that Word. It is God's gift, inspired by him, through the revelation of his love in Christ. So it is trust, confidence in God. "Faith is never of past things but always of future." Christ is its essential content; what is his becomes ours; there is "a perfect marriage" between Christ and man. "His mercy is my righteousness. . . . What is mercy, unless I know it? My righteousness signifies that I am accepted by the merciful One." "If there is true faith, there is a certain confidence and firm assent, by which Christ is apprehended." "Here it is to be observed that there are two kinds of believing: first, a believing about God, which means that I believe that what is said of God is true. This faith is

rather a form of knowledge or observation than a faith. There is, secondly, a believing in God, which means that I put my trust in him, give myself up to thinking that I am dealing with him, and believe without any doubt that he will be and do to me according to the things said of him. Such faith, which throws itself on God, whether in life or in death, alone makes a Christian man." "Faith is a divine work in us, through which we are changed and regenerated by God. . . . O, it is a living, busy, active, powerful thing—faith, so that it is impossible for it not to do us good continually. Neither does it ask whether good works are to be done, but before one asks it has done them and is doing them always. But anyone who does not do such works is an unbelieving man, gropes and looks about him for faith and good works, and knows neither what faith is nor what good works are. . . . Faith is a living, deliberate confidence in the grace of God, so certain that for it it could die a thousand deaths. And such confidence and knowledge of divine grace makes us joyous, intrepid, and cheerful towards God and all creation." Thus faith is no theoretical opinion, but the practical assurance that through Christ's work we are accepted of God. It is also the beginning of an absolutely new life.

Faith renews man. The gift of the Holy Spirit and his work in the soul follow faith. "Your faith is no dream or fiction, but life and deed." It is life in Christ and through Christ, for he lives and rules in us. "Of a dry stump God makes a living tree."

From this follows the assurance of salvation, which is the ground of peace and joy. The believer is directly conscious of God's favour to him; he has and feels Christ and the effects of grace in his heart. This fixed, direct, inner consciousness gives experience, not uncertain opinions. "Though I should preach about God a century, how kind and gentle and good he is, how he saves man, and yet do not taste this in experience, it is all nothing, and no one learns in this way to trust God aright." Creation and redemption are no reality to us without experience and feeling. Only with such feeling and experience are we "certain of faith, assured of salvation." This experience is not identical with the act of faith; it may be lacking for a time, so that faith lives only on the Word; but, as a rule, it accompanies every act of faith and the whole Christian life. The believer has a light, joyous heart. "Thou must have heaven and be saved already before thou canst do good works." Luther frequently insists that Christian life is a looking for blessedness which it already

has. The Christian has a "bold, valiant, fearless heart." Even as to earthly things he trusts joyfully in God's Providence.

JUSTIFICATION.—Luther's chief service to truth was in his clear distinction of justification from regeneration, identifying it with non-imputation of sin, imputation of righteousness, forgiveness. This was no less than a discovery or rediscovery of Paul's meaning (Rom. 4th). At first his language wavers. Thus, he says, "Every one who believes in Christ is just, not yet completely in fact, but in hope. For he has begun to be justified and healed," as if the change were gradual. And again, he finds the ground of the blessing in the twofold consideration that the believer begins to be righteous, and that he is in fellowship with Christ. But he soon learns to define the blessing simply as forgiveness, and to find the ground in the latter consideration only. And yet Luther never considers the two blessings as given or existing apart. Whoever is justified (forgiven) is regenerated, and the converse.¹ This is a sufficient reply to the charge

¹ "Luther never thought of a faith that is not already in itself regeneration, quickening, and therefore good work ; but, on the other hand, in all doubt, in all uncertainty and despondency, refuge is found, not in the thought of the faith which is regeneration, but only in the faith which is nothing but faith : in other words, we are justified by faith alone, *i.e.* only by the

that Reformation doctrine neglected ethical Christianity. Faith is the condition, an indwelling Christ and Spirit the source, of both blessings. Faith justifies and renews, Christ justifies and renews. As to which gift is first in order of thought Luther says tersely, "Before obedience it is necessary that the person be acceptable." He is fond of saying that the sin which remains in the Christian is not imputed for Christ's sake. At the same time the power of the indwelling Christ and Spirit makes man actually righteous. "Because through faith righteousness and fulfilling of the law are begun, therefore for the sake of Christ, in whom they believe, the remainder of sin and the unfulfilled law are not imputed." "Although there are many sins in us, grace so abounds that we are reckoned wholly and completely righteous before God" (1522). "Although sin in the flesh is not wholly gone or dead, he will not reckon or know it. And on such faith, renewal and forgiveness of sin, good works follow" (1537). "Not for the sake of man's faith, but because Christ, the Redeemer,

faith which lays hold on the forgiveness of sins. That continued to be the chief matter for Luther; for only this faith secures certainty of salvation" (Harnack). "Faith is the beginning of the work of the Holy Spirit in the soul in the same sense in which the good tree is the beginning of good fruit" (*ibid.*).

forms the content and the power of this faith, God pronounces the believer righteous, by forgiveness" (Seeberg). Luther says again, "Therefore it is not our righteousness, but Christ's righteousness, nay, this righteousness is Christ himself; and yet he becomes my righteousness when I believe." It was this view of justification that formed the core of Reformation teaching. It also furnished a powerful weapon against the doctrine of human merit in every form.

GOOD WORKS are the invariable fruit of faith. Indeed, faith itself, as exercised by us, may be regarded as a good work, "the first and highest of all good works." Luther dwells much on such works being the free, joyous expression of gratitude and love. The believer does good, not from obedience to law, not from constraint or fear, but from choice and delight. "Just as a living man cannot be inactive, he must move, eat and drink and work, and it is impossible that such acts should be wanting, because he lives, and we need not order and drive him to do such works, but if he is living, he does them; so all that one has to say in order to the doing of good works is, 'Only believe, and thou shalt do all of thyself.'" It is a pleasure to the believer to serve God; for this reason he does good, not in order to obtain merit. Not that works make

men pious; the converse is the case. Man must be good first; then good works follow. "Christ's doctrine is not about doing and non-doing, but about becoming; not new works done, but becoming new first; not a new manner of life, but a new birth." As these works spring from faith or the Holy Spirit, it is clear that they have nothing to do with the law. They are done in the freedom of faith. "To sum up: The Holy Spirit produces faith as the beginning of regeneration. Thus the man becomes actually good, faith becomes the beginning of a new pious life" (Seeberg).¹

WORD AND SACRAMENT.—We have already spoken of Scripture as the sole authority on doctrine (p. 131). But the ministry of the Word in a wider sense is a prominent feature in Lutheranism, supplying an antidote to the partly materialist tendency of its sacramental doctrine. On both subjects Luther's teaching was largely determined by antagonism to the mystic and fanatical extremes² common in his day. The sectarians thought the inner Word enough, and dispensed with outward forms and ordinances. Luther distinguished between the inner and

¹ Harnack's account of Luther's doctrine of justification is somewhat different, vii. p. 206.

² Carlstadt, Schwenkfeld, and others.

outer Word, but insisted that the first is only possible through the second. "The Word alone is the medium of God's grace." The outer Word comes first, the inner afterwards. Where the Word is there Christ and the Spirit are. The Spirit himself "speaks to the heart," impresses the words on the heart. The Spirit's light is given in, with, and through the Word.

Luther defined Sacraments generally as "efficacious signs of grace,"¹—signs, thus going back to Augustine, — efficacious, giving the believer the grace of which they are the outward signs. Their efficacy depends on faith. In one place Luther says that baptism is only an outward sign,—good, if accessible, but otherwise not essential. On this subject also his views underwent development. For some time he recognised penance or penitence as a sacrament, but afterwards accepted only Baptism and the Supper. Even as early as 1519 he speaks of the "two principal sacraments."

God's Word makes Baptism what it is, so that it is not a mere sign. By it the Spirit effects regeneration; the heart is cleansed, the whole nature converted, the Spirit conferred, grace "infused." In it God enters into covenant

¹ Seeberg sees here and elsewhere evidence of the influence of Duns Scotus on Luther, p. 268.

with man. "Thus baptism always abides, and thou canst not fall so far and deep as not to be able again to adhere to it." It signifies both a dying to sin and a birth to new life, and also conveys this. "Thus the Christian life is nothing else than a certain daily baptism." It also witnesses the readiness of God to forgive sin afterwards. In view of the dependence of sacraments on faith, it is maintained that God in some way gives faith even to children brought to baptism.

His doctrine of the Supper was greatly hardened in the controversy with Zwingli; but even previously he had held the presence of Christ's body. The opposite he stamped as a Hussite heresy. Still from 1520 he rejected transubstantiation, holding that the substance as well as the accidents of bread and wine remained. The body is given in, with, under the elements.¹ Questions of mode he repels as refinements of subtilty. The spiritual truth signified and grace conveyed is communion with Christ and all saints in heaven and earth, so that all things become common to them. The presence of Christ's body is the "strongest of all noble seals and signs." It testifies and confirms the grace of

¹ He appeals to D'Ailli (p. 110). Here we have consubstantiation.

God, while strengthening our faith. "If I believe that his body and blood are mine, then I have the Lord Christ utterly and wholly." "You have two fruits of the holy Sacrament: one is, that it makes us brethren and fellow-heirs of the Lord Christ, so that he and we become one whole;¹ the other, that we become one with all other believers, and so are all one whole." From 1520 also Luther received communion in both kinds.

THE CHURCH.—Up to the Leipzig Disputation of 1519 Luther stood on the old ground of Church authority. Then he moved to the new ground, which he occupied ever afterward—the sole authority of Scripture. The great system of Popes, Councils, Canon Law fell away from him. The Church, according to Luther, has two sides, an inward and spiritual one, and an outward and visible one. The principle of the first is Christ's presence and working in the hearts of all believers. On this side the Church is invisible,—a term afterwards applied to true believers as known only to God. The notion of the invisible Church figures largely in Reformation teaching. Christ is the principle of Church unity. There is also an outward, visible Church with visible ordinances and a ministerial order.

¹ *Kuche* = cake.

The two aspects of the Church may be distinguished in thought, but are inseparable in reality. The invisible Church is an object of faith, as the Apostles' Creed says, "I believe." "What is believed is not bodily or visible." The Church is the "communion of saints," "the congregation of all believers," "the holy Christian people," the regenerate. Its members are all priests in the spiritual sense. It is the product and sphere of Christ's redeeming work, the kingdom of God in the earthly stage of its growth. But the working of Christ, which thus constitutes the Church, uses the Word and Sacrament as instruments. Thus a visible Church arises, to which all who would be saved must belong, "for outside the Christian Church is no truth, no Christ, no salvation." All members of the Church are called to preach the Word. But since all have not the necessary gifts, an order of men is set apart for the work. The keys of teaching and preaching belong to all Christians, but the public, official exercise is limited to this special order of men. The end of every act of public worship is the preaching of the Word, not the Mass. Whoever receives the office of preaching the Word and dispensing the sacraments receives the highest office in Christendom. Christ's is the only authority in

the Church. No one can impose laws on the Church without the will and consent of the members. "All believing Christians have the right and power to judge respecting doctrine." The mark of the true Church is that in it the pure gospel is preached. Its doctrine must agree with Christ's word. Hence "pure doctrine" is of the greatest importance, because every corruption of this must affect the life. False teachers the Church cannot tolerate. As, therefore, the inner unity of the Church is secured by Christ the Head, so the outer unity is secured by the pure doctrine of the gospel.¹ Where the old true doctrine, *i.e.* the Apostles' Creed, is in force, the conditions exist for the existence of the communion of saints, there is the true Church. The emphasis on doctrine is a new point. Still the connection shows that religious, not merely intellectual, faith is meant. Papal doctrine is described as "new." Protestants have the old doctrine, and are therefore the old, true Church, "for whoever believes and holds with the old Church is of the old Church." Dr. Loofs says: "Luther's own view of the Church differed from the old Catholic one in this, that to Luther the Church is not a school, not a doctrinal Church, but a religious community ;

¹ Seeberg, p. 281.

a member of the Church is everyone who has justifying faith. Nevertheless Luther held the idea that there is and must be public teaching in the Church, the acceptance of which is the condition of belonging to the Church, without perceiving that this idea is only consistent with the former one when the religious conception of the Church is distinguished from the ethical and juristic one" (p. 342). We know how predominant mere intellectual orthodoxy became in later days.

In these expositions we feel the new breath of the Reformation. The immense difference lies less in details than in the entirely new direction and aim. We are worlds away from abstract, philosophical definitions of Christian truth. Everything is fresh, concrete, moral, practical. The moral purpose of Christianity is ever kept first. Luther was no logical dialectician. Theology he left to Melancthon and after days. It is easy to find contradictions in abundance in his writings, if we forget the point from which he started and the process of development he went through. The last thing he cared for was consistency of expression. Hence the importance of noting the historical setting and the date of his writings. And yet the new in him was the old—the doctrine of

Paul and of Christ. He was ever open to new light breaking forth from the living Word, which was the only teacher he acknowledged.

We have seen that to Luther Scripture was the sole divine authority. God's Word, not man's doctrine—Christ, not philosophy, must govern God's people; Christ's servants must teach his Word only. The Word itself must be taught, not some authorised interpretation, and not apart from the context. Yet Scripture is not rigid, iron law. Luther himself added a very weighty canon of interpretation (p. 131). He also insisted on the self-evidencing character of Scripture, not on external evidence. Experience must discover and confirm its truth. The contents of Scripture—Christ and his salvation—give it all its value. The free criticism which he applied to everything else in Scripture shows that he held no rigid theory of inspiration, certainly no strictly verbal theory, probably no theory of any kind.

Again and again he reproduces the old faith in the Trinity and the Incarnation. But it is the substance of the creeds, rather than the form, that he holds in honour. He criticises the term "Trinity" and similar terms as "sounding cold" and of human invention. In brief, he receives the teachings of the old councils and

creeds because they agree with Scripture. He held the Apostles' Creed, which is the least dogmatic, in special honour, giving it a place in his celebrated Catechisms. He says it contains all the main articles of the faith. "I have a little book called the CREDO. . . . This is my Bible, which has stood so long and still stands unshaken; by it I abide, in it I was baptized, in it I live and die." "This symbol is taken from the dear prophets and the books of the apostles; it is put together with fine brevity from the whole of Holy Scripture for children and simple Christians, so that we may justly call it the Symbol or Faith of the Apostles." Luther denies to early Councils any binding authority. The greatest Council was that in Acts 15. Councils have no power to make new articles of faith, but only to reject errors, as they did in the case of Arius, Nestorius, and others.

On the nature of the two sacraments Luther retained much of the old teaching. His unfortunate obstinacy here sprang chiefly from his regard for the literal sense of Scripture; the "is" of Matthew 26²⁶ seemed to him to preclude any other course.

There is no ground for thinking that Luther's teaching is reconcilable with Sabellian views.¹

¹ *Development of Doctrine in Early Church*, p. 31.

He strongly emphasises the human life of Christ and the revelation of God given in it, so as to suggest at first sight that he acknowledges only the personality of the Father. He is also greatly impressed by the thought of the divine unity, and is jealous of anything that infringes it. Hence his want of cordiality towards technical terms. We are thankful of course for the emphasis on the man Christ Jesus, for which there was great need. But there is ample evidence that Luther acknowledged the separate divine personality of the Son.¹ He is recognised as true God and true man, two natures in one person. In his suffering and death the divine nature was "altogether hidden and passive in him, not appearing or showing itself"; Jesus restrained his omnipotence—so to speak—and concealed it. God is "not only one person." Christ is "an inseparable person with God." The Holy Spirit is a specific person; his Godhead is seen in his working; by word and sacrament he begets faith and all good in man. "Learn how and where thou shouldst seek the Spirit: not on high above the clouds, but he is here below on earth, as Christianity is on earth." In each divine person Luther sees the entire Godhead. Father and Son are "one being, one

¹ Seeberg, p. 291.

will," "one heart and will." Where one part is, "there certainly is the whole Godhead." But Luther does not think out and formulate all that is involved in these statements. To do this was not his mission.¹ Dr. Seeberg well says: "He stopped at Augustine's doctrine of original sin or, more correctly, he renewed it; but to him the nature of sin lay in unbelief, not in sensuous desire. He often reproduced the early theological and Christological formulas; but the God, of whom he had experience, was not infinite substance, but almighty loving will. He spoke of grace and its gifts in us, nay of 'infused grace'; but he was thinking there not of an 'inherent quality,' but of the active power of love which inwardly transforms us."

Not the least of Luther's achievements was the new ideal of Christian life which he preached incessantly. The mediæval ideal was the monastic. The Christian advanced in perfection as he approached this. The aim was the suppression of natural desire and impulse. Hence the monastic is still called the "religious" life in

¹ Luther says: "There is but one article and rule in theology,—whoever does not know and possess it is no theologian,—namely, true faith or confidence in Christ. The other articles all flow into this and out of it again, and without this the others are nothing."

Romanism. Luther taught the rightfulness of nature in itself. Religion is the hallowing and perfecting of all that is natural. It is better to bring up children well than to go on pilgrimages or build churches. A Christian is to do God's will in his worldly calling (John 17¹⁵). The other idea of holiness he was never weary of denouncing as artificial and unnatural. He also recognised in the State a divine institution, co-ordinate with the Church. The calling of Christian princes is to serve God and man. As to its nature, civil authority has to do only with men's outward walk. Contrast this teaching with the Papal doctrine of the relation of the secular to the ecclesiastical power (p. 53).

Luther's little book on *The Liberty of a Christian Man* nobly expounds the Christian type of moral life. Faith makes a Christian the lord of all things, love makes him servant of all. "Faith and love are the whole being of a Christian man. Faith receives, love gives." "Thus faith is the doer, love the deed. Faith brings man to God, love brings him to man; through faith he receives benefits from God, through love he does benefits to man." In all this there is no compulsion. The Christian life is a free life. The good he does is from love. Love is the will to do good. "To love is to

heartily wish good to others." Thus all love is service. We must show humility, patience, gentleness to our fellow-men, and that in our special calling. The moral equality of all callings is assumed. In this way God's kingdom is to be realised on earth. The kingdom is defined both as the rule which Christ exercises and the sphere of that rule. "The kingdom of God is nothing else than to be devout, sober, pure, mild, good, full of all virtue and grace, so that God has his being in us, and he alone is, lives and reigns in us. This we ought to desire most and first." "The perfect state is to be of bold spirit, a despiser of death, life, glory, and the whole world, and by fervent charity a servant of all." "Thus faith the doer abides, and love the deed abides." Such is Luther's view of Christian perfection. That perfection is not a realised state, but a state desired and longed for. "On earth it is and remains a beginning and growth; it is accomplished in the other world."

CHAPTER II

PROTESTANT CONTROVERSIES AND DIVISIONS : LUTHERAN AND REFORMED

ZWINGLI (1484 – 1531) was the founder of another type of Protestantism which, in a sense perfected by Calvin, ran a parallel course to Lutheranism. The differences between the two systems correspond to differences of temperament and experience in the founders. Zwingli early came under the influence of Humanism. His aims at first were rather intellectual than religious; he sought truth more than spiritual life and peace. Unlike Luther, he had passed through no agonies of penitence and spiritual need. He was more dependent on Luther than he was aware. He himself denies the dependence; but the acquaintance that he shows with Luther's writings before 1522, when his own work as Reformer began, and the contents of his sixty-seven Theses of the following year, amply prove the dependence. What he first learned from

Luther he afterwards verified for himself by Scripture, and so perhaps unconsciously regarded it as his own discovery. On all the great Christian conceptions he agreed with Luther, —the authority of Scripture, sin, redemption, faith, justification, the Church; but even here differences of form and emphasis were not wanting. Justification was not the pivot on which his whole teaching turned. Faith is not specifically faith in forgiving grace, but often general trust in God and his Word. God to him is almighty power rather than love. “Zwingli’s conception of Christianity is far less religious than Luther’s, far more humanistic,” more intellectual, philosophical. He acknowledged the working of God’s Spirit outside Christendom, in men like Plato, Cato, Seneca, etc. The Church does not consist of prelates simply, but is “the community of all those who are built and grounded in one faith in the Lord Jesus Christ.” As the communion of saints it is invisible. This is the true Church, which does not err, which cleaves to God’s Word, and only follows the shepherds who teach that Word. The nature of the Church was afterwards defined in the light of predestination, as the aggregate of the elect in all ages. The invisible, elect Church is contained in the visible Church.

Zwingli's distinctive doctrines are two. Predestination in a strong form was to him what justification by faith was to Luther. God is the one absolute cause, all second causes not being properly causes. God rules in the world as the soul in the body. All that happens is traced back to his power. All chance along with all free action is denied. Even evil is grounded in God's will. Thus Zwingli's predestination is based on a philosophical determinism or fatalism. He does not seem, like Luther, to have taken it directly from Augustine. Salvation and condemnation alike depend on God's eternal will. Election is the primary cause of salvation; faith and preaching are the instruments. Thomas Aquinas and the ancient Stoics were his chief teachers. The doctrine did not at a later time retire into the background with Zwingli as with Luther; it rather grew in importance as time went on. He used it as a weapon against the idea of merit in man, which of course it cuts up by the roots. If God's power and grace are the efficient causes of everything, no possibility of merit is left in man.

Zwingli's view of the sacraments is purely symbolic or figurative. They are signs and seals, acts of confession and dedication. This interpretation

is what we should expect from Zwingli's cast of mind. It first appears in his Commentary in 1525. "In this chapter (John 6) Christ understands by bread and eating nothing else than the gospel and believing . . . there is no reference to sacramental eating at all. Let this be a brazen wall: The flesh profiteth nothing. Not Christ eaten (*esus*) but Christ slain (*cæsus*) saves. His body is eaten when we believe it was slain for us. 'Is' in the sacred writings in more than one place is put for 'signify': Gen. 41²⁶, Luke 8¹¹, Matt. 13¹⁹, etc. What then does this eating do? It does nothing but make thee openly a member of Christ and of the number of those who trust in Christ; and again, it binds thee to a Christian life." In the same year he writes: "Baptism is a ceremonial sign to which salvation is not bound." In it we pledge ourselves as followers, soldiers of Christ.

Zwingli held theocratic notions inherited from the Middle Ages. The Church should dictate State laws, the State should carry out Church principles. The State is the organ of the Church in regulating faith and conduct. Savonarola and Calvin had similar utopian ideals. We see here an approach to Papal theories (p. 53).

The fierce controversy between the Lutheran

and Reformed, which brought such fearful havoc on the cause of the Reformation, turned on the bodily presence in the Last Supper. Between 1524 and 1529 the war of words and publications was fierce, Œcolampadius, Bucer, Capito, siding with Zwingli, while Luther, a host in himself, was supported by Melancthon, Bugenhagen, and others. The aggressive spirit was not all with Luther; Zwingli carried on an active propaganda. Œcolampadius took the "is" literally, but interpreted "body" as "figure of the body." On both sides the doctrine of the Supper was connected with or sprang from differences respecting Christ's person, and again brought those differences into clearer expression.

To Zwingli the bread and wine are simply signs of the body and blood and help faith through the senses. The only eating is by faith. At the time of institution the blood was not shed. Zwingli relied on John 6⁶³ as much as Luther did on Matt. 26²⁶. In construing the incarnation, Zwingli, while holding the unity of person, starts from and lays stress on the distinction of natures. The human in Christ can only be in one place; all talk of its being in more than one place is figure of speech; it is affirming of one nature what is only true of the other. A certain Nestorian

tendency pervades all Zwingli's teaching on the subject. The finite is not capable of the infinite. There is no real union in the incarnation. Just as in the earthly life of Christ the two natures are to be kept sharply apart, so now the divine nature fills heaven and earth, while the human is limited to one place. Thus, according to Zwingli, the Supper is on one side a memorial of the redemption wrought by Christ's death, on the other it is an open confession of Christ and consecration to a Christian life.

Luther strongly maintains the reception in the Supper of the body and blood in the form of consubstantiation. The words of institution seemed to him too simple and plain to be evaded. What is there to be explained in ideas like bread, wine, body, blood, eating, drinking, "is"? The accounts in all the narratives are the same. How this takes place, no one can say. Luther's Christology was in harmony with the doctrine and was greatly influenced by it. He started from the principle that the finite is capable of the divine. In speaking of the incarnation it had always been usual to ascribe to the divine person of the Son the affections and acts of his humanity, as when we speak of God being born, suffering, dying (Acts 20²⁸). But Luther and Lutherans inverted the order,

and said that the result of the incarnation was that the human actually acquired the properties of the divine (omnipresence included). This was the famous Lutheran doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's humanity. Wherever one nature is the other is. Luther said, "Where thou settest God before me, thou must set the humanity also before me, they cannot be severed . . . they have become one person. If Christ had never said these words, 'This is my body,' the words 'Christ sits at the right hand of God' would imply that his body and blood may be there as in all places." According to this "communication of properties" Christ's humanity must be not merely in the Supper but everywhere, in all objects and creatures alike; but in the Supper, in virtue of the words of institution, it is present in a pre-eminent sense. Christ's flesh therefore, penetrated by God, is "pure spirit, pure holiness." His flesh is a "divine flesh, a spirit-flesh." God has become man altogether, so that all human properties have become his. "The divine nature gives its properties to the human and again the humanity to the divine nature." The interchange is complete. Still the first aspect of the mutual communication is the one dwelt upon. When we ask further how this is reconcilable with the

nature of matter, Luther draws upon old scholastic notions of a "definitive" and "repletive"¹ as well as mere "local or circumscriptive" presence. The definitive presence is like that of an angel in a house or room; so Christ's body is in the bread. The repletive is when something is wholly and fully in all places alike and yet is limited and bounded by none. The ubiquity of Christ's body in this sense is illustrated by the diffusion of light and colour.

All this sounds grossly material, and there is much more to the same effect. Luther affirms the "eating with the mouth" (*manducatio oralis*) as much as a believer in transubstantiation could. Even unbelievers receive the body, although to their hurt. Yet Luther held transubstantiation as little as Zwingli. And this being the case he must have held the bodily presence in some special and, we should say, unreal sense. The truth is that the Lutheran doctrine has the consistency neither of the Roman nor the Reformed view; it is made up of contradictory elements. There is much in Luther's language which looks in a spiritual direction. The bread is the body as the dove is the Spirit, for "no one

¹ Taken from William Ockham. It is strange to see Luther driven to use scholastic ideas, which at other times he strongly condemned.

sees, grasps, eats, or bites Christ's body as one visibly sees and bites other flesh; for what is done to the bread is rightly and truly applied to the body of Christ because of the sacramental unity."¹ Properly bread is eaten, but with it Christ's spiritual body also. Great stress is laid on the divine Word of institution; in it lies all the saving power. The heart must believe the existence in the body of Christ's presence promised in the Word. This is the spiritual eating which must be added to the bodily eating. "The words are the chief thing, for without the words the cup and bread were nothing. Further, without bread and cup the body and blood of Christ were not there. Without Christ's body and blood the New Testament were not there. Without the New Testament forgiveness of sins were not there. Without forgiveness of sins life and blessedness were not there. Thus the words first make the bread and cup a sacrament. Bread and cup make the body and blood of Christ, body and blood of Christ make the New Testament, the New Testament makes forgiveness of sins, forgiveness of sins makes eternal life and blessedness. See, all this the words of the Supper give us, and we take it with faith." Thus the religious side of Luther's

¹ In Seeberg, p. 315.

teaching in the end emphatically asserts itself. The blessing of the sacrament is strengthened faith, assured forgiveness, "the Spirit, grace, life, and all blessedness." Luther also incidentally mentions the effect of Christ's body on the believer's physical nature, alluding to a notion of the early Fathers,¹ but the spiritual benefit is the chief. The sacrament is a "saving, comforting medicine, saving and giving life both to body and soul; for when the soul is in health, the body also is well."

The Conference at Marburg in 1529 between the two parties, headed by Luther and Zwingli, drove them still farther apart, although it proved that only this one point divided them.² The fifteen Marburg Articles expressed the agreement of the two sides on fourteen topics, such as the Trinity, Incarnation, Christ's Person, Original Sin, Salvation by Faith in Christ's Death, Faith God's Gift, Faith our Righteousness, the preached Word the Means of Faith, Baptism, Good Works, Confession, Earthly Office and Calling, Freedom as to Human Tradition, Infant Baptism, and also a great measure of agreement as to the Last Supper. On the last point it was said: "The sacrament of the altar is a sacrament of the true

¹ *Development of Doctrine in Early Church*, pp. 14, 51.

² Loofs, p. 366.

body and blood of Jesus Christ, and the spiritual partaking of that body and blood is especially necessary for every Christian. Likewise, the use of the sacrament, like the Word, is given and ordained by Almighty God that weak consciences may be helped to faith by the Holy Spirit." Yet Luther would not acknowledge Zwingli as a Christian. In the seventeen Schwabach Articles, drawn up by the Lutherans on the way back from Marburg to Wittenberg, it is said: "There is truly present in the bread and wine, through Christ's Word, the true body and blood of Christ"; and again: "The Church is nothing else than the believers in Christ, who believe and teach the above-named articles and points." On this Dr. Loofs says: "Membership in the Church was made to depend on a dogma, on whose Scriptural character very earnest men were not agreed" (p. 366). The mischief wrought by these and subsequent internal divisions of Protestantism was incalculable. All that the malice and tyranny of foes could effect was slight in comparison.

CHAPTER III

THE FIRST LUTHERAN CREEDS: THE AUGSBURG CONFESSION AND THE APOLOGY

THE *Augsburg Confession* (*Confessio Augustana*) is the first, and in many respects the greatest, of the Protestant Creeds.¹ It was the work of Melancthon, the first theologian of the Reformation, and was presented to Charles v. at the Diet of Augsburg, in the name of the German Reformers, divines and laymen. It bears no traces of internal Protestant dissension, and faithfully represents the stage of thought at the time of Luther and his helpers.² The creed is sometimes described as temporising and unduly diplomatic. But the charge is untrue save in so far as it is true of Luther and all the other

¹ The *Apology* for the Augsburg Confession, written by Melancthon in reply to the Roman *Confutation*, should also be taken into account.

² Harnack, vii. 26, gives a less favourable account of the creed, especially as giving a "doctrinal" basis to the Church, and so changing its character.

Reformers at the time. In many respects Luther was conservative of the old to the end of his life. While firm and determined on essential doctrine, he was ready to yield on questions of form and usage. On the question of the sacraments he was firm to the point of obstinacy against Zwingli and complaisant towards Rome. Certainly there is no reason to ascribe any temporising influence at this time to Melancthon. Luther was far too strong a man to yield even to his dear Melancthon on vital questions. It will be found that the creed lays the chief stress on the central teaching of the Reformation as held at the time. In a creed presented to the imperial authorities it was, of course, desirable to avoid unnecessary accentuation of differences. Accordingly, the Protestants claimed to be the true Catholic Church, and to protest only against error and abuse. Luther speaks of the Augsburg Creed as "stepping lightly." No one doubts it is a masterly exposition.

It may seem strange that there is no reference in the creed to Scripture as the sole rule of faith (afterwards called the "formal principle" of the Reformation). But this is capable of easy explanation. At that time, however Church tradition might be appealed to by individual controversialists, it had not been officially put

on a level with Scripture in point of authority, as was done afterwards at the Council of Trent. Mediaeval theologians always appealed to Scripture as the final authority. There was therefore no need to formulate anything on the subject.

The central place in the creed is rightly given to the doctrine of justification by faith (afterwards known as the "material principle" of the Reformation). Thus full justice is done to Luther's "article of a standing or falling Church." The doctrine which forms the very heart of Protestant teaching is put in direct contrast with the Papal system. Faith is distinguished from historical faith. It is "trusting in the merits of Christ, that for his sake God is certainly willing to be propitious to us ; it is willingly to accept the offered remission of sins and justification." It is a special faith, "by which some one believes that his sins are remitted,"¹ an apprehension of or assent to the promise. Faith is spoken of as the first work in man of the Holy Ghost, who is given "through the Word and sacraments as instruments." Of the nature of justification it is said : "Men cannot be justified before God by their own strength, merits, and works, but are justified freely for Christ's sake through faith,

¹ In the early days of the Reformation faith was said to include assurance from the first.

when they believe that they are received into favour, and their sins are remitted for the sake of Christ, who by his death made satisfaction for our sins. This faith God imputes for righteousness in his sight." The *Apology* says: "By faith alone we obtain remission of sins for Christ's sake, and by faith alone we are justified, *i.e.* are made just from being unjust, or regenerated." Justification and regeneration are distinguished from each other with sufficient clearness; but sometimes they seem to be confounded. To be justified is to enter into a state of acceptance with God, an "approval of the whole person." Faith alone is our righteousness before God, not because it is a "work worthy in itself," but because it trusts in "free remission." Yet justification is also described both as a "being rendered (*effici*) righteous or regenerated" (a *becoming* righteous), and also as "being pronounced or counted righteous" (a *being* righteous) before God.¹ The new state and the new life are closely united. Faith, besides putting us into a state of acceptance, is the beginning of a new life. "In the former sense it receives the imputed righteousness of Christ, in the latter it is the beginning of ethical righteousness. But the first

¹ The German translation of the Latin original is "to be counted righteous before God for Christ's sake."

is the fundamental point; from it, *i.e.* from the consciousness of forgiveness, the *Apology* derives psychologically the inner renewal, for whoever is assured of forgiveness becomes inwardly free and glad.”¹ How this doctrine cuts up human merit by the root is evident.

The preliminary articles define sin as the “lack of original righteousness,” a being “without the fear of God and trust in God, and with concupiscence.” “The benefits of Christ cannot be perceived until our evils are understood.” Of Christ it is said: “Two natures are inseparably combined in unity of person.” He died “that he might reconcile the Father to us, and be a sacrifice not merely for original guilt, but also for all the actual sins of men,” the latter rendering unnecessary penance for sin after baptism. A “civil” or “carnal” righteousness is distinguished from “spiritual interior” righteousness. Men are naturally inclined to trust in it; and the purpose of the law of God is to destroy such trust, and convict man of weakness as well as guilt (“weak,” Rom. 5⁶). The law, rightly understood, reveals inward depravity, displays God’s anger, and shuts man up to despair of himself.

Good works follow as the fruit of faith. They

¹ Seeberg, p. 326.

are to be done "because of God's commandment, both to exercise faith and as acts of confession and thanksgiving." They spring from the Holy Spirit or the new birth and justification. But they are not the ground of justification, and they are done of free will. All acts belonging to civil life, domestic life, and our worldly calling come under this head. The monkish ideal of life gives place to a Christian life lived in ordinary relations. "Christian perfection is seriously to fear God, and again to possess strong faith and confidence that God is propitious to us, to seek and surely expect from God help in all matters belonging to our vocation ; meantime to be diligent in good works and in the discharge of our calling."

The Church is defined as the "congregation of saints, in which the gospel is duly preached and the sacraments are duly administered." These two notes are the only ones essential to the true Church, the Church here evidently being the visible one. "Saints" points to an inner, invisible Church, which in the last resort is the only true one. Luther assumes that, where the two notes of the Church are found, "saints" will be found. Both Luther and Melancthon hold that such a Church with a double aspect has always existed. The presence in the visible Church of "hypocrites and wicked

men" is acknowledged. Inferences drawn from this definition of the Church are that bishops have no power to ordain anything against the gospel, that "the preaching office is the highest in the Church," that all other regulations are of purely human origin and must be tested by the gospel, and that the Church has no power of compulsion.

The sacraments are described not merely as "signs of profession among men" (against Zwingli), but also as "pledges and testimonies of God's goodwill towards us in order to stir up and confirm faith in those who use them." The Word in them "offers remission of sins; the ceremony is, as it were, a picture of the Word or seal." As God has attached certain promises to these rites, faith is the condition of their right reception. The sacrament thus requires and confirms faith. The *Apology* rejects the notion of mechanical efficacy (*opus operatum*). Baptism is necessary to salvation; by it "the grace of God is offered"; children also are to be thus received into the divine favour. Sin is forgiven, not erased. In the Supper "the body and blood of Christ are truly present and distributed," body and blood are "truly and substantially present," "we speak of the presence of the living Christ," the latter words being meant to exclude

the suspicion that only the flesh is included. The Roman Confutation, prepared by imperial command as a reply to the Augsburg Confession, asserted that the wording covered transubstantiation. Technically this is admitted by Lutheran writers. While Luther rejected transubstantiation, he seems to have regarded it as a comparatively harmless error. His own doctrine explains this attitude.

Dr. Loofs regards the teaching on penance as a still more serious blot (p. 373). Penance is regarded as a sacrament in the Augsburg Confession,¹ even as confession and absolution are still retained in the Lutheran Church.² Dr. Loofs expounds as follows:—At first Luther defined justification as remission of sins, connected this with baptism, and made regeneration its fruit. But finding afterwards that in actual life these results did not appear, in the Augsburg Confession he and Melancthon reverted in part to the Roman idea of penance for post-baptismal sin. Penance is defined as consisting of contrition and faith, and by it “those who fall after baptism obtain remission whenever they are converted.” Good works follow as the fruit of penitence. Thus the selfsame results are as-

¹ Seeberg, p. 331.

² Confirmation also is retained, but not as a sacrament.

cribed in the creed to justification and to penance. At the same time the very different definition of penance from the Roman one should be noted.¹ Dr. Loofs also acknowledges that the ruling idea of justification in the creed is Luther's, and only affirms that the teaching about penance forms the "groundwork" of mischievous error. Dr. Seeberg gets over the difficulty by supposing that the accounts of justification and penitence are merely different ways of saying the same thing. The two parts of penitence, according to the creed, are "contrition or terrors of conscience, the other is faith springing from the gospel or absolution. Then good works follow as the fruits of penitence." "Here it is plain that the entire evangelical plan of salvation forms the counterpart and the substitute for the sacrament of penance, for these thoughts simply combine what we have already heard about faith, justification, and works" (Seeberg, p. 331). The preaching of the law leads to repentance, repentance to faith, faith to justification and regeneration. It is possible that these are further remnants of Roman doctrine, which have never really coalesced with Protestant teaching.

The creed condemns worship of saints, priestly

¹ See p. 83.

celibacy, the mass, monkish vows, the withholding of the cup, episcopal authority, oral confession.¹

The *Tetrapolitana Confession* was also presented to the emperor at Augsburg (1530) by Bucer as the expression of the faith of the Reformed Churches in the name of the four cities of Strassburg, Constance, Memmingen, Lindau. Other Reformed Confessions of this date are, the first one of Basle (1534) and first Helvetic (1536). On predestination and the sacraments they follow in the main the line of Zwingli, and give prominence to the supreme authority of Scripture. On the central doctrines the teaching is the same as in the Lutheran creed. "The highest and foremost article is, that we are saved and blessed through God's mercy and Christ's merit alone. . . . Such high and great benefits of divine grace, and the true sanctifying of God's Spirit, we receive, not from our own merits and strength, but through the faith which is purely God's gift and favour" (Helvetic). Faith is thus both the organ by which all grace is received and the principle of a new moral life. "The same faith is a sure, firm, yea undoubted ground and apprehending of all things

¹ Confession, as retained in Lutheranism, does not require the enumeration of sins in detail.

that we hope for from God, who causes love and therefore all virtues to spring from it. . . . This faith, which trusts, not in its own work, although it does innumerable good works, but in God's mercy, is the right, true service with which we please God " (Helvetic).

CHAPTER IV

MELANCTHON'S TEACHING : LUTHERAN CONTROVERSIES

MELANCTHON'S influence on the formal theology of the Reformation was as great as Luther's on its practical life. His *Loci Communes*, first published in 1521,¹ answered in the Protestant world to the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard in the Middle Ages. The two works are characteristically different in spirit. Melancthon's work disclaims philosophy and metaphysics, and treats mainly of the doctrines of the Roman epistle, with a practical end in view.² The doctrines of the Trinity and Christ's person are assumed, representing mysteries which are rather to be

¹ Second enlarged edition in 1535, third in 1543, and often afterwards. There were many reprints between 1521 and the editions of 1535 and 1543.

² He says: "Just as in these later days of the Church we have embraced Aristotle instead of Christ, so directly after the beginnings of the Church Christian doctrine was spoilt by the Platonic philosophy."

adored than discussed. It may be said that Luther left theology to Melancthon entirely, allowing him not only to draw up the Creeds, but afterwards to make changes in their wording, without interfering himself or even defending them against objections from the Protestant side. He said to his students: "Read Philip's *Loci* next to the Bible. In this most beautiful book the pure theology is stated in a quiet and orderly way. Augustine, Bernard, Bonaventura, Lyra, Gabriel Biel, Staupitz, and others have much that is good; but our Master Philip can explain the Scriptures and present their meaning in brief compass." There is no need to compare Luther and Melancthon, to the disadvantage of either. Melancthon is only inferior as the theologian is inferior to the great apostle and evangelist. One founded Protestant Christendom, the other founded Protestant theology. The work of both was necessary. No difference of opinion interfered with their close relations of personal friendship. Melancthon was the first to recognise his leader's greatness, putting him in the line of succession to Isaiah, the Baptist, Paul, Augustine, and always speaking of his teaching as the true faith of the Christian Church.

Melancthon is sometimes blamed for having

given the Reformation a theological direction and basis. But the criticism can only be justified on the supposition that theology is unnecessary and harmful. Under Melancthon's leading the Protestant Church appeared as the Church of "pure doctrine." This was part of its protest against the false doctrine of the old Church. It was inevitable that the new doctrine should be definitely formulated and embodied in creeds. It may be true that excessive importance was in course of time attached to orthodoxy in the Lutheran Church. Orthodoxy in fact became the fundamental mark of the Church. But this one-sidedness, so evident in the seventeenth century, was due to the decline of earnest religious life in that Church generally. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were the "Middle Ages" of the Reformation. The wonderful revival of practical religion, which our days have witnessed, will not do away with the necessity of definite theological belief. The work of the Christian preacher and pastor rests on a creed.

On three important questions Melancthon's teaching underwent modification during Luther's lifetime. In the first edition of the *Loci* he taught absolute Predestination, supporting it by passages of Scripture, while not defending it on grounds of reason. But before the revision in

1535 the arguments of Erasmus and fresh study of Scripture have altered his views. He now speaks of necessity as a dream or "raving" (*deliramentum*) of the Stoics. "There are three causes which concur in conversion: the Word, the Holy Spirit, and the Will, not indeed neutral, but resisting its own weakness,"—stronger language than modern Arminians would use. "God precedes, calls, moves, assists us, but we should take care not to resist. For it is evident that sin arises from us, not from the will of God." In his *Commentary on Romans* (1532) he dwells on the universal promises and offers of the gospel. In the Augsburg Confession the question of predestination is avoided, and the doctrine is no part of authoritative Lutheran teaching.

On the Last Supper Melancthon approached nearer and nearer to the figurative interpretation, while still holding that in substance he agreed with Luther. A treatise of Ecolampadius (*Dialogue on the Teaching of the Ancients*, 1530), maintaining the figurative sense to be the faith of the Fathers, impressed him greatly. For the teaching of the ancients he had great reverence; at the Marburg Conference he drew up a collection of patristic opinions in support of Luther. In 1535 he writes to Brentz: "I am

unwilling to be the author or defender of a new dogma in the Church. I see that there are many passages of the ancients which certainly explain the mystery figuratively. There are also opposing passages, perhaps later or spurious." In the same letter he affirms "the true presence of Christ in the Supper"; but it can only have been a spiritual presence. He repudiates "bread-worship," and gives up the phrase "in the bread." "I add no such inclusion or conjunction as would attach the body to the bread." In the *Loci* of 1535 he writes: "As the chief thing we should consider that the sacrament is a sign of grace, that this Supper is a sign of the New Testament. But what is the New Testament? Certainly it is the promise of the remission of sins and of reconciliation for Christ's sake." The Augsburg Confession says: "With the bread and wine the body and blood of Christ are truly administered (*exhibeantur*) to the partakers of the Lord's Supper." If, as Dr. Seeberg says (p. 337), he maintained "the bodily presence of Christ," it must have been in some sacramental sense. It is altogether unlikely that Luther agreed with these teachings; but he refused openly to dissent from them.

Another point of difference from Luther was that Melancthon limited justification to the

forensic sense of pronouncing or adjudging righteous, upon which follows the gift of the Spirit and the new birth. According to Luther the Spirit in the first instance begets faith through the Word, and faith both justifies and regenerates. According to the later Melancthon faith is the first step in the process, before even the Spirit, though Melancthon cannot mean this. In the *Loci* of 1535 he says: "When God remits sins, he also gives us the Holy Spirit, who initiates new virtues in the good." Thus, justification is more sharply distinguished as a forensic act from the real inner change, which is the work of the Spirit. But no separation in point of fact or time is meant. The two blessings are still but two parts or sides of one act of salvation. Some writers (among them Drs. Loofs, p. 380, and Seeberg, p. 348) find fault with the change as tending to obscure the ethical nature of salvation. All that Melancthon meant to do was to make the theological distinction clearer. His mode of statement has established itself in later theology.

Dr. Seeberg sketches the leading thoughts of Melancthon's *Loci* in the 1535 revision. We see at least the kind of food on which several generations of Lutheran teachers were brought up.

There are two preliminary assumptions. It

is only natural that Melancthon should emphasise the importance of philosophy and science to a student of theology, not merely as an instrument of mental discipline and as supplying logical principles, but also as a source of elementary religious and moral truth. The light of nature furnishes every man with religious knowledge, which serves as a basis of fuller knowledge. Sin has obscured, but not extinguished, that light (John 1^o). Great heathen writers, like Cicero, are appealed to.

Scripture is assumed as the source and rule of Christian doctrine. The three early creeds, along with the Augsburg Confession, are supposed to contain Scripture teaching.¹ His language about Scripture contains the germ of later doctrines of inspiration. He seems to take a less free attitude to Scripture than Luther (*ante*, p. 156). He assumes, rather than states, Luther's limitation of the early creeds by Scripture. He will change nothing in church formulæ, for "changing words generally gives birth also to new opinions."

The two centres round which Melancthon's

¹ In 1551 Melancthon writes: "With true faith I embrace the whole doctrine handed down in the books of the prophets and apostles and contained in the Apostolic, Nicene, and Athanasian Creeds."

teaching revolved were the *Church* and *Justification*. "The visible Church is the congregation of those who embrace the gospel of Christ and use rightly the sacraments, in which God works by the ministry of the gospel and regenerates many unto eternal life, in which congregation, however, many are not born again, but they agree as to true doctrine." Thus, true doctrine is the one note of the true Church. The two are inseparable. In past times the Church was wherever the teaching of an Augustine and Bernard, a Tauler and Wessel, was found. This is the Church of the elect, the regenerate. In it only forgiveness of sin is to be had. Whoever has not the centre of right doctrine and has persecuted the true Church, like Romanists, does not belong to the true Church. Inasmuch as we do not know who are the elect in this "congregation," the Church on this side is invisible and an object of faith. The divine working in the Church and the success of the Church are thus bound to pure doctrine. Not that the Church is faultless in this respect. "Although the true Church holds fast the articles of the faith, yet even that true Church may have errors which obscure the articles of faith." Nor are all doctrines equally essential. The main doctrine is that of the benefits of Christ or justification,—

a thoroughly Lutheran sentiment.¹ Thus, the holding of true doctrine in essentials seems to be made both a mark of the true Church and a condition of salvation. Here the way is paved for the rigid orthodoxy of the next century.

Justification, the other central truth, takes place thus. The preaching of the law, which, as man is a sinner by birth and practice, can only condemn him, produces *contrition*; the preaching of the gospel produces *faith*. The Holy Spirit must be at work provisionally in both acts, the Law and the Gospel being his instruments. The gospel consists mainly of Christ's work of atonement, which is described quite in Anselm's way. "Christ has a ministry of teaching, but this is not his principal office; he was sent principally that he might be a sacrifice for the human race and a redeemer, and set us free from the curse of the law." "The final cause of the incarnation of the Son is that he may be a sacrifice and appease God's anger."² In this work both his divinity and humanity are engaged. The reconciliation (*temperamentum*) of justice and mercy is secured

¹ In the first form of the *Loci* (1521) he says: "This is to know Christ—to know his benefits, not to study his natures or modes of incarnation."

² Elsewhere the end of Christ's mission is said to be "the gathering, preserving, and sanctifying of the Church."

by the fact that Christ bore our penalty, or offered a sacrifice and "equivalent price," for us, thus satisfying God's justice. Here is the object of faith. The effect is justification or forgiveness in the forensic sense. We are righteous for Christ's sake, his righteousness active and passive being imputed to us. Justification is accompanied by the gift of the Spirit, who renews us inwardly. Good works (true obedience) are the ultimate effect. They are necessary, because without them faith would be lost, for faith cannot coexist with a sinful life; they are commanded by God and are in keeping with the dignity of the Christian state. On account of faith they are really good works, which may even be described as "meritorious," but not in the sense that they merit forgiveness of sin; they merit, however, other spiritual and temporal rewards.

Melancthon describes penance or repentance in exactly similar terms to justification, etc., as "contrition, faith, true obedience," showing that the evangelical way of salvation takes the place of the old doctrine of penance (p. 181). Dr. Seeberg remarks on the fitness of the coincidence that penance, which in the form of indulgences was the occasion of the Reformation, reappears at the close in an evangelical form.

It was after Luther's death (1546) that the weakness of Melancthon's character was most clearly seen. In his excessive love for conciliation he put peace before truth. The peril that lay in his weakness was aggravated by the circumstances of the time. The trimming, time-serving Maurice of Saxony was the opposite in character to Luther's protectors, Frederick the Wise and John the Constant. Still it is difficult to understand how Melancthon could give his sanction to such an agreement as the *Leipzig Interim*, by which Papal doctrines and practices were admitted wholesale, while Protestant doctrine received the most scanty recognition (1548). The Latin Mass, Image-Worship, Canonical Hours, Feasts (including the *Corpus Christi*), Fasts, the Episcopal Authority, the Seven Sacraments were received as permissible under the head of things indifferent (*adiaphora*). It was argued that as long as "pure doctrine" is retained, other things are indifferent, the "pure doctrine" being a verbal affirmation of justification by faith. Semi-Pelagian views of sin and man's native ability to co-operate with God (condemned by opponents as *Synergism*) were also promulgated. If the Interim had been successful, Luther's work would have been undone. Happily the extravagance of the agreement secured its

rejection by the Lutherans as a whole. The opposition of men like Flacius and Amsdorf, if extreme, was warrantable and successful. The effect was, not union between Protestant and Catholic, but division among Protestants. Melancthon's influence as a leader of the Reformation was gone. His adherents were called Philippists, and were greatly outnumbered and outweighed by the "Genuine Lutherans" (Gnesio-Lutherans). One can only feel pity for Luther's friend. The remainder of his life was made a burden to him; he died in 1560. His opponents, however unjustifiable the violence of their attacks, were undoubtedly in the right on this subject.

Controversy led to extreme positions being taken up. George Major (1552) and Justus Menius taught the necessity of good works to salvation, not to the initiation but to the progress of salvation. This was not meant in the Roman sense, but in the sense of fruits and evidences of the new life that follows justification. But extreme Gnesio-Lutherans like Flacius and Amsdorf thought that this endangered the sole sufficiency of faith. Faith is sufficient, they said, not merely to the genesis, but to the continuance and perfecting of salvation. They surely out-Luthered Luther. Amsdorf even

declared that good works are injurious to salvation. They also disparaged the gift of the Holy Ghost as a mere appendix or addition. But all Gnesio-Lutherans did not go to this extreme. The majority agreed with the Philippists in saying, "the new obedience is necessary," not venturing to add "to salvation" (Seeberg, p. 353). The antinomian leaven or poison is the peril of Reformation doctrine, and has worked the greatest mischief in the Protestant world.

A similar question was involved in the *synergistic* controversy. Here the two chief opponents were leading Gnesio-Lutherans, Victorin Strigel and Flacius, between whom a disputation on the subject took place at Weimar in 1560. The former, while teaching the necessity of the Holy Spirit in order to conversion, also held the power of the will to co-operate of itself with the Holy Spirit. The power of the will is only lessened, not destroyed, by sin. The divine and human factors seem to be here co-ordinated. The will co-operates before conversion. This Semi-Pelagian doctrine led Flacius—otherwise the most orthodox of the orthodox—into the worst heresy ever known, namely, the corruption of the very substance of the will, or the very nature of man, by sin,—a

doctrine going far beyond the "bound will" of Augustine and Luther. Co-operation of the human with the divine will only takes place, Flacius said, after conversion; in conversion the will is entirely passive. "Man is converted not only when the natural free will co-operates, but also when it violently resists." "God alone converts man, not excluding will but all its efficiency and operation." Conversion is thus a change of the very nature of man, not merely of his moral character. The effect of sin is really to debase man into a devil. Flacius found few or no supporters. The Lutherans as a whole tried to combine the truth on both sides, denying that man can contribute to his own conversion, and yet trying to preserve even for fallen man the prerogative of free will. The controversy had the effect of destroying the influence of Flacius.

The teaching of Andreas Osiander (1550) was a reaction against the separation of justification from regeneration. He said: "More frigid than ice is the teaching of those who say that we are accounted righteous only on account of remission of sins, and not also on account of the righteousness of Christ dwelling in us by faith. For God is not so unjust as to reckon him righteous in whom nothing at all of true righteousness exists."

He had in view especially Melancthon's doctrine (p. 189). He confused the questions at issue by peculiarities of terminology, giving the name of *redemption* to what the Reformers called justification, and the name of justification to what they called regeneration. Justification thus meant to him making intrinsically just, not reckoning just.¹ At the same time his views of the nature of the two blessings were peculiar. As to redemption, he said that the sinner lies under a twofold obligation; he has to bear the punishment of sin and to keep the law perfectly. We can do neither; Christ has done both for us. And faith makes his work ours. This is redemption. Here we meet for the first time with the distinction between Christ's active and passive obedience, a distinction which from this time established itself in Protestant theology. But this is not enough. We need also inherent righteousness, and this is ours through God's or Christ's indwelling in us. "His divine nature is our righteousness." Osiander speaks as if the divine nature itself dwelt in us as in Christ. The reason why faith is said to justify us is that it is the means or condition of the divine indwelling.

¹ "To justify," he said, "is to make the impious just, *i.e.* to recall the dead to life." Osiander's teaching reminds us somewhat of Dr. M'Leod Campbell's in recent years.

This is the subjective side of salvation, as redemption is the objective. Osiander's view of man's original state was on similar lines. Man was made in God's image; and as the Son is God's image, the Son dwelt in Adam before the Fall. Man lost this indwelling by sin, and it is restored in Christ. Thus the original righteousness and the righteousness of the believer are the same in nature. The Son came into humanity by the incarnation, and he comes into the believer through the Word. He is the inner Word, of which the outer Word is the channel. Righteousness is "no work, no doing or suffering, but is the nature which makes those who receive it righteous and leads them to act and suffer righteously." There is some ground for the charge of Romanising brought against this teaching at the time; at least to justify is made to mean making just inherently. Still there is a point of connection with Luther's teaching, which Osiander did not intentionally depart from. The difference is greatly one of phraseology. The doctrine was attacked from nearly every quarter. Philippists and Lutherans united against it.¹ Brentz to a certain extent defended it. Melancthon accused the doctrine of depreci-

¹ Calvin attacked it sharply in his *Institutes*. See also Dorner, *Protestant Theology*, i. 355.

ating forgiveness by severing it from justification and laying the emphasis, not on the change in God's mind to us, but on the fruit of grace in us. The ground of justification seems to be placed within us, in our own state, instead of in Christ; at least it is placed in Christ in us, not in Christ atoning for us.¹

The Lutheran doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's humanity in the Supper gave rise to much wire-drawn controversy respecting Christ's Person. Brentz of Tübingen (1561) explained the ubiquity by the communication to Christ's humanity, in virtue of the incarnation, of the divine omnipresence along with the other attributes. All the divine attributes are communicable to humanity save self-existence. Thus, from the first moment of his human existence and to the end the man Christ exercised his divine attributes without a break, but secretly. It is not easy to see how this is reconcilable with the reality of humanity and with the facts of Christ's life. The humanity seems reduced to mere appearance (*docetism*).

¹ Dr. Seeberg (p. 361) speaks highly of Osiander's ability as a systematic theological thinker, ranking him with Calvin and Melancthon in some respects. Melancthon put a one-sided emphasis on the imputed, Osiander on the imparted, righteousness of faith. It was a good thing that Melancthon's form of teaching prevailed, as Osiander's was easily liable to misunderstanding.

Chemnitz of Giessen (1571) advances a more moderate conception. The human nature of Christ is the perfect organ of the divine; and this divine nature is the Son's almighty loving will. In virtue of that will the God-man can be corporeally present wherever he wills (multipresence instead of omnipresence). "The Son of God with his assumed nature can by reason of the hypostatic union be present wherever, whenever, and however he wills, *i.e.* where by his sure word he has given and promised with that nature to be present." "The human will in Christ desires, seeks, wills and approves what Christ by his divine power does in those offices." "For that soul of Christ willed what the divine will of the Word willed it to will." Thus the measure of the divine communicated to the human in Christ depends on the divine will. The entire divine nature was present in him from the first, but its influence on the human was regulated by his will. The human nature possessed the "fulness of the divinity," but "did not always use it." In the state of exaltation "the full and manifest possession and use of his majesty" again began. These two schools in course of time drew nearer together by mutual concession.

CHAPTER V

THE FORMULA OF CONCORD, 1580

THE dissensions just described threatened the cause of the Reformation with dissolution. Every petty German State and nearly every city had its own confession of faith. The divisions told injuriously on civil life, rendering united political action well-nigh impossible. Princes like Duke Julius of Brunswick and Augustus of Saxony, and several theologians, made many efforts to bring about a workable basis of unity, with little result for a long time. The first generation had to pass away before a spirit of mutual concession could arise. At last the *Formula of Concord*, which, in keeping with its name, became the Lutheran bond of union, emerged out of these efforts. It was mainly the work of Chemnitz, who had been a follower of Melancthon, and Jacob Andreae, a pronounced Lutheran. It was published at Dresden in June 1580, and was accepted by 51 princes, nobles, and knights, 35

cities, and 8000 ministers. Many cities and states still held aloof; some accepted the Reformed teaching of Calvin. Extremists on both sides attacked the Formula. In every line it bears the marks of compromise. It is bare, didactic, formal, altogether different in tone and spirit from the Augsburg Confession. But it answered its purpose as a measure of conciliation, and came to be generally accepted as the final Lutheran standard. It also sealed the separation of Lutheran from Reformed. In its contents it followed the old Lutheran line on the sacraments and Christology, and the new Melancthon ways of stating the doctrines of sin, free will, predestination. "The predestination doctrine is no longer that of Luther, nor of the Lutheran predestinarians."¹ Here we see the compromise effected. The following is a summary.

The first two Articles treat of Original Sin and Free Will. The Flacian extreme of the corruption of the substance of human nature by sin and of original sin itself as "something substantial" is rejected. Yet strong language is used of the extent of original sin. "Man is utterly corrupt and dead to good." No "spark" of spiritual power is left. Man is more than passive, he resists the divine will,

¹ Dorner, *Protestant Theology*, i. 382.

and so is worse than a stone or block. Man has no power of "turning to grace" (*facultas applicandi se ad gratiam*). The sole efficient cause of conversion is the Holy Spirit; thus every form of co-operation (*Semi-Pelagian synergism*) by man's natural powers is excluded. The Holy Spirit by means of the Word seizes the heart, producing faith, new spiritual feeling, regeneration, renewal, a new will. Man's attitude is "purely passive"; he simply receives. On the other hand, from the first moment of the inner awakening man begins to co-operate, and continues to do so. Then the will becomes truly free. The Spirit makes the unwilling willing. It will be seen that this doctrine denies all action of prevenient grace, which is acknowledged in other places. These two articles deny that God deals with man as a block or stone; yet the account given here implies that he does.

The third Article on Justification follows Melancthon's teaching. The separation in order of thought of justification from sanctification (*renovatio, regeneratio*) is made more definite,—a deviation from Luther and the Augsburg Confession. Justification is more exactly defined as forgiveness, reconciliation with God and adoption, unconnected with any real, internal change. It

consists in the imputation to faith of the righteousness or obedience of Christ, which righteousness again includes both the active and passive sides. Our justification does not depend on the divine nature of Christ only, as Osiander said, nor on the human only, as Stancarus (an opponent of Osiander) said, but on his whole person and the twofold obedience of the whole person. Thus, faith must come first, and “true, not fictitious” contrition must precede faith. Faith is the work of the Holy Spirit. But the presence of the Spirit and of contrition can only be explained on the supposition of prevenient grace, which, however, is not recognised. The Formula often says that renovation or regeneration follows justification,¹ not the reverse order as in later Lutheran dogmatics and the Reformed doctrine. But no link of connection is supplied. As justification in the forensic sense precedes regeneration and the good works which are its fruit, the latter cannot be a means of justification. Justification has to do only with the obedience of Christ imputed to us.

Article 4 on Good Works excludes the extreme antinomianism of Flacius and Amsdorf. Good works are necessary as evidence of faith and as commanded by God; but the position

¹ Dorner, *ibid.* i. 361.

that they are necessary to salvation is regarded as inconsistent with assurance in the case of the tempted. They are conditions rather of blessedness than of salvation. Nor are they to be regarded as conditions of justification. Faith is "the mother and source of good works." Good works follow of necessity; faith is never alone. One easily sees the difficulty in which the framers of the creed were placed. When the Christian is advised to find the assurance of his faith in his works, the sole sufficiency of faith is in peril.

Articles 5 and 6 on the Law and Gospel still more explicitly condemn antinomianism. Luther in his earlier utterances had applied terms of strong disparagement to the law, regarded as a means of salvation. When Melancthon argued for the preparatory purpose of the law, Agricola (1527) and others attacked him. Luther then defended Melancthon's teaching on the subject. Melancthon's position is affirmed in the creed. The law is spoken of as "the divine teaching, in which God's most righteous and immutable will is revealed as to what man ought to be." The law condemns, convicts of sin, and drives to self-despair, from which the preaching of the gospel or the grace of God delivers. Such a

condemning purpose remains even under the gospel, in so far as sin still cleaves to the believer. There is also a didactic use of the law. Still the Christian keeps the law freely, not from constraint.¹ The recognition of contrition in Article 3 implies a preparatory work of the law.

Article 7 treats of the Lord's Supper, adhering rigidly to the teaching of Luther and the Augsburg Confession. Zwingli's and Calvin's doctrine, and by implication Melancthon's, are rejected. On the ground of the words of institution the bodily presence of Christ is taught. "In the Lord's Supper the body and blood of Christ are truly and substantially present, and along with the bread and wine are truly distributed and taken." Thus the literal eating (*manducatio oralis*) is taught, though not the "Capernaite" eating; and yet the literal eating is said to be in a "spiritual manner," if this can be understood. The body of Christ is present and distributed "under, with, and in the bread." The union between the substance of the bread and that of the body is compared to the union of the two natures in Christ; it is a "sacra-

¹ A threefold use of the law was distinguished: *usus politicus*, in civil life; *pæduticus* or *elencticus*, to induce repentance; *didacticus*, for instruction.

mental," not "personal" union. The possibility of the union is based on the ubiquity understood in the sense of Chemnitz (p. 201), ubiquity at will. The Supper is witness that Christ is permanently at work in believers even in his human nature; it is a seal that the blessings which Christ procured in his body are through him present to us. Forgiveness is the chief blessing of the Supper. "The pious receive Christ's body and blood as a certain pledge and confirmation that their sins are certainly forgiven them, and that Christ dwells and is at work in them." "Christians who are weak of faith, desponding and anxious, who are cast down because of the greatness and number of their sins, and think that they are unworthy of this glorious treasure and Christ's benefits, are the right welcome guests for whom this noble sacrament is chiefly appointed and ordained." But the Supper is a sacrament only when partaken of; the mere blessing of the elements avails nothing.¹

In Article 8 the doctrine of Christ's Person is shaped in harmony with the doctrine of the Supper, and bears marks of compromise. On the one hand, the communication of divine attributes to the human is assumed, as was done

¹ Seeberg, p. 375.

by Luther. Besides the ubiquity at will an absolute ubiquity is affirmed in one place, "present to all creatures." The communication is only from the divine to the human. The entire divine glory belonging to the human is only revealed "when and how it seemed good to him." The perfect revelation is in heaven. The God-man kept secret the glory dwelling in him, using it "as often as seemed good to him." The absolute statements remind of Brentz and his school, the conditional ones of Chemnitz (p. 200).

Article 9 affirms that the whole Christ descended into hell in order to vanquish the devil and the powers of hell. The allusion is to an opinion expressed by Æpin of Hamburg, that only the soul of Christ so descended, —a needless correction.

Article 10 teaches that rites and ceremonies are indifferent things, and are in the power of the Church to alter at pleasure. But even in these matters we are not to yield to opponents as to church status (Gal. 2⁵).

Article 11 leaves very little of Predestination as held by Luther. Foreordination is distinguished from foreknowledge in this, that the latter refers to good and evil, the former is foreordination to salvation; reprobation is not

mentioned. Foreknowledge has no causal force, but election is the cause of the salvation of the elect. The promise of the gospel is universal; if it fails, the fault is man's; God's call is always meant in earnest; the Holy Ghost is always active in the preached Word. The divine will is that all should be saved; God wills the ruin of none. It seems like playing with words to apply the term "eternal predestination" to the proposition that God wills that all shall be saved who believe in Christ. That will rests on Christ's merit, not on our works. On the basis of this eternal will we may be sure of our salvation, for it lies in God's hands; it is grounded in his eternal purpose, which cannot be overthrown. Thus all the glory is given to God, all salvation being traced back to his gracious will. This is a view of predestination which Luther would have recognised as little as Calvin.

Article 12 rejects the "erroneous articles" of Anabaptists, Schwenkfeldians,¹ and the "New Antitrinitarians."

The purpose of the creed was not to give a complete account of Lutheran doctrine, but rather to interpret certain controverted aspects of it.

¹ Schwenkfeld († 1561) founded a sect which made light of outward ordinances, and held certain mystical notions, such as that everything in Christ, even the flesh, is divine.

Every article is controversial, tacitly excluding some rival teaching. The moderation of the creed secured in time its general acceptance; peace and order reigned within the Lutheran lines. The Augsburg Confession, the Apology, and the Formula of Concord together give the "pure doctrine" of the Lutheran Church.

CHAPTER VI

CALVIN'S TEACHING ¹

It should be remembered that Calvin's work is subsequent to Luther's.² He received the new doctrine from Luther. While his presentation of Christian doctrine and his entire conception of Christian life and the Church differ greatly from Luther's, the difference does not touch essentials. He was no creative genius like Luther; but his genius as a systematic theologian, exegete, and organiser was superb. In all these respects he undoubtedly ranks with the finest minds of the Church. While the substance of predestinarianism was Augustine's, its long reign in the modern world for good or evil was Calvin's work. The Presbyterian polity also was his creation. We might have expected him to take up and continue the work of Zwingli, but it was not so. Calvin had far more sympathy with

¹ *Institutio Religionis Christianæ*, Commentaries, etc.

² Luther, 1483-1546; Calvin, 1509-1564.

Luther than with Zwingli, despite his agreement with the latter on distinctive points of doctrine.¹ The intellectual cast of Zwingli would doubtless repel him, as Luther's more ethical and spiritual tone would be an attraction. From his day the influence of the Reformation takes two lines, distinct yet parallel, while the essential agreement is so great that it would be wrong to speak of Calvin as the head of a new Reformation. It is worth while to note the chief points in Calvin's system. We have the means of doing so in his *Institutes*, published first in 1536, and in complete form in 1559, one of the great theological treatises of the Church.² The last edition is the one we follow, but Calvin's doctrine was, generally speaking, completely developed in the edition of 1539. He changed far less than Luther and Melancthon.

Calvin, quite differently from Luther, puts first the divine authority of Scripture as the

¹ Zwingli's teaching left little mark on history.

² We follow mainly Dr. Seeberg's admirable outline, which again follows the order of the *Institutes*, p. 379. He says: "Calvin's influence on his Church as a theologian surpasses the corresponding influence of Melancthon, and even Luther; for we may say that his theology became the accepted doctrine of the Reformed Church—almost all later Confessions reproduce its forms. Calvin left behind no disputable coins like Melancthon, but also no unminted gold like Luther."

source and standard of doctrine. While he does not define inspiration, he affirms it in strong terms. "Scripture is the school of the Holy Spirit, in which, as nothing is passed over that is necessary and useful, so nothing is taught but what it is good to know." "No doctrine of faith can be established before we are convinced beyond doubt that its (Scripture's) author is God." God first revealed the law; "then followed the prophets through whom God published new oracles." "To these are added histories, which themselves are expositions of the prophets, but composed at the dictation of the Holy Spirit." Of the New Testament writers it is said, "They were trusty and authentic amanuenses of the Holy Spirit, and so their writings are to be regarded as divine oracles." The evidence for this doctrine is the witness of the Holy Spirit through Scripture to the reader's heart. This unique witness is the warrant of faith. The Reformed Creeds follow Calvin in his doctrine of Scripture, asserting inspiration in strong terms, and often enumerating the canonical books.¹ Calvin also endorses the early creeds as formulating Scripture teaching in opposition to heretics. He says: "I know how certain good-for-nothings make a noise in obscure corners that they may

¹ So *Westminster Confession* and *Thirty-nine Articles*.

show their cleverness in opposing divine truth. For they ask, Who can prove to us that the Scriptures called after Moses and the prophets were written by them? Moreover, they dare to raise the question whether Moses ever lived. But if anyone were to call in question whether Plato or Aristotle or Cicero ever lived, who would not say that such insanity deserves thrashing or whipping?" The legal strictness with which the form and text of Scripture have been invested in the Reformed Churches is in strong contrast with the free—not to say lax—treatment in Lutheranism. Calvin and Luther set the fashion to their followers on both lines.

The ruling idea in Calvin's conception of God is Almighty will; in Luther's it is love. He repudiates the charge of Stoic fatalism, since the latter rests on inexorable natural law. Christian faith refers everything that takes place to the determination of the divine will. "We make God the arbiter and ruler of all, seeing that in his wisdom he has decreed from eternity what he will do, and now by his power carries out what he decreed." Thus all that takes place in the natural world and in man's life goes back to God's eternal counsel. The immediate end is the good of man and the Church; the ultimate end is the revealing of God's glory. "Thus God

provided for our salvation in order that, not forgetting himself, he might in the first place be glorified; and so he founded the whole world for this end, that it might be the theatre of his glory." It follows that even the action of the wicked points back to God's will. Calvin rejects the thought of divine "permission" as frivolous. "Not only does he exert his power in the elect, who are ruled by the Holy Spirit, but he also compels the reprobate to do homage." Here is a great system of religious determinism. Redemption, the Church, the means of grace are simply means for executing the divine purpose. Still, in the interest of God's freedom, Calvin holds that God is not absolutely bound to the means he has appointed. He saves some apart from the ordinary means. "He has endowed many inwardly with true knowledge of himself by illumination of the Spirit, without any intervention of preaching." "The highest rule of justice is God's will, so that whatever he wills is to be deemed just simply because he wills. Where then it is asked why the Lord did so, the answer is, because he willed." Yet God is not above law (*exlex*), for his will is the "law of all laws." Accordingly the election of some and the rejection of others are to be absolutely referred to God's will.

Adam's sin consisted in disobedience. By God's ordination his sinful nature passed down to posterity; "from a rotten root rotten branches proceeded." "The contagion has not its cause in the substance of flesh or soul, but because it was so ordained by God that the first man should both possess and lose as well for himself as for them the gifts which God had conferred." Original sin is defined as "the hereditary depravity and corruption of our nature . . . which first subjects us to God's anger, and then brings forth works in us which Scripture calls works of the flesh." The whole man is corrupt; "from the crown of the head to the sole of the foot no spark of good can be found." Natural freedom of will remains, "not in the sense that man has equally free choice of good and evil, but that he does evil willingly, not by coercion." Natural powers remain, although corrupt; they are exercised in the course of daily life. Conscience is acknowledged as the organ of innate natural law, "graven by God on the minds of men." "It confronts us with the distinction of good and evil, and so accuses us, when we depart from duty." Calvin thus acknowledges a ground of natural morality and religion in man.

Prominent elements in the statement of Christ's work of redemption are the satisfaction

made to God and the appeasing of divine anger. The whole work of Christ is presented under the head of his threefold office, stress being laid on the prophetic and kingly as well as the priestly character. The atonement is the end of the incarnation, "that he might be a sacrifice to appease the Father for us." Calvin dismisses as "vague speculation" the notion of an incarnation apart from redemption. The ground of atonement is no "absolute necessity," but simply God's decree that it should be so. "He shed his sacred blood as the price of redemption, in order that both God's anger (*dei furor*), kindled against us, might be extinguished and our iniquity might be purged." The means by which Christ did this was his obedience, covering both his life and death. The condemnation due to our sin was borne by him. In bearing it "it behoved him to contend with the forces of hell and eternal death, so to speak in hand-to-hand conflict." Not only was his suffering bodily, "another greater and more excellent part of the price was that he bore in his soul the dire anguish of man condemned and lost." "By his death sin was done away and death extinguished; by his resurrection righteousness was restored and life established." The atonement applied only to the elect. The love of God is magnified as the source of the

atonement. None of the difficulties of the subject are dealt with.

The order of actual salvation, as stated by Calvin, is full of interest, being marked by greater clearness than either Luther's or Melancthon's teaching, and having been adopted by all the Reformed confessions. The starting-point is the union with Christ, the new head of the race. The union is effected by the gift to the elect of the Holy Spirit. "By the grace and power of the same Spirit we are made members of Christ, so that he includes us in himself, and we in turn possess him." Thus we are united with Christ by the Holy Spirit through faith. This is prepared for by an "initial fear," which is the result of the preaching of the law; but the connection at this point is not perfect. The effect of the gift of the Spirit is faith, which is clearly distinguished from historical knowledge and belief, and defined as a trust and confidence of the heart in Christ. It is called "a certain assured and secure possession of the things promised us by God"; "a firm and assured knowledge of God's goodwill towards us, founded on the truth of his free promise in Christ, and revealed and sealed to our minds and hearts by the Holy Spirit"; "a firm and solid reliance (*fiducia*) of the heart, by which we rest securely

in God's mercy promised to us in the gospel." It is not the "intrinsic power" of faith that saves, but the object of which faith lays hold—"Christ outside us."

The effect of faith is clearly described as two-fold—penitence and justification. Penitence is the beginning of regeneration, and consists both of "mortification of our flesh and the old man" and "a new life of the Spirit." This work of regeneration or sanctification is also the fruit of the union with Christ effected by faith. There is no interval of time between faith and penitence. The work of inner renewal is carried on in continual conflict to the end of life.

Then Calvin comes to define justification. Not that it follows regeneration. The two blessings are co-ordinate and coincident in time. Justification itself is clearly defined as forensic in nature—God's counting the sinner righteous for Christ's sake. "He is justified by faith who, being excluded from a righteousness of works, appears not as a sinner, but as righteous." It is "the acceptance, by which God regards as righteous those who are received into grace," and consists in remission of sins and the imputation of Christ's righteousness both active and passive. Our trust is not in our own inner righteousness, which is God's work, but in Christ's righteousness.

“To place our righteousness in Christ’s obedience, what is it but to assert that we are counted righteous solely because Christ’s obedience is accepted for us as if it were ours?” At the same time justification and regeneration are inseparable. “Would you obtain righteousness in Christ? First you must possess Christ. But you cannot possess him unless you partake in his holiness, because he cannot be divided. . . . Thus it is evident how true it is that we are not justified without works nor yet by works, because we are justified by a participation in Christ in which sanctification is no less contained than justification.” “We confess with Paul that no other faith justifies than faith which works by love, but does not borrow its justifying power from the efficacy of love.” Nothing could well be clearer than such statements. The “efficient cause” of salvation is God’s mercy; the “material cause,” Christ with his obedience; the “formal or instrumental cause,” faith.

On the subject of predestination there was great difference between Luther and Calvin. With Luther the doctrine was a subordinate one, and fell more and more into the background. With Calvin it was prominent,¹ and grew in

¹ Dr. Seeberg objects to the word “central,” because other doctrines were not based on it (p. 397).

importance. His statements are uncompromising. Reprobation is affirmed as strongly as election. The only reason assigned for the difference is God's absolute will. The lost have as little ground of complaint as animals have for not being created men. Predestination is defined as "the eternal decree by which God decided with himself what should become of every man. For all were not created on an equal basis (*pari conditione*), but eternal life was foreordained for some, eternal damnation for others. And so as each one was created for one or the other end, each one we say was predestinated either to life or death." Election is impossible without reprobation. As the former is grounded, not in foresight of faith or good works in man, but only in God's inscrutable will, so with the latter. "God not only foresaw the fall of the first man and the ruin of posterity in him, but also ordained (*dispensasse*) it by his free will" (*arbitrio suo*). All this is supposed to be necessary for the glory of God and the humbling of man. Even the perdition of the reprobate as much as the saving of the elect is for God's glory, *i.e.* for the glory of his justice. Verbally Calvin asserts that the fault of man's ruin is in himself. "Man therefore falls, God's providence so ordering, but he falls by his own fault." The whole theory is

closely connected with Calvin's conception of God as almighty power or will. It seems strange that he finds in the doctrine the ground of a believer's comfort and assurance of salvation. How the assurance is possible, unless the believer is first assured of his election, is not clear; and election can only be inferred from the possession of faith and similar marks. The gift of perseverance also is included in the decree of election.

The invisible Church is the total number of the elect, comprehending not only the saints dwelling on earth but all the elect who have lived from the beginning of the world. By instinct the elect are drawn to each other that the gifts which they have received may be shared by all. Hence arises the visible Church of the Word and sacraments. From the means of grace, which can never be ineffectual, we may infer the existence of a true Church. Calvin denounced sectarian separation from the Church. The duty of preaching and administration of ordinances and discipline was entrusted to certain definite officers. "As Christ's saving doctrine is the soul of the Church, so discipline forms its nerves." He speaks of doctrine, discipline, and the sacraments as necessary to the Church's safety. This constitution of the Church Calvin held to be divine.

Calvin's doctrine of the sacraments mediates between the Lutheran and Zwinglian. It makes the sacrament not merely a sign, like the Zwinglian, but a seal and pledge of grace. "An outward symbol, by which the Lord seals to our consciences his promises of goodwill toward us in order to support our weak faith, and we in turn testify devotion to him." It is a symbolic confirmation of the grace announced in the words of institution. It is also a sure pledge of grace. In and of itself the sacrament is just as little accompanied by God's Spirit as the Word. The Spirit follows Word and Sacrament; only where this "interior master" inwardly moves and illumines the heart do they bring grace to man. The predestination doctrine exerts its influence here. Only the predestinated receive anything through the sacrament.

Baptism is "instead of some signed document," and testifies to us the forgiveness of sins. It introduces us into communion with Christ, with his death and resurrection, in order to our "mortification and renewal." We are made partakers of all Christ's benefits. Unlike Zwingli, Calvin supposes a real working of God in the act. That working is not simply linked to the act, but accompanies it in the predestinated.

Besides saying that the Supper effects a real

spiritual fellowship with Christ, which is the food of the soul, and that it is a renewal of the covenant made by Christ's blood, Calvin affirms a real presence of Christ even in his bodily nature. "I say that in the mystery of the Supper by the symbols of bread and wine Christ is truly presented (*exhiberi*) to us and likewise his body and blood." It is not enough to speak of a spiritual fellowship with Christ; he has described his flesh and blood as actual food. Christ, coming from heaven, has infused life-giving power into his flesh, "in order that thence communication of life may flow to us." But how can the difficulty of space be overcome? By "the mysterious power of the Holy Spirit. What therefore our mind cannot comprehend faith conceives, namely, that the Spirit truly unites things separated in space." Yet what can this be but a spiritual presence, especially when we know that Calvin held to the figurative interpretation of the words of institution? He also rejected the notion of ubiquity. Christ's bodily presence is mediated to faith by the Spirit. "He is ever present to his people, breathing into them his own life, lives in them, supports, confirms, animates them, keeps them safe, *just as if he were present in body*; moreover, he feeds them with his body, the communion of which the Spirit by his power

pours into them. In this manner the body and blood of Christ are presented (*exhibetur*) to us in the sacrament." What is meant by the real spiritual presence of a body is not clear. The difference between Luther and Calvin is that one holds a bodily, the other a spiritual presence of Christ. Calvin says: "As distance of place seems to prevent the power of Christ's flesh coming to us, I solve the knot thus,—that Christ, although he does not change his place, descends to us by his power."¹ He speaks also of the believing recipient being elevated to Christ, evidently in a spiritual sense. Again: "There is a well-worn distinction in the schools, that although the whole Christ is everywhere yet the whole that is in him is not everywhere."

Calvin's sacramental doctrine passed into all the Reformed confessions—the Heidelberg Catechism (1563), the Helvetic (1566), Gallic (1559), Belgic (1566), Scottish (1560) creeds, the English Articles (1562), Westminster Confession (1646). The *Consensus Tigurinus* (1549) formulated the agreement between Calvin and Bullinger which united the Calvinist and Zwinglian doctrine, the influence of the former being predominant. The sacraments are signs of confession and remembrance. But they are not

¹ Loofs, p. 398.

empty signs ; God accompanies them with special influence. In the Supper the Christian really receives Christ with all spiritual gifts, which actually applies only to the elect. A bodily presence is rejected ; the words of institution are to be understood figuratively. The sacraments are "effectual signs of grace" (39 Articles). "He himself as certainly feeds my soul with his crucified body and shed blood unto eternal life as I receive the bread from the minister's hand" (*Heidelberg Catechism*). Believers "by the Holy Spirit perceive also the flesh and blood of the Lord and are fed by them unto eternal life" (*Helvetic Confession* 2). The body and blood are the food and drink of the soul, as bread and wine are of the body (*Gallic Confession*).

Nearly the whole of the Reformation was at first predestinarian. Lutheranism, as we have seen, never formally adopted the doctrine. Not so the Reformed Churches, which were far more aggressive ; they carried Calvin's doctrine into many lands. The voice of opposition was soon heard. Pighius, a Romanist divine of Utrecht, sharply attacked the doctrine in a work on *Man's Free Will and Divine Grace* in 1542, arguing that it overthrows morality and responsibility, Calvin replying in a treatise on Free Will. Bolsec also at Geneva referred all salvation to

grace, but opposed election; he held that free will in man was not destroyed but only injured and depraved by sin. Even the Reformed Creeds for the most part taught predestination in a more or less mild form. Only the *Geneva Consensus* (1552), which was Calvin's own work, asserted supra-lapsarianism, which included the Fall in the divine decree. The *Tetrapolitana* and the *Heidelberg Catechism* were silent on the subject. The Anglican Articles, *Basel* i., *Helvetic* i. and ii., use general terms. Even the *Scottish*, *Gallic*, and *Belgic*, which come nearest to Calvin, are not extreme. The *Helvetic*, while teaching the doctrine, adds: "Nevertheless good hope should be cherished respecting all men, and no one should be rashly numbered with the reprobate;" and again: "If thou believest and art in Christ, hold without doubt that thou art elect." The *Westminster Confession* uses stronger terms; yet here the doctrine is applied to support the assurance of salvation. The extreme supra-lapsarian form was held by writers of the next generation, like Beza, Peter Martyr, Musculus, Zanchius.

The doctrine was definitely formulated at the synod of Dordrecht (Dort), in Holland (November 13, 1618, to May 9, 1649), the most influential council ever held on Protestant ground. The

occasion was the teaching of Arminius, Professor at Leyden (1603–1609), in opposition to Franz Gomarus, his colleague, a supra-lapsarian Calvinist. The protest of Arminius and his adherents was embodied in a document known as the *Remonstrance*, whence Arminians got the name of Remonstrants. Their position was that God's decree of salvation was conditional on man's faith in Christ; this faith is not the result of man's free will simply, but of free will under the influence of grace; the continuance of good in man also is dependent on grace, but grace does not work irresistibly. It was against this teaching that the decisions of the council were directed. Deputies attended from all the lands of the Reformation, England and Scotland included. The following are the chief points affirmed. They are of importance because they were generally accepted as the final form of the doctrine in the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Britain, and several German States. They are on infra-lapsarian lines.¹ God chose a definite number of human beings in Christ to salvation, leaving the rest to destruction. The election is carried out in Christ's mission, effectual calling, the gift of faith, justification, sanctification, glorification.

¹ Only Gomarus was definitely supra-lapsarian. See Seeberg, p. 413; Dorner, *ibid.* i. 426.

The subjective assurance of salvation is derived from experience of the fruits of grace, such as faith, fear of God, sorrow for sin, hunger and thirst after righteousness. God's work in saving men is therefore simply the realising of predestination. Christ's satisfaction, which in itself is of infinite value, only effects the redemption of the elect. Hence God accompanies the calling through the Word with the Holy Spirit and regenerating grace. This regeneration is a miraculous act of God, not the result of moral conviction, nor yet giving man a mere possibility of conversion: "so that all those, in whose hearts God works in this wonderful way, are certainly, infallibly, and effectually regenerated, and really (*actu*) believe." Yet it is asserted that the ruin of others is due to their unwillingness. "As many as are called, are called in earnest" (*serio vocantur*). How this is true is not shown. The salvation of the elect is placed beyond doubt by the gift of perseverance. Although they may fall into grievous sin, and so for a time lose the sense of God's favour, God by his indwelling Spirit will prevent their final falling away, which would frustrate the divine decree.

While this development made no change in the substance of the doctrine, it made a great change in its relation to other doctrines. Even

in Calvin's day predestination was used rather as a ground of Christian assurance, and so stood in the second line. Now it was made fundamental. Formerly the order was first justification, then predestination; now the order is reversed (Seeberg).

An effort to soften the doctrine was made by a French divine, Moses Amyraldus, of Saumur, in his treatise on Predestination (1634). First, as the will follows the understanding, he supposed that effectual grace acted on the understanding, and so on the will, making the action of grace psychologically more intelligible. Secondly, he taught a "hypothetical" universalism, namely, that besides the revelation of grace in Christ there is also a partial one in nature and history, the fruit of the atonement. But neither this universal revelation nor the teaching of the gospel in themselves bring salvation to man; this depends on election. It is hard to see how this second position softens the harshness of reprobation; the limited election still remains. The reprobate are made to reject a general as well as a special revelation; but they could never have accepted the one or the other. Two French National Synods (1637 and 1645) did not condemn the teaching of Amyraldus; Camero, a divine of Montauban († 1625)

accepted it. The *Formula Consensus Helvetica*¹ (composed by Heidegger, 1675) was written to condemn it. We thus see how the predestinarian doctrine became more and more rigid as time went on. It does not seem necessary to follow the reaction which took place in the form of Socinianism.² The Arminian development belongs to a later period (Grotius, † 1645; Episcopius, † 1643; Curcellæus, † 1659; Limborch, † 1711; Leclerc, † 1736). The best evidence of the strength of predestinarianism and the hold which it took of religious thought is the length of time it has taken to bring about its dissolution. Its disappearance was the work less of the great Arminian divines just mentioned than of the Evangelical Revival in England in the eighteenth century and of the general progress of thought.

¹ Different from the two Helvetic Confessions. This last Confession affirmed the inspiration even of the consonants and vowels in the Hebrew text of the Old Testament.

² Dorner, *ibid.* i. 427.

CHAPTER VII

THE COUNTER REFORMATION IN DOCTRINE

THE teaching of the Council of Trent (1545–1563) forms the dogmatic basis of modern Romanism. In it the Roman Church defined its attitude both to the doctrine of the Middle Ages and the Reformation. Of the first it was an endorsement. Apart from modifications of detail the mediæval system was adopted and formally sanctioned as part and parcel of Christianity. To the Reformation the attitude of the Council was one of point-blank antagonism. Many of the doctrinal definitions are direct contradictions of Protestant doctrine; the teaching of the Reformers was in the mind of the framers of the definitions. Here there was no compromise. There is abundance of compromise in the definitions and decrees;¹ but it is compromise between different schools in the Roman

¹ Quite as much as or more than in any Protestant creed (Harnack, vii. 61, 71).

Church. The Middle Ages had bequeathed a multitude of questions which were eagerly debated between different schools and orders. The Franciscans and Dominicans took opposite sides on most questions. Augustine's teaching on sin, grace, election, free will had both supporters and opponents in the Church. All these questions were settled—some finally, others provisionally. The decisions of the Council cover the entire field of doctrine. They form a complete and authoritative interpretation of Christianity as the Roman Church understands it. The ability and diplomatic skill displayed were very great. Members of the Jesuit Order played a conspicuous part as the advocates of the most extreme views of doctrine and polity, showing consummate art in accommodating mediæval doctrines to modern conditions.¹ Moderate views found representatives at the Council,² as there had long been desires for and attempts at reformation within the Church. But reaction carried the day. The authorities for the teaching of the Council are the Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent,

¹ Loyola and Calvin were fellow-students in Paris.

² Such as Contarini, Sanfelice, bishop of Cava, Seripando, General of the Augustines, Archbishop Bandini of Siena. They were outnumbered and overpowered by more extreme men.

the *Professio Fidei Tridentinæ* (1564), and the *Roman Catechism* (1566).

Not the least important change made by the Council was the recognition of the authority of Church Tradition as on a level with Scripture. Practically no doubt Tradition had long been so regarded in the Church. But, in words at least, mediæval divines always treated Scripture as the supreme authority. Face to face with Luther's constant demand for Scripture proof, Roman controversialists became conscious of their inability to meet the challenge. The Council receives the Scriptures and Traditions "with equal reverence" (*pari pietatis affectu*); the former have God for their author, the latter were "dictated by Christ or the Holy Spirit." Opposition was raised in the Council against this momentous step, but in vain. Not only so, but Scripture is virtually, although not formally, subordinated to Church Tradition, for it is declared to be "the office of holy Mother Church to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures." The Vulgate is endorsed as the authentic translation. The Old Testament Apocrypha are also accepted. The *Professio Fidei Tridentinæ* says: "I most firmly accept and embrace the apostolical and ecclesiastical traditions and other observances and regulations

of the same Church. I also accept Holy Scripture according to that sense, which holy Mother Church held and holds, whose office it is to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, nor will I ever accept and interpret it save according to the unanimous consent of the Fathers."

The following are the chief points in the doctrine of Original Sin (Session 5). The first man lost the righteousness which belonged to him in Paradise, and so fell under God's wrath. The whole man was changed for the worse in soul and body. While free will was not destroyed, it was weakened and perverted (*inclinatum*). Adam's guilt passed over to the entire race. As sin is transmitted by birth, not imitation, human means cannot deliver from it. Even children can only be cleansed from inherited sin by the regeneration of baptism. Concupiscence remains which, although sometimes called sin by the apostle, according to the doctrine of the Church is "not truly and properly sin, but springs from sin (*ex peccato est*) and inclines to sin." These definitions do not apply to the Virgin Mary.

Immense trouble was taken on the subject of Justification, the central doctrine of the Reformation (Session 6). According to the historian Sarpi, about a hundred sessions were spent on it.

This is not strange, for there was no doctrine on which there was greater diversity of opinion in the Middle Ages. Three points were in question — (1) how justification is obtained; (2) how it is kept; (3) how, when lost, it is recovered. On the first point discussion went on two lines. According to the view of Thomas Aquinas, which finally prevailed, forgiveness depends on a previous communication of grace; according to the Scotist view forgiveness precedes the infusion of grace. The latter, it will be seen, looks towards Protestant doctrine. The advocates of the one view said: "God first infuses grace, then remits sin;" the advocates of the other: "The imputation of Christ in us prevents the imputing of sin, but does not justify; but God justifies us after remission of sin, and justification is not remission." There were also some who had a more direct sympathy with evangelical teaching, without being evangelical (p. 234). There were differences of opinion as to the relations of divine influence and human freedom in the work of grace. The Thomists denied that there could be assurance of salvation without special revelation; the Scotists affirmed that it was possible on the ground of receiving the sacraments and the keeping of God's commands. The following was the final result.

Preparation for justification begins with prevenient grace, which includes the divine calling and help. Man freely assents to and co-operates with that grace. Yet the calling is without any "existing merits." The result is faith that those things are true which are divinely revealed and promised, especially that God will justify the sinner through grace in Christ. Fear of the divine justice thus gives way to faith in the divine mercy. Now begins love to Christ as the fountainhead of righteousness, as well as a certain hate and detestation of sin and the purpose to lead a new life. On this preparation follows justification itself, which is thus defined: "Not remission of sins alone, but also the sanctification and renewal of the inward man by voluntary reception of the grace and gifts by which man from being unrighteous becomes righteous." "That men are justified either by imputation of righteousness alone or by remission of sins alone, to the exclusion of the grace and love which are shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy Ghost and dwell in them, or that the grace by which we are justified is God's favour only," is expressly denied. It will be seen in what sense "to the exclusion" must be understood in the allusion to Protestant doctrine. Thus justification consists in the renewing of the inner

man, which takes place by baptism. Forgiveness, faith, hope, and love are imparted at the same time. Paul's words "by faith" are explained by saying that "faith is the foundation and root of all justification." "Freely" is said to mean that the faith preceding justification along with works does not merit grace; "without works" is passed by in silence.

The gift of justification is preserved by keeping the commandments and by good works, by which growth is secured. "By keeping the commandments of God and the Church they grow in the righteousness received through Christ's grace, faith co-operating with good works, and are justified more and more" (*magis justificantur*). Justification is, no doubt, an instantaneous act, but the state which it initiates is capable of growth. If the justified man falls into venial sin, he does not thereby cease to be righteous. No one can be sure of his predestination. The spirit of the Christian life is one of fear. "With fear and trembling let them work out their salvation in labours, vigils, alms, in prayers and offerings, in fasts and purity, for they ought to fear, knowing that the regenerate have attained to the hope of glory and not yet to glory." "To one who reads these sentences," says Dr. Seeberg, "in their impressive context it

is as if no Augustine had ever lived in the Western Church. The decree moves practically in the piety of Cyprian with its fear and legal observance." The moral life is ruled by the idea of merit. No doubt it is said that these merits, because produced by the power of Christ in the members of his body and proceeding from inherent righteousness, are God's gifts. But "the good works of a justified man" are also "merits of the justified man himself," and as such merit eternal life.

By mortal sin, not by unbelief merely, the grace of justification is lost. It may be recovered by penance,¹ not simply by faith; penance consists of contrition, confession, absolution, and works of satisfaction. Absolution takes away the spiritual penalty, works of satisfaction the temporal. Thus the Christian life is placed, in the mediæval spirit, under the law of penance.

The seventh Session dealt with the Sacraments. The general agreement on the subject is indicated by the fact that there is no defining decree; opposing doctrines are simply condemned in authoritative canons. Thomists and Scotists differed on such points as whether sacraments contain grace, or are merely signs which God

¹ "A second plank after shipwreck."

accompanies with grace, and also respecting the "indelible character" imparted in sacraments. It is decided that they contain grace in accordance with Thomist doctrine. The seven sacraments were instituted by Christ, they are necessary to salvation, they act *ex opere operato*. Three of them (baptism, confirmation, ordination) imprint an indelible character, the intention of the minister is necessary, "they confer grace on those who oppose no obstacle." "Through the sacraments all true righteousness either begins, or begun grows, or lost is restored."

Baptism by heretics is valid, "if performed with the intention of doing what the Church does." Baptism does not exempt from keeping the law of Christ and the precepts of the Church. Anathema is pronounced on those who say that Confirmation is no true sacrament, or that a simple priest, not a bishop only, can perform it.

The doctrine of the Supper is considered in the thirteenth Session. Under the species of the elements Christ the God-man is "really and substantially" present. While he sits at the right hand of God "as to his natural mode of existence," this does not preclude another mode which we cannot express in words, but can conceive as possible, by which Christ, "present

sacramentally in many other places, is present with us in his own substance." By consecration "a conversion of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of Christ's body" takes place. The term "transubstantiation" is used. The whole Christ is present under the form of the bread and in every part of this form. Whereas in other sacraments the sanctifying power exists only in the moment of use, here it exists before the partaking, because the Lord called the bread his body before the disciples received it. Hence "the worship of latria due to the true God" is claimed for the sacramental host. The blessing received is the forgiveness of venial sins and preservation from mortal sins. The opposite doctrines are laid under anathema. In the twenty-first Session the practice of withdrawing the cup from the laity is approved and defended on the ground of the power of the Church to decide such questions, and because Christ's whole humanity must be present in the flesh.

Session 22 affirms the Sacrifice of the Mass. The Mass is said both to represent the sacrifice of the cross and to continue and repeat it. It can scarcely do both. If even the first Supper was a sacrifice, why the crucifixion? The same Christ, it is said, who offered himself

on the cross, is offered in the Mass. The only difference is one of form (*sola offerendi ratione diversa*). By this offering God is reconciled, bestowing grace, the gift of penitence and forgiveness. It avails also for the dead. Masses in honour of the saints, private masses, mixing the wine with water, ceremonies and vestments, modulations of the voice, are approved. All deviations are condemned. Here the practice of the Middle Ages was emphatically endorsed. The work of Christ was put into the hand of the priests of the Church.

The sacrament of Penance, so essential a part of Roman practice, is treated at length in Session 14. Christ instituted it (John 20²²) in order to forgiveness in the case of those who have lost baptismal grace. Its centre is priestly absolution, the conditions of which are *contrition*, *confession*, and *satisfaction*. The fruit is reconciliation with God, which is "occasionally" followed, "in good men and those receiving the sacrament with devotion," by "peace of conscience and serenity along with great consolation of spirit." *Contrition* includes sorrow for sin along with purpose to amend. It must be united "with trust in the divine mercy and the vow to fulfil all other conditions." Attrition is "imperfect contrition," and is useful as preparing for

contrition. *Confession* to the priest must be circumstantial. The priest has not merely the "ministry of declaring sin to be remitted; but in the form of a judicial act by which judgment is pronounced by him as by a judge." Works of *satisfaction*, imposed by the priest, are meant first to restrain from sin, then to make the sinner like Christ, "since by making satisfaction we suffer for sin"; thirdly, to make expiation; it is added that "all our sufficiency" comes from Christ's satisfaction. Also the patient bearing of the temporal chastisements sent by God is of the nature of satisfaction. The canons add anathemas on opposing opinions, such as that contrition of itself leads to hypocrisy, that detailed sacramental confession is not of divine right, that priestly absolution is not a judicial act, that Matt. 16¹⁹ and John 20²³ give the power of absolution to all Christians, that satisfactions are only traditions of men, that it is a fiction to suppose that after the abrogation of eternal penalties "temporal penalty very often remains to be discharged," etc.

The twenty-fifth Session treats of Indulgences. But all that was done was to affirm their lawfulness and usefulness, while warning against abuse and counselling moderation. Purgatory is treated in the same cursory way. The

common notions and practice are simply affirmed. Extreme Unction (Session 14) is said to abolish remaining sin and to strengthen and cheer the heart.

The sacrament of Ordination (Session 23) was instituted by Christ, who thus gave the apostles and their successors "the power of offering and ministering his body and blood and also of remitting and retaining sin." The priesthood and diaconate are said to be named in Scripture, the other offices have come down from the beginning of the Church. Since according to Scripture, apostolic tradition, and the unanimous consent of the Fathers, grace is imparted by ordination, it is without doubt to be reckoned one of the sacraments. The general priesthood of Christians is rejected, not all have the same "spiritual authority," priests are distinguished from laymen by more than "temporary authority." The hierarchy exists "by divine appointment." Bishops are superior to presbyters, the sacraments of confirmation and ordination "and many other things" being reserved to them.

In Session 24 the sacrament of Matrimony is described in general terms. Christian marriage being superior to pre-Christian, it must be numbered among the sacraments. The canons treat of different points of ecclesiastical law, for-

bid clerics and monks to marry, and condemn those who say that "it is not better and more blessed to remain in virginity or celibacy than to be joined in matrimony."

At the time of the Council two theories of the constitution of the Church were held—the Episcopal and the Papal.¹ According to the first the bishops derived their authority directly from Christ—as successors of the apostles they were vicars of Christ, the Pope was only the highest vicar of Christ; according to the second they derive their authority from the Pope and only indirectly from Christ. The difference was great. The episcopal theory was the old and prevailing one, and was strongly held; the bishops were naturally unwilling to part with their independence. But many circumstances favoured the other theory—the influence of the Papal court, the logic of the situation, and the need of unity of action. Two separate traditions had come down from earlier days—the independence of the bishops as successors of the apostles, and the authority of the Pope as successor of Christ. How to reconcile them was a difficult question. The Papal court desired to press the question to decision; but so many differences of opinion arose that it was thought wiser to abstain from

¹ Called sometimes Episcopatism and Curialism.

all action. The time was not ripe. This final step was reserved for the Vatican Council three centuries later.

The *Roman Catechism* and the *Profession of Tridentine Faith*, written and published at the instance of Pius v. and Pius iv. respectively, teach more advanced doctrine respecting the Papal power. According to the former all the power of the clerical order is concentrated in the Pope. "One is the ruler and governor of the Church, the invisible Christ; but the visible one is he who holds the Roman chair of Peter as lawful successor of the Prince of apostles." Christ, who rules the Church, "appointed a man as vicar and minister of his own power; for, since the visible Church needs a visible head, our Saviour made Peter the head and pastor of the whole race of the faithful." The *Profession* says: "I vow and swear true obedience to the Roman Pontiff, the successor of blessed Peter, Prince of Apostles and Vicar of Jesus Christ." The Gallican party long maintained episcopal authority against papalism.

The great significance of the Council of Trent is that it gave the Roman Church in its compact system of doctrine and polity a unity it never had before. All its essential principles were taken out of the region of pious opinion and

made matter of faith. An uncompromising front was offered to Protestantism. Tradition, sacraments as the only channels of grace, priestly mediation, ascetic ideals of life were stamped with the seal of divine authority. Despite the inconsistencies, contradictions, compromises which abound in its teaching, the Council marks an era in Church history—the conclusion of one long course of development and the beginning of another. “Mediæval theology was raised into Church doctrine. . . . The anathemas of the Tridentine Canons made Protestant teaching in its entire extent heresy, as the Decrees raised mediæval teaching into dogma” (Seeberg).

The Jesuit Order has always declared against Augustine’s predestinarianism just as earnestly as it has declared for his doctrine of Church unity and authority. The most memorable attempt to revive predestinarianism in the modern Roman Church was that of the Jansenists of Port-Royal. Jansenius († 1638), bishop of Ypres, in Holland, aimed at simply reproducing Augustine’s doctrine.¹ His teaching was adopted and advocated by the heads of the abbey of Port-Royal, near Paris. Anton Arnauld and Blaise Pascal were the leading writers who

¹ *Augustinus seu Doctrina Augustini*; see Harnack, vii. 94. Jansen is a sort of Catholic Calvin.

sought to strike down Semi-Pelagianism and Jesuitism at one blow. Five propositions, taken from Jansen's book, were condemned in a Papal bull (1663), and after many fluctuations of fortune, in 1710 Port-Royal was destroyed.

The Semi-Pelagian tendencies of the Roman Church favoured the raising of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary into a Church dogma. This was done by Pius IX. in a bull dated December 8, 1854. The doctrine had long been the subject of discussion as a private opinion, on which theologians were divided.¹ The definition runs: "We declare, pronounce, and define that the doctrine, which holds that the most blessed Virgin Mary, in the first instant of her conception was, by the singular favour and privilege of Almighty God, in view of the merits of Christ Jesus, the Saviour of the human race, kept from all taint of original guilt, has been revealed by God, and is therefore to be firmly and constantly believed by all the faithful."

The crown was put on the Roman hierarchy at the, still unfinished, Vatican Council of 1870, by the definition of the Pope's personal infallibility. A long controversy was thus decided in

¹ Anselm, Bernard, Aquinas, Alexander Hales, Bonaventura against, Duns Scotus for. The Franciscans for, the Dominicans against.

favour of the Roman court. In the days of Louis XIV. the "Declaration of the Clergy of France"¹ had formulated the Gallican principles as follows:—1. The power of Peter and his successors extends only to spiritual things; in temporal things princes are not subject to spiritual authority. 2. While full authority in spiritual things belongs to the Pope, the decrees of Constance respecting the authority of General Councils, which had been acknowledged by the Popes and the whole Church, hold good. 3. Only those rules, customs, and ordinances which are accepted by the government and Gallican Church have force. 4. "In questions of faith also the functions of the chief Pontiff are supreme, and his decrees apply to each and every church, and yet his judgment is not unalterable, unless the consent of the Church has been added" (*nec tamen irreformabile esse judicium, nisi ecclesiæ consensus accesserit*). The Declaration was of course condemned at Rome, and Louis did not venture to maintain it without qualification. Napoleon bartered away the Gallican liberties to the Pope for political ends. A similar struggle went on in Germany. The great bishops there, while acknowledging the Papal primacy, tried to save some measure of episcopal inde-

¹ Mirbt, *Quellen zur Gesch. des Papstthums*, p. 209.

pendence. But the Popes never relaxed their claims, and availed themselves of every opportunity given by political changes and emergencies to enforce them. A number of able French writers supported them on high grounds of abstract theory. De Maistre said: "If it were permitted to set up degrees of importance in things of divine institution, I would put the hierarchy before dogma; so indispensable is it to the maintenance of the faith." Men like Montalembert, Lamennais, Lacordaire were the last combatants on the other side.

On July 18, 1870, the decree passed the Council with only two dissentients out of 535 bishops present; the long Jesuit agitation triumphed; Pius IX. had his wish. Many leading bishops absented themselves, but afterwards accepted the decision. It looks as if the conflict had lain chiefly between the leading prelates and the Pope, and as if the rank and file of the episcopate preferred subjection to the latter. The following are the chief heads of the fateful decree. Christ placed Peter at the head of the apostles, in order to secure unity in the episcopate and among believers. "Primacy of jurisdiction over the whole Church" was given directly and immediately by Christ to Peter, and to him alone. It is against Scripture to say that the

primacy is not given immediately and directly to blessed Peter, but to the Church, and through it to him as a minister of the Church. This power was transmitted by Peter to his successors. The Pope is therefore to be acknowledged as "the true Vicar of Christ and Head of the whole Church, and father and teacher of all Christians." To him belongs the actual "power of jurisdiction." In all things affecting faith and morals, the discipline and government of the Church, everyone is bound to direct obedience to the ordinances of the Pope. "This is the doctrine of the Catholic truth, from which no one can deviate without danger to faith and salvation." The Pope is the supreme Judge of believers; it is wrong to appeal from his judgment to a Council as a higher authority. This power was given to Peter and his successors. "Therefore, with the approbation of the holy Council, we teach and declare that it is a dogma of divine revelation, that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedra* (i.e. when in the exercise of his office as pastor and doctor of all Christians, by his supreme apostolic authority he defines doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the whole Church), by the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, is endowed with the infallibility with which the

divine Redeemer willed his Church to be furnished in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals; and therefore the definitions of the same Roman Pontiff are unalterable *of themselves, and not through consent of the Church*.¹ And if anyone shall presume to contradict this our definition, which God forbid, let him be anathema." The qualification "ex cathedra" is important, and still more the qualification, "when defining doctrine concerning faith or morals," although it must be said again that the decision on these points is in the Pope's hands. Even on the Roman theory of the Church, the function of General Councils, which played so great a part in early days, is superseded; they become mere advisers or servants of the Pope. One wonders what the Fathers of Nicæa and Chalcedon would have said to such a claim on the part of the Roman Bishop. In later days we know what doctors of the Roman Church itself — Gregory the Great, Bernard, Bossuet — would have said.

¹ "Irreformabiles ex sese, non autem ex consensu ecclesiæ," *i.e.* the unalterableness depends on their own nature, and does not require the consent of the Church (Seeberg, p. 454).

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

1. THE survey we have made shows that, despite the great divisions of doctrine in the Church, a thread of continuity unites past and present. The two greatest divisions have been, first, the one between Romanism and Protestantism; and secondly, the one, on Protestant ground, between Predestinarians and Arminians. In regard to both a great amount of unity exists.

As to the first, while the Church of Rome is identical in principle with the Church of the Middle Ages, it represents a great improvement on that Church in many respects. Great abuses have been cleared away; monstrous claims are a dead letter. Anyone who compares the modern Church of Rome with the mediæval one will see that an immense reform has taken place both in teaching and practice. Although at the Reformation no such break with the

past took place in the Roman Church as we should have desired, a powerful check was placed on the growth of corruption, and the force of that restraint has grown with time. Rome owes much to the Reformation, which it bans and persistently vilifies. For the truth's sake, which is dearer to us than all schools and parties, we rejoice in the improvement. No intelligent Protestant, who wishes to retain his heritage in the past of Christianity, will be slow to acknowledge that even the great accretions of mediævalism have not utterly neutralised or buried the fundamental Christian truths in the Roman Church. In the war against the materialist and pantheist tendencies of the day, against rationalist efforts to reduce Christianity to scientific moralism, in defence of theism, of Trinitarianism, of the gospel of atonement, of written revelation, Romanists and Protestants are allies, not enemies. It is interesting to find so stout a defender of Calvinist Protestantism as Dr. Kuyper recognising this. In a recent work on "Calvinism,"¹ he says: "In this conflict Rome is not an antagonist, but stands on our side, inasmuch as she also recognises and maintains the Trinity, the Deity of Christ, the Cross as an atoning sacrifice, the Scriptures as the Word of

¹ T. & T. Clark.

God, and the Ten Commandments as a divinely imposed rule of life" (p. 251). Calvin at least was accustomed to appeal to Thomas of Aquino.

As to the great Protestant division, it is difficult for us to understand the intense bitterness awakened by the controversy in the past, especially when we remember that the root questions involved are insoluble. Probably the limitation of the area of controversy had something to do with this. The conflict was fought mainly on the ground of Scripture. It is now seen more clearly that the underlying question is the world-old debate between necessity and freedom. In practical life the problem settles itself. Even if there were no reply to the theoretical argument for necessity, we act as if we were free. The restriction of the controversy to the schools is a gain. The hard dogmatism of the past has disappeared. All the other divisions of Protestant Christendom are insignificant in comparison. The breaches of centuries are being healed.

2. The Middle Ages supply an instructive lesson on the value of the external unity which from Augustine's days has been extolled as a primary essential of the Church. Then the unity existed; it was unbroken for centuries. Yet, to say nothing of the means by which it

was enforced, it did not prevent strife and controversy as bitter and wasteful as any in modern days. It is not easy to see the difference between division and dissension carried on under the shelter of a common name, and difference of opinion and practice between separate communities. There is immeasurably more of the spirit of mutual tolerance, sympathy, charity, more of "the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace," in the Church now than in mediæval days.

3. Critical historians of our day complain loudly that the Reformation was left unfinished, that its principles were not carried out to their logical conclusion, and especially that there is contradiction between the early evangelical teaching of Luther and his later dogmatic position. Professor Loofs says that with the *Formula of Concord* "the doctrinaire petrifying of Reformation ideas came to completion" (p. 416). Both he and Professor Harnack argue at great length that in taking up a definite doctrinal position the Reformation reverted to the old Catholic type (Loofs pp. 341, 421). Harnack speaks as if the Reformation of necessity involved the dissolution of dogma in every shape. "In Luther's Reformation the old dogmatic Christianity was discarded, and a new evangel-

ical view substituted for it." "The history of dogma was brought to an end." "It set up the evangelical faith in place of dogma" (vii. 227 f.). Why the "evangelical faith" itself should not be expressed in dogmatic form is by no means clear. The same writers dwell emphatically on Luther's "retention of old Catholic postulates and dogmas." The elaborate criticism of Professor Harnack, especially in vol. vii., seems to imply a radical inconsistency between "evangelical faith" and definite teaching.

To say the least, there is great exaggeration in these representations. So far as the course of events in Lutheranism is concerned, the rise of creeds sprang from similar causes to those which operated in the case of the creeds of the early Church. Luther, Melancthon, and their successors were confronted with misstatements and errors, which they were bound to meet with explanation and defence. Our critics find it convenient to ignore the differences between the use and abuse of dogma. Dogmatism was undoubtedly carried to excess in the Lutheranism of the seventeenth century; but this is no argument against the creeds of the sixteenth century. We venture to think that the "doctrinaire" teaching is on the part of those who argue as if Church life were possible without a common standard of

faith on essential points. If common action in ordinary life is impossible without a common understanding as to principles and aims, if it is right in science to boast of its precise definitions and rules, how should the same thing be wrong in religious life? How are common worship and work in the kingdom of God possible without agreement in essential ideas? The question ought not to need argument in our days. The advocates of "undogmatic" Christianity and Churches have human nature and history against them. So far from a Church succeeding on such a basis, it will never move a step any more than a machine will move without motive power. Correct what is excessive and strained in dogma, but to do without it in some form is impossible. It is quite true that "pure doctrine" was made by the Reformers the first mark of the true Church, but it was not made the only mark. And it is difficult for us to see that they were wrong. Dr. Seeberg says wisely: "From the idea of faith, 'doctrine' and 'dogma' follow. The evangelical Church as such can never sink into 'undogmatic Christianity' without losing itself. But in holding fast thereto the Church must act in the spirit of Luther. 1. The dogma which it preaches and which guides its preaching must be evangelical doctrine; its doctrines must

flow from the redemption in Christ and have their goal in faith in Christ, from faith to faith.

2. Evangelical Christendom must always work at its dogma, always being ready to test and improve it by the revelation of God in Scripture.
3. The evangelical Church highly prizes a free theology, because it sees that in the Church of pure doctrine theology is called to exercise a vital function" (p. 456).

We cannot but think that there is even greater exaggeration in much that is written about Luther's "retention of Catholic dogmas." As we have seen, the most serious case is in regard to the doctrine of the sacraments, but we know no other of equal importance. Set against this the revolution in the case of other doctrines. Really the gravamen of the charge is in the Reformers holding the necessity of a doctrinal test in the Church at all. This is the chief evidence given by Professor Loofs in the chapter headed as above (p. 341). The accusation is supported by Professor Harnack with similar evidence (vii. 239-250). Because Luther in discarding mediæval dogma did not discard all dogma, because in rejecting what he held to be false tests he did not reject all tests, he is charged with self-contradiction, as if there were no middle course. The charge brought by these

critics of undermining and dissolving all guarantees for truth is the very charge brought by Roman controversialists, so true is it that extremes often meet. None will rejoice more to find such charges brought by Protestant writers than Roman opponents.

Yet another test. We have seen the "evangelical faith" of Luther's early teaching pitted against the later dogmatic statements. That faith included the evangelical doctrines of sin, atonement, incarnation, Trinity, justification, divine revelation. Luther held tenaciously to these doctrines as the doctrines of Scripture and especially of Paul and John. How tenaciously he held to them may be estimated from his obstinate adherence to sacramental doctrine in opposition to Zwingli. Would our modern critics accept the doctrines apart from the dogmas, the early Luther apart from the later one? There is nothing to indicate that they would, but much the other way. For anything that appears they differ as much from the doctrines which Luther held dearer than life as from the dogmatic utterances of the later creeds. Is it not simply throwing dust in our eyes to write as if the only quarrel were with dogma and creed, when it is really with the doctrines which the Reformers admittedly held in common

with the apostles of the Lord? It is not the authority of Protestant dogma that is in question but the authority of Scripture teaching. No Protestant contends that dogma is essential. It has its rise in some need of a particular age, and has therefore to a great extent a merely temporary value. It is the human, and therefore imperfect, expression of eternal truth. No creeds are the essence of the faith. If the proposal in the present case were to go back from Lutheran, Nicene, Athanasian forms to Paul's and John's interpretation of Christ, or to the combined gospel of Christ and his apostles, we might acquiesce. "What then is Apollos? And what is Paul? Ministers through whom ye believed." But here the doctrines which Luther and Paul regarded as the heart of the Christian gospel of salvation are as little accepted as Church dogmas. The same free criticism is applied to them. The Reformers are condemned for having taught them on the ground of divine authority. For such a sacrifice we are not prepared. To the form of Church doctrine current in any particular age we are comparatively indifferent; to its substance we are irrevocably committed.

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